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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays related to bankruptcy.  In the first we explore 
how institutional investors trade shares of bankrupt firms five years prior to the firms 
petitioning for Chapter 11 reorganization.  In the second we investigate whether or not 
institutional ownership is related to performance of distressed firms as they attempt to 
reorganize.  Another main theme of this essay is to examine whether or not institutional 
managers who acquire shares of bankrupt firms within three months from Chapter 11 filings, 
during bankrupt firms’ reorganization, or shortly after bankruptcy proceedings possess ability 
to process information and to predict successful recovery of distressed firms by acquiring their 
undervalued shares in advance of improved share performance.  The third essay explores 
changes in market and operating performances of merged bankrupt and distressed firms, 
analyzes whether or not distressed firms should pursue mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as an 
alternative to filing for Chapter 11, and evaluates how institutional investors trade shares of 
the firms that are about to be acquired.  The main focus of the dissertation is to analyze how 
various market players behave as they face consequences of investing in, dealing with, or 
operating alongside the firms experiencing financial and/or operating difficulties that lead to 
filing for bankruptcy.  In these three essays we intend to explore topics that have not 
previously been studied and presented in the finance literature. 
In the first essay, we utilize a probability model to analyze institutions’ propensity to 
start selling shares of failing firms at some point during the five-year period preceding 
bankruptcy filings.  We develop modifications of the Seyhun and Bradley (1997) 
methodology to analyze how much investment behavior of institutional investors resembles 
that of corporate insiders and partition our sample based on the size of trades to determine the 
magnitude of the results for each trading group.  To address the issues of endogeneity and 
selection bias we use a standard two-stage Heckman model.  We find that during the five-year 
period preceding a bankruptcy filing institutional investors (except those managing investment 
  
companies) are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the 
period as compared to a control sample.  Institutional managers start to sell shares of bankrupt 
firms sooner in some firms than in others; these earlier sales are of smaller firms with weaker 
operating performance, and lower equity risk.  We observe strong signs of herding when 
assessing what prompts the institutions to start divesting failing investments.  Institutional 
investors tend to sell well in advance of a bankruptcy filing firms that have smaller 
shareholdings of all institutional investors. 
In the second essay we concentrate on analyzing institutional share purchases shortly 
before underperforming firms file for bankruptcy and while they are reorganizing.  We 
determine types of institutions acquiring shares of bankrupt firms and track their investment 
behavior from the time of purchase to the time institutions start earning positive returns on 
investment or incur capital losses as a result of bankrupt firms’ unsuccessful attempts to 
reorganize.  We analyze market returns of distressed firms and address where necessary the 
issue of missing return data (Peterson (1989)).  We find that during the five-quarter period 
starting in the quarter of emergence from Chapter 11 institutional investors are net buyers of 
firms’ equity with a significantly larger positive abnormal net number of shares traded during 
the period as compared to a control sample.  We also find that only in the quarter of 
emergence do the managers trade strategically.  Institutional ownership negatively relates to 
bankrupt firms’ post-emergence operating performance improvement and positively relates to 
the firms’ post-emergence market performance recovery.  Although the firms with 
institutional holdings have a better pre-bankruptcy operating performance and are less levered, 
we find that these characteristics do not relate to the firms’ post-emergence operating or 
market performance improvements. 
In the third essay we utilize a probability model to test the likelihood of distressed firms 
being acquired prior to filing for bankruptcy.  Further, we analyze changes in post-merger 
performance and compare it between the sample and control firms.  As part of this analysis we 
  
define post-merger changes in operating cash flows as our dependent variable and have a 
binary variable measuring timing of acquisitions as one of the controls in the regression.  We 
employ event study methodology to test the market reaction to acquisition announcements and 
how it affects security prices of targets and bidders.  We find that distressed targets sell their 
assets at a premium or at a discount smaller than bankrupt firms do, thereby benefiting from 
acquisitions more than bankrupt targets.  We also find that abnormal post-merger cash flow 
and cumulative abnormal return changes are more pronounced for bankrupt than distressed 
firms, indicating that acquisitions in Chapter 11 add greater economic value for both target 
and its acquirer than do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy.  Insurance companies and, to a 
lesser extent, independent investment advisors recognize the acquired bankrupt firms’ post-
merger operating and market performance improvements and increase their ownership in the 
firms starting two to three quarters prior to the acquisition announcements.  However we find 
that market returns around the day of the announcements do not accurately reflect post-merger 
changes in the operating cash flow returns.  Abnormal market returns are negative for 
bankrupt targets, suggesting that investors do not anticipate positive changes in firms’ future 
cash flows that we find as part of our analysis.  Similarly, positive market reaction to 
acquisition announcements of distressed firms does not correspond to weak positive changes 
in their post-acquisition operating cash flow returns.  We find post-merger market 
performance improvements for bankrupt and not distressed firms.  In summary, distressed 
firms get a merger announcement premium and bankrupt firms give it away to their acquirers 
whose shareholders benefit from acquisition premiums in a year after the mergers. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze investment behavior of institutional managers who hold and 
trade shares of firms which file for bankruptcy.  We find that during the five-year period 
preceding a bankruptcy filing institutional investors (except those managing investment 
companies) are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the 
period as compared to a control sample.  Institutional managers start to sell shares of bankrupt 
firms sooner in some firms than in others; these earlier sales are of smaller firms with weaker 
operating performance, and lower equity risk.  We observe strong signs of herding when 
assessing what prompts the institutions to start divesting failing investments.  Institutional 
investors tend to sell well in advance of a bankruptcy filing firms that have smaller 
shareholdings of all institutional investors.  We do not find evidence that institutional 
stockholders trade strategically and avoid material price declines before they occur.  
Institutional managers trade consistently with sell recommendations issued by security 
analysts.  However, on average analysts do not materially downgrade their recommendations 
for the failing firms until only a few months before a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing; 
consequently the institutional managers’ decision to divest of shares of the firms may be too-
little-too-late. 
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I. Introduction 
An informed investor is compensated for the costly investigation into asset’s value by 
his or her ability to identify and acquire assets that yield greater potential returns on the 
investments (Rock (1986)).
3
  Some academics argue that institutional investors are prone to 
behave rationally and to appear as “intelligent” investors who stabilize security prices by 
offsetting irrational trades by individual investors (Lakonishok et al. (1994)).  Because of the 
size of the investments and their time horizons,
4
 institutional investors have strong incentives 
to gather costly information about firms whose shares they acquire for their portfolios and to 
decide whether contemporaneous weak performance is an indication of poor firm quality or a 
result of desirable long-term firm investment (Admati et al. (1994), Maug (1998), Edmans 
(2009)).   
In this paper we analyze the investment behavior of institutional investors and 
quarterly changes in their investment holdings of firms during five years prior to these firms 
filing for reorganization.  The existing empirical literature on institutional trading does not 
provide concrete evidence as to how sophisticated the investment strategies are that 
institutions employ in their overall trading.  While some researchers argue that institutional 
investors are capable of picking winners and exhibit fully rational herding behavior that 
promotes price discovery and predicts stock returns (Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias (2004)), 
others conclude that managers mechanically acquire stocks with certain desirable 
characteristics and price levels (Falkenstein (1996)) and irrationally engage in herding causing 
                                                 
3
 Or identify and divest assets that have low or negative potential returns. 
4
 According to Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) who investigate investor composition, low turnover 
institutional investors (those with average holding period of 3 years or longer) own the greatest 
percentage of shares outstanding (mean of 27.4% and median of 27.5%); high turnover managers, with 
holding period of less than 1.5 years, hold on average 10.8% of shares outstanding (with median of 
8.7%).  Maug (1998) finds that information cost and cost of monitoring inversely relates to market 
liquidity and that frequently traded shares reduce institutional investors’ incentives to gather 
information through monitoring because the share liquidity allows institutions to sell their holdings 
more easily.  We believe that the marginal benefits institutional investors gain from information 
gathering and analysis must exceed their marginal costs for the investors to consider these expenditures. 
 4 
 
temporary price bubbles (Dreman and Lufkin (2000)) and future price corrections (Gutierrez 
and Kelley (2009)).  Irrespective of that, we can, to this point, find no empirical evidence 
relevant to institutional holdings/trading of companies as they approach bankruptcy. 
It is well established that the investment returns of firms in financial distress are 
invariably quite negative and equity holders suffer significant capital losses starting several 
years prior to Chapter 11 filings (Clark and Weinstein (1983)).  Firms usually start 
experiencing financial difficulties long before petitioning for reorganization in the federal 
court by filing Chapter 11 (Altman (1968), Aharony, Jones, and Swary (1980), Clark and 
Weinstein (1983)) and investors continue to suffer sizable losses up to the time of filing (Clark 
and Weinstein (1983)).  Aharony et al. (1980) observe negative cumulative differential 
portfolio return starting roughly four years before bankruptcy with investors having to 
continuously adjust for declining solvency over the four-year period.   
The analysis presented in this paper is intended to provide a first examination of 
whether institutional investors utilize information they acquire to accurately time transactions 
during the five years prior to Chapter 11 filings.  If institutional investors accurately process 
valuable information they possess (or should possess) regarding the future stock performance 
of the firms in which they invest, we conjecture that because of their in-depth knowledge they 
would engage in sell-offs prior to the filings.  Timing of a sell-off, however, is of a greater 
importance than the mere fact that the investors dispose of the holdings sometime during the 
five-year period.  Do the institutional investors divest long before a struggling firm goes 
under, prior to its share price significantly declining?  Or do they hold on to the shares of 
distressed firms until it is well established that bankruptcy is inevitable (thus achieving the 
same negative results as other investors)?  In addition, do institutions behave differently if 
other institutional managers are holding shares of the same firms and does the magnitude of 
 5 
 
these (other institutional) holdings matter?
5
  We attempt to answer these questions and expect 
to observe investment behavior that closely resembles that of corporate insiders, when the 
latter sell (postpone purchase) before significant stock-price decreases and buy (postpone 
sales) before significant price increases (Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986), Seyhun and Bradley 
(1997)).  Investors may liquidate their positions because they feel that they possess adverse 
information about the firms’ prospects that, if it became public, would cause immediate 
downward adjustment in the firms’ share price (Scholes (1972)) or they may divest their 
portfolios of the underperforming shares because other large investors are doing so (Dreman 
and Lufkin (2000)). 
Institutional investors expend considerable sums of money to obtain information on 
the firms whose securities they own or are considering purchasing.  Institutions utilize both 
internal analysis and other, purchased, research.  They may also use sell-side analyst research 
and recommendations in their decision making process.  Sell side analysts tend to have an 
“upward bias” in their recommendations toward buy while internal research does not suffer 
from this upward bias.  Hence, if a firm is deteriorating and sell-side recommendations are 
becoming more negative the internal research in the vast majority of cases would also become 
more negative, perhaps even sooner than analyst recommendations.  Reasonable logic 
suggests institutional investors use this information when deciding whether to purchase or sell 
shares of firms subsequently filing for bankruptcy.  If we rely on the assumption that 
institutional holders are informed about soundness of their investments, we expect to see 
fewer purchases of securities of failing firms as they approach bankruptcy and more sales of 
the underperforming investments as early as several years prior to bankruptcy filings.  To 
analyze behavior of the institutional investors as the firms approach bankruptcy, we evaluate 
quarterly changes in institutional holdings starting five years (twenty calendar quarters) prior 
                                                 
5
 This question addresses the issue of institutional herding during five years preceding bankruptcy 
filings.  It also addresses institutional independence of analysis. 
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to Chapter 11 filings.  We further contrast these quarterly net changes with those for the firms 
of similar size that do not file for reorganization.  We determine “abnormal” institutional 
trading by comparing changes in the quarterly institutional holdings for the distressed firms 
that petition for Chapter 11 reorganization to those for all other firms.
6
 
As part of this research we also focus on whether institutional trading behavior is 
consistent with analysts’ sell recommendations issued for the distressed firms held by the 
institutions during 20 quarters preceding bankruptcy filings.  While analysts strive to increase 
institutional ownership in the firms they follow, institutional demand for information about 
particular firms affects analysts’ decision about which firms to follow (O’Brien and Bhushan 
(1990)).  We are interested in learning about whether institutional investors’ buy/sell decisions 
are consistent with analysts’ recommendations, and if so, whether this trading behavior is 
warranted.   
We examine the investment behavior of institutional investors in light of two 
contrasting pieces of evidence: (1) institutional investors possess valuable information and act 
as informed investors and (2) they invest in securities of distressed firms, possibly 
disregarding the empirical evidence that these investments lack profitability and result in 
significant capital losses.
7
  Although the investment behavior of institutional shareholders has 
been studied in the past, our paper is the first to examine changes in institutional holdings of 
the securities of firms approaching bankruptcy and to provide evidence of the institutions’ 
ability to timely recognize failing investments.  In addition, our results have implications 
                                                 
6
 Henceforth, firms that file Chapter 11 are sample firms and institutional holdings of them are sample 
holdings, and firms that do not file are control firms and institutional holdings of these firms are control 
holdings. 
7
 On November 1, 2012 The Wall Street Journal’s professional edition with Factiva announced the 
launch of Vega-Chi trading platform solely for institutional investors.  The platform focuses on high 
yield and distressed securities only and offers institutional investors the ability to trade directly with 
each other.  This launch indicates that institutional investors have an appetite for shares of distressed 
firms and risky investments.  Previously, in the October 22, 2012 issue of the Journal, Nick Elliott 
reports that according to the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) annual survey, investors rank “risk 
oversight” in sixth place on a list of nine other topics, two notches down from previous ISS surveys in 
2010 and 2011, when it ranked as the fourth-highest concern.    
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regarding the consequences of retail investors replicating investment behaviors of institutions 
in attempt to achieve greater returns.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows.  In Section II, we provide the 
necessary background on bankruptcy, the behavior of institutional investors and the 
interrelation between changes in institutional holdings and sell recommendations issued by 
security sell-side analysts.  In Section III we describe our data and in Section IV we present 
our hypotheses.  We develop our test methodology and report regression results in Section V.  
Section VI concludes our paper. 
II. Chapter 11 Filings, The Investment Behavior of Institutional Investors, and 
Effects of Analyst Coverage and Management Reporting on Institutional 
Holdings 
 
i. Corporate Financial Distress and Firms’ Chapter 11 Petitions  
Firms usually start experiencing financial difficulties long before petitioning for 
reorganization in federal court by filing Chapter 11 (Altman (1968), Aharony, Jones, and 
Swary (1980), and Clark and Weinstein (1983)).  It is also important to note that firms file for 
Chapter 11 for various reasons.  Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) list several reasons for 
corporate failures: 
 Chronically sick industries (e.g., agriculture, textiles, department stores). 
 Deregulation of key industries (e. g., airlines, financial services, healthcare, energy). 
  High real interest rates in certain periods. 
  International competition. 
  Overcapacity within an industry. 
  Increased leveraging of corporate America. 
  Relatively high new business formation rates in certain periods. 
We refine this list by offering two more reasons for firms to file for bankruptcy: 
 8 
 
 High and/or frequently incurred litigation costs caused by product liability and/or 
other issues. 
 Recurring union disputes resulting in rising operating and administrative costs. 
In reality firms need not wait until they become financially insolvent to file for 
Chapter 11.  Firm management can take advantage of the filing in an effort to amend firm’s 
obligations and to avoid (or at least to deal with) costs and issues that threaten its existence.   
What determines the success of a firm’s reorganization?  Hotchkiss and Mooradian 
(2004) study a comprehensive sample of 1,770 public companies that filed for Chapter 11 
between 1979 and 2002 and find that 79 percent of the firms in their sample reached 
resolution of the case by June 2004 while the remaining 21 percent were either still in 
bankruptcy as of June 2004 or ended in liquidation.  The firms that converted from Chapter 11 
to Chapter 7 after failed efforts to reorganize were typically smaller firms.  Hence, firm size 
(measured by prepetition assets) is an important characteristic related to the firm’s success in 
reorganizing and emerging from Chapter 11 rather than converting to Chapter 7 and 
subsequently liquidating (Hotchkiss (1993)).  In addition, Dahiya et al. (2003) find that 
availability of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing to large companies is an important 
determinant of the reorganization versus liquidation outcome. 
Hotchkiss (1995) finds that about 40 percent of firms emerging from bankruptcy 
continue to experience operating losses for several years following emergence.  Hotchkiss 
(1995) uses return on assets and profit margin to assess firms’ operating performance.  She 
observes substantially lower firm performance than that of firms in similar industries: “The 
firms showed some positive growth in revenues, assets, and number of employees in the post-
bankruptcy period, but showed little improvement in profitability, especially in comparison to 
industry groups.  Performance varied little over the five-year post-bankruptcy period, which 
 9 
 
suggests the firms did not simply need more time to recover”.8  Furthermore, Maksimovic and 
Phillips (1998) find that industry conditions (high-growth vs. declining) are an important 
determinant not just of the frequency of bankruptcy, but of economic decisions such as asset 
sales in bankruptcy.  Finally, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) find that whether firms return 
to profitability after Chapter 11 also depends on their ownership structure, governance, and the 
involvement of outside (vulture) investors.  The participation of outside investors strongly and 
positively relates to post-bankruptcy success. 
ii. Investment Behavior of Institutional Managers 
Most large shareholders are institutional investors, rather than individual investors.  
Further, in many firms these large investors own substantial stakes, including, in aggregate, a 
majority of the outstanding shares.  Institutional shareholders actively monitor firms in which 
they invest.  Monitoring is costly and more difficult for smaller investors (Black (1992), 
Wahal (1996), DelGuercio and Hawkins (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000), Noe (2002), 
Woidtke (2002), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Almazan et al. (2005)).  However, the extent 
of the institutional investors’ monitoring may be limited by the free-rider problem due to the 
private cost of monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), fiduciary duties and responsibilities 
(Badrinath et al. (1989), Gillan and Starks (2000)), and potential business relations with the 
firms (banks, insurance companies, and trusts are especially sensitive to this issue) (Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988)). 
Arbel et al. (1983) find that institutions typically avoid investing in thinly traded stock 
and in firms with small capitalizations.  Institutional investors avoid taking greater risks 
associated with investment in small firms such as greater return volatility and lower liquidity.  
These constraints that affect investment decisions of institutions may lead to market 
segmentation, herding behavior, and continuous neglect of certain securities (Arbel et al. 
(1983), Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).  Similarly, Falkenstein (1996) believes that managers 
                                                 
8
 Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), 3
rd
 edition, p. 84. 
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acquire stocks with certain desirable characteristics and price levels.  He observes that 
managers have preference for stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs and avoid 
investments with low idiosyncratic volatility.
9
   
Institutional investors engage in a positive-feedback trading and institutional herding
10
 
impacts share prices more than the herding behavior of individual investors (Nofsinger and 
Sias (1999), Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2008)).  Nofsinger and Sias (1999) focus on four 
issues: (1) the cross-sectional relation between changes in institutional ownership and stock 
returns, (2) post-herding returns, (3) relation between changes in institutional ownership and 
lag returns (indicators of feedback trading) and stock return momentum, and (4) differentiation 
between price-impact of herding and intra-period positive-feedback trading.  They find that 
securities institutional investors add to their portfolios outperform those they sell and that this 
phenomenon does not stem from momentum strategies.  They conclude that institutions’ 
herding behavior is fully rational and observe no evidence of returns reversal in the two years 
following the herding period.  Sias (2004) complements this literature on institutional herding 
by demonstrating that the fraction of institutions buying securities in a quarter positively 
correlates with the demand for the securities in the previous quarter, directly evidencing 
herding behavior.  He finds that herding promotes price discovery and correctly predicts stock 
returns. 
In contrast, Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) find that stocks with ”buy” herds realize 
negative abnormal returns two to three years after the herding.  This finding suggests that buy 
herds cause overvaluation and result in future price correction and this contrasts with the 
earlier conclusions that herding promotes price discovery.  Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) do not 
                                                 
9
 Falkenstein (1996) explains this occurrence with fund managers taking advantage of the option-like 
payoff to their relative performance by avoiding the lowest volatility stocks rather than investing in the 
most highly volatile stocks. 
10
 Nofsinger and Sias (1999, footnote 1, p.1,) define feedback trading as a special case of herding that 
“results when lag returns, or variables correlated with lag returns (e.g., earnings momentum, decisions 
of previous traders, changes in firms characteristics, etc.), act as the common signal; herding is a group 
of investors trading in the same direction over a period of time.” 
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observe the same relation between “sell” herds and future returns; the “sell” herds do not 
predict future returns.  They explain these asymmetric findings for “buy” and “sell” herds by 
concluding that price impact of the latter is temporary while price impact of the former is 
permanent. 
Alternatively, some researchers suggest that institutional herding is a result of 
irrational psychological behavior and causes temporary price bubbles (Dreman and Lufkin 
(2000)).  Scharfstein and Stein (1990) describe managers’ herding and feedback trading as a 
fad often encouraged by agency problems: “managers simply mimic the investment decisions 
of other managers, ignoring substantive private information.” (p. 465) 
Several researchers provide evidence that higher institutional ownership has an effect 
on stock prices and returns (Brown and Brooke (1993), Gompers and Metrick (1999)), 
negatively impacts bid-ask spreads (Jennings et al. (2002)), and negatively (positively) 
correlates with stock return volatility among non-dividend (dividend) paying stocks (Rubin 
and Smith (2009)).  Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutions demand stock 
characteristics that differ from the rest of the market: “institutions invest in stocks that are 
large, more liquid, and have had relatively low returns during the previous year.” (pp. 1-2)  
They state that the increase in institutional share holdings of large stocks leads to higher 
demand for large, more liquid stocks, thereby affecting stock market prices and returns.  
Consistent with the research findings that support managers’ superior investment abilities, 
Gompers and Metrick (1999) present evidence that level of institutional ownership forecasts 
returns, with forecasting power the strongest when institutional inflows are the highest. 
iii. How the information issued by analysts impacts institutional holdings  
Analysts’ decisions to follow firms and institutional investors’ decisions to hold 
shares of the same firms in their portfolios are interrelated: institutions pay close attention to 
the recommendations and analysts base their decision to provide coverage on, among other 
things, size of the institutional holdings (O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), Gompers and Metrick 
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(1999), Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)).  The 
relationship between institutions and analysts is a supplier-customer type of relationship; 
while analysts strive to increase institutional ownership in the firms they follow, institutional 
demand for information about particular firms affects analysts’ decision about which firms to 
follow (O’Brien and Bhushan (1990)).  O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that the analyst 
following increases more in relatively neglected firms, to avoid competition from preexisting 
analyst following, and in firms whose volatility has declined, while institutional ownership 
increases with firm size, prior analyst following, and with increased market risk.  Consistent 
with this, Mola et al. (2013) find that analysts are more likely to stop covering firms with 
small market capitalization, high book-to-market ratios, low liquidity, low trading volume, 
and low institutional holding. 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) analyze the reaction of two types of traders, 
large and small, to upward bias of analyst recommendations (especially when it comes to 
affiliated analysts).  They find that large investors adjust their responses to analyst 
recommendations and exert buy pressure when strong buy recommendations are issued, no 
pressure when buy recommendations are issued, and sell pressure when hold 
recommendations are issued.  The researchers observe that institutions discount their reaction 
even further for recommendations issued by affiliated analysts.   
Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) assess trading behavior and reaction of institutional 
investors to security analysts’ forecast errors.  The objective of their study is to determine 
whether institutional investors cause price destabilization as a result of an overreaction to 
unexpected earnings news.  They find that institutions, such as income-oriented banks, whose 
managers are less pressured to invest based on short-term performance are less sensitive to 
analysts’ missed forecasts and earnings surprises and would consider sell-off only when the 
stock no longer meets their investment guidelines.  On the other hand, when a stock is owned 
by aggressive growth and/or momentum types of institutions, the magnitude of the reaction to 
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the earnings announcements that are not in-line with earlier analysts’ performance predictions 
is greater.  Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) conclude that institutional investors “act as 
‘traders’ rather than ‘owners’.  They have short expected holding periods and focus on 
predicting near-term price movements instead of long-term prospects.” (p. 1470) 
Conversely, Bartov et al. (2000) find that mispricing following earnings 
announcements is least pronounced for stocks held by institutional investors, whose 
interpretation of the process underlying earnings is far more accurate than that of 
unsophisticated investors.  Bartov et al. (2000) describe stock prices as reflecting a weighted 
average of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors’ expectations of and reactions to 
the earnings announcements and conclude that greater involvement of institutional investors 
leads to smaller observed post-announcement abnormal returns.  The authors relate this 
occurrence to the level of the investor’s erudition and dub institutional investors sophisticated 
and informed.   
III. Sample Selection and Data Analysis 
i. Corporate bankruptcy 
We use Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum database to obtain our sample of 
U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization and emerged from bankruptcy during the 
period of October 1993 through December 2011.  The total initial sample consists of 1,831 
firms filing for reorganization during this period.  We do not restrict the sample by industry or 
regulatory requirements. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
As shown in Table 1, and not surprisingly, the frequency of bankruptcy filings rises 
during two recessionary periods, 1999-2003, peaking in 2001, and 2008-2009.    The recession 
of the early 2000s followed the dotcom boom of the late 1990s and was further exacerbated by 
a number of large accounting frauds (Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and others).  The second 
increase in the frequency of Chapter 11 filings occurs right around the mortgage meltdown 
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that triggered the recession of the late 2000s and resulted in many bankruptcies in the financial 
industry.
11
  On average, the firms that filed during these two periods are larger than those 
filing during non-recessionary periods of this study.
12
  We find that the durations in 
bankruptcy tend to be between one and two years, with some indication of shorter periods 
during the most recent years.  Of 1,831 firms sampled, 1,790 filed for bankruptcy once during 
October 1993-December 2011, 39 filed twice, and 2 filed for bankruptcy three times.  
ii. Firm characteristics and institutional ownership 
Using a sample of 13f quarterly filings obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional 
(13f) Holdings – s34 we analyze changes in institutional holdings for firms filing and 
emerging from bankruptcy between 1993 and 2011 during the five years (twenty quarters) 
preceding the filings.
13
  After identifying firms in the initial sample whose shares were held by 
institutional investors during the 1988-2011 time period, our sample is reduced from 1,831 
firms to 1,142 firms.
14
  During the twenty-quarter period we consider for each firm, most of 
them were held by more than one manager resulting in 124,844 quarterly institutional holding 
observations for the 1,142 firms in the sample.
15
   
We utilize Compustat to obtain the market value of equity, cash, total assets, current 
assets, total liabilities, current liabilities, sales, operating income before depreciation, net 
income, pretax income, interest expense, working capital, retained earnings, common equity, 
deferred taxes, investment tax credit, and volatility (standard deviation of stock monthly 
returns).  We derive several performance measure ratios using Compustat data: sales divided 
by total assets; operating income before depreciation divided by total assets (operating ROA); 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted that in the 2008-2009 there were a few very large bankruptcies such as Lehman 
Brothers and General Motors which strongly affect both the mean and standard deviation of the size 
measures. 
12
 The largest median size is in 2009; the second largest is in 2011. 
13
 Thomson Reuters adjusts the reported holdings and net changes for stock splits (including reverse 
stock splits which are a more frequent occurrence in the case of bankrupt firms), and we use the split-
adjusted values.   
14 T
here were 689 firms (or 38% of 1,831 firms in the initial sample) that were not held by institutions 
during 1988-2011 time period. 
15
 The mean (median) number of institutional investors per firm is 109 (56). 
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net income divided by total assets (ROA); total liabilities divided by total assets; total 
liabilities divided by market value of equity; current assets divided by current liabilities 
(current ratio); cash divided by current liabilities (cash ratio); and a sum of common equity, 
deferred taxes, and investment tax credit divided by market capitalization (B/M ratio).  
Altman’s Z-score (Altman (1968)) is defined as 3.3x((pretax income + interest expense)/total 
assets) + 0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market capitalization/total liabilities) + 
1.2x(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets).   
We use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to obtain stock market related 
data.  Following Seyhun and Bradley’s (1997) methodology to capture shares’ abnormal 
performance we determine market-adjusted abnormal return as quarterly holding period return 
adjusted for the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted return and share turnover as trading 
volume divided by total shares outstanding.  Market adjusted returns capture the extent of 
underperformance of shares of the firms approaching bankruptcy and are used in studies 
similar to ours (Seyhun and Bradley’s (1997), Brav et al (2000), Kadiyala and Rau (2004)).  
Brown and Warner (1985) describe “market adjusted returns” (p.7) as one of the methods and 
models of the return-generating process.  In addition, risk adjusted returns are an unreliable 
measure of abnormal returns for the firms in distress.   
There are multiple studies that investigate the relationship between bankruptcy risk 
and systematic risk.  However, results of these studies are contradictory: for example, Lang 
and Stulz (1992) demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is positively related to systematic risk, 
while Opler and Titman (1994) and Dichev (1998) find that bankruptcies are most due to 
idiosyncratic factors, suggesting that bankruptcy risk is unrelated to systematic risk and that 
bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns.  We also report trading volume and bid-ask 
spread obtained from CRSP.   
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Institutions are required to file 13f forms with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on a quarterly basis.
16
  Thomson Reuters continues reporting 13f data for 
several quarters after an institutional manager stops filing with the SEC.  The data provider 
maintains original filing date (date on the holding report in the SEC’s EDGAR, the regulator’s 
electronic record database) and changes reporting date for the repeating holdings.  We 
eliminate all observations from the 13f data file for which filing date does not match reporting 
date, thereby determining the last quarter of actual 13f filings.   
In addition, Thomson Reuters does not provide net change holdings for the institutions 
no longer filing 13f forms with the SEC; instead the data provider reports zero change in 
holdings for these institutions.  To address this issue, we calculate the sell-off amounts as a 
negative of the prior quarter’s holdings and report them as a net change for the quarter when 
no 13f report is filed with the SEC for the first time.
17
  By refining the data in that manner, we 
have an accurate reflection of institutional holdings and their changes. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Panel A of Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  We 
report annual measures starting with year t-5, where year t=0 is the year of bankruptcy filing.  
While the median market value starts declining significantly in year t-4, the mean market 
                                                 
16 The SEC’s institutional investment manager filing mandate is as follows: “An institutional investment 
manager that uses the U.S. mail (or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce) in the course 
of its business, and exercises investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities 
(explained below) must report its holdings on Form 13F with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).  Form 13F is required to be filed within 45 days of the end of a calendar quarter.  The Form 13F 
report requires disclosure of the name of the institutional investment manager that files the report, and, 
with respect to each section 13(f) security over which it exercises investment discretion, the name and 
class, the CUSIP number, the number of shares as of the end of the calendar quarter for which the report 
is filed, and the total market value.”  The SEC defines an institutional investor as “(1) an entity that 
invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a natural person or an entity that 
exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or entity. Institutional 
investment managers can include investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, 
pension funds, and corporations.” 
17
 The institutions may not necessarily sell their entire holdings when they stop the SEC’s 13f reporting.  
Some institutions may sell-off and some may have their holdings fall under the SEC’s reporting 
threshold requirement.  By assuming that all institutions that stop the reporting sell-off their 
shareholdings we obtain more conservative results in our analysis of timeliness of institutional selling 
of shares of struggling firms as they approach bankruptcy. 
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value does not decline significantly until year t-1, suggesting there are many large firms in the 
sample which actually have an increase in the value during the period prior to a bankruptcy 
filing.
18
  Both mean and median total assets and sales increase from t-5 through t-1 and 
median total assets and sales are higher at t=0 than in any other year.  The firms become more 
levered from year t-4 to year t-1 (both mean and median debt-to-assets ratio increase during 
this period) with the ability to meet current obligations (measured by current and cash ratios) 
declining during this period, especially from t-3 on.
19
  The firms also struggle operationally–
both mean and median operating ROA and ROA are decreasing from year t-4 to year t-1.
20
  
The debt-to-equity ratio grows steadily from year t-4 to year t-1 and increases dramatically 
from year t-1 to year t=0.  The firms’ median book-to-market ratios are below unity for all 
years presented in the table and are decreasing starting in year t-4.  Mean and median 
Altman’s Z-scores fall below 1.8, the upper limit of the range for high probability of 
bankruptcy, in year t-3 and continue to decline.  By most operational measures there are ample 
financial data suggesting firms are in deep trouble.  Finally, trading volume and share turnover 
increase gradually earlier in the five-year period and then sharply as bankruptcy filing 
approaches.      
In Panels B and C we summarize characteristics of and changes in institutional 
ownership during the five-year period.  We report means and medians of ownership 
percentages for various institutional groups.  To obtain the results in Panel B, we determine 
quarterly institutional ownerships of each security and then average them for four quarters of 
each year prior to a bankruptcy filing.  We report these average annual institutional holdings 
                                                 
18
 An unanswered question at this point is whether some of these firms execute SEOs during this five 
year period, which may partially drive the unexpected lack of a decline in mean market capitalization 
until year t-1.  In addition, we observe an increase in the number of firms from year t-5 to t-2 and then a 
sharp decrease from year t-2 to the quarter of bankruptcy.   
19
 However, both current and cash ratios are unexpectedly high at t=0.  These results may be because we 
lose smaller firms from our sample during the later quarters (we lose about 1/4 of the firms from t-2 to 
t-1 and then another 2/3 of the firms from t-1 to t=0).  Hence, increases in total assets, sales, and debt-
to-assets ratio as the firms approach bankruptcy filings is indication of having larger firms in the 
sample, which are allowed a bigger leverage than smaller firms that are no longer in the sample. 
20
 Again, with some t=0 improvement. 
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for all 13f filers as a percentage of total shares outstanding as of each of the five annual 
periods before filing and the quarter of filing.  Then, we report the largest institutional holding 
as a percentage of total institutional holdings, and the largest five and ten institutional 
holdings as a percentage of total institutional holdings.  As reported in Panel B, means and 
medians for all institutional holdings remain relatively unchanged from -20, -17 through -8, -5 
quarter horizons (years t-5 through t-2).  Mean (median) 13f holdings declines by about 28 
percent (38 percent) from -8, -5 to -4, -1 and by 62 percent (77 percent) from -4, -1 to the 
quarter of filing.  One should keep in mind when evaluating these results that some changes in 
13f holdings reported for quarter 0 occur after Chapter 11 filings, making these changes 
reactive and not proactive, as one would expect from informed and sophisticated investors.
21
  
We also find that the proportional ownership (of the total institutional ownership) of the 
largest, the five largest and the ten largest institutions tends to grow during this period–simply 
put, the institutional ownership tends to become more concentrated among fewer institutions.  
Thus institutions as a group do not divest themselves of these securities particularly quickly 
prior to a bankruptcy filing (irrespective of financial indicators), and some of them maintain 
meaningful ownership in these securities quite close to a bankruptcy filing.
22
  The descriptive 
evidence to this point does not suggest the increased trading is divestiture by institutional 
investors. 
In Table 2, Panel C, we categorize institutional ownership by manager type and weigh 
the ownership by the total shares outstanding as of each corresponding quarter period.  The 
largest ownership share belongs to independent investment advisors with mean percentage 
holdings between 14 and 18 percent during the five-year period and decreasing to about 6 
percent in the quarter of filing.  While institutions in the other classifications hold smaller 
                                                 
21
 Some occur before Chapter 11 filing, but well after public knowledge that filing is either certain or 
near certain; thus these too are reactive, not proactive. 
22
 Using the median holdings, the largest institution (five largest institutions) held 7.56 percent (20.25 
percent) of struggling firms five years prior to filing and by year t-2 this had only been reduced to 7.35 
percent (17.22 percent).  In year t-1 it was 5.59 percent (11.83 percent). 
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percentages of firm shares outstanding than do the independent investment advisors, their 
pattern of holdings during the five-year period through filing does not seem to be different 
from the independent investment advisors’ pattern. 
iii. Corporate bankruptcies and institutional trading 
A purpose of our paper is to determine whether institutional investors holding shares 
of distressed firms sell the investments well before the bankruptcy filings and before the 
market becomes fully aware of the firms’ financial and/or operating issues.  To accomplish 
this goal, we group the institutional trading data by firm filing for reorganization and by 
quarter when either shareholding or net holding change are not equal zero.  In Table 3 we 
report the number of firms classified as net buyers, non-traders, or net sellers for each quarter 
horizon preceding filings of the reorganization petitions.
23
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Several aspects of aggregate activity for our sample firms are quite interesting.  First, 
the proportion of our sample with net institutional ownership/trading grows as bankruptcy 
filing approaches.  Second, the balance between net buying and net selling is slightly tilted 
toward net buying during the years t-5 through t-4.  Third, while the balance becomes 
somewhat tilted toward net selling by year t-2, heavy net selling does not seem to occur until 
t-1 (and, of course, it is heavy during t=0).  In aggregate, the results reported in Table 3 
indicate that institutional investors as a group do not engage in selling of shares of the firms 
that subsequently file for Chapter 11 any earlier than two years prior to the filing of Chapter 
11 reorganization petitions.  In addition, some types of institutions (investment companies and 
their managers, independent investment advisors, and institutions in “All other” category) may 
engage in short selling during the pre-filing period in anticipation of the share price decline. 
                                                 
23
 Not all firms had institutional ownership every quarter (or even year); thus the number of firms 
reported in Table 3, in any given year is fewer than the sample size of 1,142. 
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In Table 3 we also report similar statistics for control firms.  We first collect a sample 
consisting of all other firms not filing for bankruptcy during this time period.
24
  Frequently, in 
the empirical literature, a control sample consists of the same-industry firms of comparable 
size.  We eschew this standard method of identifying control firms and utilize a modification 
of Seyhun and Bradley’s (1997) methodology.  Seyhun and Bradley (1997) point out two 
limitations of the conventional method: (1) firms filing bankruptcy become significantly 
smaller as they approach the filing date,
25
 and (2) non-filer firms in the same industry are 
likely to experience financial difficulty along with the filers.  To construct their control sample 
for each insider portfolio (all insiders, executives, and officers), Seyhun and Bradley (1997) 
calculate the mean annual equity values of all firms not in their sample and reporting insider 
trading activity during 1975-1992.  They rank these firms according to their total market 
equity and divide them into deciles.  Then, they calculate insider trading activity over the 
entire period for each size decile.  They obtain 6,480 data points of insider trading activity–
one for each of the three portfolios, 10 size deciles, and 216 calendar months.  They then 
compare the insider trading activity (for all insiders, executives and officers separately) of 
each firm for each month with the relevant decile in the relevant month. 
 Unlike Seyhun and Bradley (1997), however, who build control portfolios based on 
mean annual equity values of all non-filing firms, we, for every quarter preceding a 
bankruptcy filing, size match each firm in our sample with all other firms that are not in our 
sample and whose shares are held by institutional investors based on a 90 percent to 110 
percent range of our sample firms’ total assets.  The matching methodology we utilize is 
                                                 
24
 By excluding firms that have filed for bankruptcy within reasonably long period of time from sample 
firm’s filing we possibly introduce a selection bias.  In addition, for firms that filed for bankruptcy 
earlier in our sample period (for example, in 1993) we exclude many more firms that did not file from 
that point in time on until 2011, when our sample period ends (in our example this time period is 1993-
2011), than for firms that filed for bankruptcy close to the end of our sample period (for example if a 
firm filed in 2010, this “exclusion” period would only be 2010-2011).  In 1993, the total population of 
firms on CRSP consisted of 30,068 firms.  During the following eighteen years (from 1993 through 
2011) 1,831 firms (or 6% of the total population) filed for Chapter 11. 
25
 Though, interestingly, that is not the case in our sample. 
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similar to that employed by Seyhun and Bradley (1997) and designed to allow us to compare 
the institutional trading of our sample firms with the institutional trading of similarly sized 
firms which did not file for bankruptcy during the period of this study.   
First, we obtain data on institutional holdings during 1988-2011 for all firms that are 
not in our sample.  Then, we identify only firms in our sample which either have institutional 
holdings in a given quarter or report a net holding change in a quarter.  Finally, for each 
quarter, we size match the sample firms with holdings and/or net holding changes with all 
other firms not in the sample with holdings and/or net holding changes based on a 90 percent 
to 110 percent range of our sample firms’ total assets.  Many firms in the sample are matched 
with multiple control firms and every firm has at least one control firm.  Our control sample 
consists of 14,635 firm observations
26
 whose shares are held by institutional investors at one 
point or another during twenty quarters prior to corresponding sample firms’ bankruptcy 
filings.  We analyze institutional holdings and net changes in those holdings for each firm in 
the control sample during the twenty-quarter period preceding the filings of each 
corresponding sample firm.  A summary of the net buying/selling activity for the control firms 
is presented in the final three columns of Table 3.  In aggregate we find that for the control 
firms there is more net selling than net buying activity during the four years prior to and the 
year of bankruptcy filing.  There tends to be more non-trading activity in the control firms 
than in the sample firms  When comparing net selling activities of sample and control groups, 
we find that proportions of sample and control firms with net selling activities are similar (for 
instance, in year t-4, 48% of sample firms and 47% of control firms have net selling activities; 
in year t-3, 50% of sample firms and 53% of control firms have net selling activities; and in 
year t-2, 55% of sample and 52% of control firms have net selling activities), and the 
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 We have 11,459 firms in our control sample.  These firms have not filed for bankruptcy between 
1993 and 2011.  Some firms are in the control sample more than once. 
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difference in net selling activity for sample and control institutions is quite pronounced in year 
t-1, with a lot more net selling in the sample (66%) than control (49%) firms.    
To test statistical significance of trading by the institutions reported in Table 3, we 
calculate “abnormal” trading for each firm in the sample.  First, we eliminate observations 
with zero holdings for all four quarters in a year for both sample and control firms.
27
  Our 
measure of “expected” institutional quarterly trading activity is net change of institutional 
holdings for firms in the control sample.  Abnormal trading is calculated as the difference in 
the net institutional holding changes for the sample firms in a certain quarter before filing and 
the net institutional holding changes for corresponding control firm(s) in the same quarter.  
Once we obtain quarterly abnormal institutional trading, we then average these measures 
across four quarters in a year preceding quarter 0 and report mean annual abnormal trading for 
each event time in Table 4.  We also report abnormal trading for quarters -4, -3, -2, -1, and 0, 
the quarter of Chapter 11 filings.  Sample institutional abnormal purchases are positive 
numbers and abnormal sales are negative numbers.  We present a summary of abnormal 
trading activity in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 The results reported in Table 4 are striking.  During the four years, t-5 through t-2, in 
aggregate, the institutional investors of firms that ultimately file for bankruptcy are net buyers 
of these firms as compared to the control firms (there is slight net selling in t-3).  The net 
buying in year t-2, during which there are clear indicators, in aggregate, of financial decline 
(see Table 2), is large.  Institutions are net buyers in the fourth quarter prior to the quarter of 
filing and consistent net sellers during quarters q-3 through q=0.  However, the behavior of 
these investors is not uniform across the broad institutional investor classes.  The managers of 
                                                 
27
 We do that to avoid comparing changes in institutional holdings, for example, for sample firms that 
have zero holdings for all four quarters in a given year with corresponding control firms with quarterly 
holdings in the same year.  We also ensure that net changes in the first quarter of each year that reflect 
share sell-off are included in that year’s data (those firms may not have an institutional holding during 
the remainder of the year). 
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investment companies are heavy net sellers (compared to their control sample counterparts) 
during all periods except quarter q-4.  In contrast those classified as “all others” (admittedly, a 
catch-all conveying little information) are net buyers in all five of the prior years (including 
relatively high net purchasing activity in both years t-2 and t-1 and quarter q-4).  Banks are 
relatively heavy sellers in years t-3 and t-1, but relatively heavy purchasers in year t-2.  
Irrespective of their activities during the five years prior to a bankruptcy filing, massive selling 
occurs during the quarter of bankruptcy filing in each institutional investor classification, far 
dwarfing the prior five years of activities, indicating that the institutions do massive 
divestiture during the quarter of filing.
28
  The significant abnormal net selling begins in quarter 
q-3 and continues through the quarter of filing for all manager types with exception of 
manager types 5, “All others”, (selling is not statistically significant for this group until q-1) 
and 2, insurance companies, (abnormal net selling is not statistically significant for this group 
in q-2).  These results are consistent with the notion from extant research that describes 
institutions as investors that exhibit herding as a result of irrational psychological behavior.  
Institutions appear to be significant net buyers (with exception of investment companies and 
their managers) of the distressed firms’ shares in the quarters and years preceding a 
bankruptcy filing, until third quarter before the filing.  The amount of net buying is 
statistically significant and economically material during this time period.  To some these 
results may seem surprising, given the amount of information we presume these investors 
obtain and the level of investment sophistication expected from institutions. 
 We report on number of institutional managers whose shareholdings fell under (sell-
off) or rose above (buy-in) the SEC’s threshold for the 13f reporting during the twenty-quarter 
pre-filing time period, starting with quarter q-19 through quarter q=0.  For managers’ buy-ins 
we report total number of shares held and mean share prices as of quarter of the buy-ins.  For 
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 Care must be exercised in looking at quarter 0 results; because of the nature of the data, we do not 
know what proportion of these net sales is before or after the bankruptcy filings. 
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managers’ sell-offs we also report total number of shares held and mean share prices as of 
quarter prior to the quarter of sell-offs.  Mean share price is an average of open and close 
prices of a quarter.  We report these numbers for all institutions as well as for each manager 
type. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 We observe that number of all institutional managers buying-in rises from quarter q-
16 to quarter q-9, is unchanged from quarter q-8 to quarter q-6, and declines from quarter q-5 
to quarter q=0.  We observe the greatest decline in the number of buy-ins of 48.5% from 
quarter q-1 to quarter q=0 (this decline, for example, is 19% from q-3 to q-2 and 21% from q-
2 to q-1).  Number of sell-offs slowly increases from quarter q-19 forward and then remains 
unchanged between quarters q-5 and q-2 and then increases again from quarter q-2 to quarter 
q=0.  This increase is 38% from quarter q-1 to quarter q=0.  Total number of buy-in shares 
increase from quarter q-16 to q-13 and then again from q-12 to q-9 and then declines from 
1,223 million shares in q-4 to 483 million in q=0; buy-in mean share price also declines from 
$24.78 in q-10 to $2.28 in q=0.  When comparing buy-ins and sell-offs we observe that the 
number of managers buying-in and total number of shares held in the quarter of buy-in are 
either greater or about equal to the number of managers selling-off and total number of shares 
held prior to the quarter of sell-off until quarter q=-5; this ratio, however, becomes lower as 
Chapter 11 approaches and operating and market conditions of the firms deteriorate, as we 
described in Table 2.  These results are also consistent with those reported in Table 4, where 
we observe negative abnormal net number of shares traded in the quarter period -4, -1, and in 
the quarter of filing, q=0 (abnormal net trading is negative for investment companies in all 21 
quarters).  The results are qualitatively similar for each manager type.  We find that the 
number of managers’ buy-ins starts to decline consistently in quarter q-5 for banks, investment 
advisors, and managers in “All others” category, manager types 1, 4, and 5, and in quarters q-8 
and q-9 for insurance and investment companies, manager types 2 and 3, respectively.  We 
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also observe that total number of shares held in the quarter of buy-ins starts declining in q-1 
for banks and independent investment advisors, manager types 1 and 4, in q-4 for insurance 
and investment companies, manager types 2 and 3, and in q-6 for managers in “All others” 
category, manager type 5.  The number of managers’ sell-offs start to increase consistently in 
quarter q-2 for banks, insurance and investment companies, manager types 1, 2, and 3, and in 
quarter q-1 for independent investment advisors and managers in “All others” category, 
manager types 4 and 5.  Total number of shares held in the quarter prior to the quarter of sell-
offs goes up starting in q-4 for banks and independent investment advisors, manager types 1 
and 4, in q-8 for insurance and investment companies , manager types 2 and 3, and in q-2 for 
managers in category “All others”, manager type 5.  
 In summary, institutional investors engage in net buying activities for quite some time 
during five years preceding bankruptcy filings.  Until about one year before the filings 
institutions initiate positions in deteriorating firms instead of eliminating them.  In the year 
preceding quarter of bankruptcy filings and in the quarter of the filings institutional managers 
become net sellers with a negative abnormal net number of shares traded. 
iv. Analyst recommendations for failing firms  
We utilize the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to gather analyst 
recommendations data for the sample.  The I/B/E/S data starts in October 1993; consequently, 
in order to obtain data on recommendations for a five-year period prior to Chapter 11 filing, 
we eliminate observations with filing dates before October 1998.  For each quarter preceding a 
bankruptcy filing we determine the total number of recommendations issued by analysts 
providing coverage and the average rating received by a sample firm in a particular quarter.
29
  
We then average the quarterly ratings and frequencies of the coverage for each five four-
quarter periods to obtain annual mean analyst recommendation and recommendation 
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 Many analyst recommendations are issued more frequently than once a quarter.  However, our 
institutional trading data is quarterly.  For comparison purposes we compute mean quarterly 
recommendations and total number of recommendations in the quarter. 
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frequency for each sample firm.  In Table 6 we summarize mean analyst recommendations 
and frequencies issued for all sample firms and then for groups of firms held by manager 
type.
30
   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Five years before bankruptcy filing, on average these firms have a rating of 2.22 
(slightly worse than a Buy of 2.00).  The vast majority (86%) of the ratings are Strong Buy, 
Buy or Hold.  Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) analyze the reaction of large institutional 
investors to upward bias of analyst recommendations and find that large investors adjust their 
responses to analyst recommendations and exert buy pressure when strong buy 
recommendations are issued, no pressure when buy recommendations are issued, and sell 
pressure when hold recommendations are issued.  Based on these findings we conjecture that 
Buy and Hold recommendations in our sample are upward biased.  Over the next three years, 
on average there is a slight deterioration of overall rating to 2.40 during year t-2.  However, 
ratings for all five manager types are still Hold or better.  The aggregate rating does not 
change dramatically until period -4, -1, but even at this point, one year prior to bankruptcy 
filing, analysts are still, on average, issuing recommendations of slightly stronger than Hold 
(2.88 versus Hold of 3.00).  More specifically, in the fourth quarter prior the quarter of filing, 
mean ratings for all firms held by institutions and for each manager type are above 2.5, an 
upper limit of buy category of Strong Buy and Buy ratings, but still better than Hold.  These 
recommendations are the weakest for manager type 5, category titled “all others”, in quarters 
q-4 through q-1 (mean changes from 2.87 in q-4 to 3.14 in q-1).  Downgrades in rating 
strength are relatively large from quarter q-1 to q=0.  In the quarter of the filing, the mean 
recommendation strength is Hold or weaker.  Not surprisingly, mean recommendations issued 
before bankruptcy filings in the quarter q=0 are stronger (3.48) than those issued after the 
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 In I/B/E/S analyst recommendations are delineated as:  1 = Strong Buy, 2 = Buy, 3 = Hold, 4 = 
Underperform, and 5 = Sell. 
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filings (3.65).  Approximately 40% of recommendations issued after the filings are Hold or 
stronger.  There are no meaningful differences in rating strengths among firms held by 
different types of institutions.   
IV. Development of Hypotheses 
The data to this point suggest that with the exception of investment funds and their 
managers, institutions are net buyers of these firms until about one year prior to the firms’ 
Chapter 11 filings.  Investment companies and their managers are significant net sellers for the 
entire five-year period through the quarter of filing.  Finally, for all institutional classes there 
is more net selling in the quarter of filing and three preceding quarters than in all prior quarters 
combined.  In many aspects these results are surprising.  To determine factors that influence 
institutional investors’ decision to postpone sale of the securities of the firms approaching 
bankruptcy we develop and test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Institutional investors delay selling shares of bankrupt firms that are larger, more 
liquid, less risky, less levered, and are more heavily held by other institutional investors.  They 
also favor investments with relatively stronger market and operating performance than the rest 
of the firms. 
Given the net purchase/selling results to this point, it is important to learn when the 
institutional investors’ buying and selling of individual firms occurs.  Thus, we offer a 
hypothesis that examines the relation between the timing of institutional investors’ trading and 
security returns.  Although we find that, in aggregate, institutions are not in a rush to sell 
shares of distressed firms, perhaps considering these investments undervalued in the market 
instead of operationally underperforming, we further analyze institutions’ investment 
behaviors and determine whether they sell the investments before the stock price declines and 
purchase the shares after the stock price has fallen.  If the selling occurs after the price 
declines, then the institutional managers would incur losses just as other shareholders would 
with investments in the securities of the same firms.  Hence: 
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H2: Institutional investors sell shares of distressed firms to avoid capital losses.  This 
behavior is similar to that of insiders, when they sell (postpone purchases) before significant 
stock-price decreases and buy (postpone sales) before significant price increases. 
From the summary of data presented in Table 6 we observe that security analysts 
materially revise their recommendations downward for the first time during the year prior to 
filing and then again materially during quarter q=0.  We investigate whether the timing of 
institutional share sell-offs and the timing of analyst recommendation downgrades are 
coincidental or whether the former is a reaction to the latter.  To make this determination we 
develop and test our third hypothesis: 
H3: Net quarterly changes in institutional holdings become negative, consistent with 
sell recommendations issued by sell-side security analysts. 
V. Test Methodology and Presentation of Regression Results 
i. Timing of institutional selling of bankrupt firms 
We would like to discern between two schools of thought when it comes to the 
investment behavior of institutional managers: 1) the notion that institutional investors are 
informed and sophisticated investors capable of outperforming the market, and 2) conversely, 
the argument that institutions exhibit irrational herding behavior.
31
  We provide a clear 
evidence of institutional managers’ inability to timely recognize failing investments held in 
their portfolios.   
Our first hypothesis is concerned with what drives the delay in institutions selling the 
firms that ultimately file for bankruptcy protection.  First we define a dependent variable 
which measures when the institutions of a firm became “net sellers”.  As a first step in this 
definition, we determine abnormal net changes in holdings for each institutional manager in 
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 Overriding both schools is the concept of monitoring.  Institutions may own securities and 
inadequately monitor their operational performance (as opposed to using available information poorly), 
thus not selling when they “should” sell.  As the results of Table 4 indicate there is net buying activity 
through year t-2, suggesting the possibility of not only poor monitoring, but, in that process, using 
information suggesting purchase of these firms. 
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each quarter approaching bankruptcy filing.  We then calculate mean annual abnormal net 
changes in institutional holdings.  For instance, for year t-5 the average abnormal net holding 
change consists of abnormal net holding changes in quarters -20 through -17.   We define our 
dependent variable to equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, depending on the year when an institution 
first became a net seller based on its mean abnormal net change trading figure as compared to 
the trading in the preceding years.  We assess each mean abnormal net change based on the 
following criteria: for example, if an institution is a net seller for the first time in year t-3 (or 
quarters -12 through -9),
32
 then we assign 3 as a dependent variable for that manager; if that 
same institution is a net buyer in the following year, year t-2 (same as quarter period -8 ,-5), 
and the amount of the average abnormal net purchase is greater than the absolute value of the 
sum of abnormal net changes for all prior periods, then we change the dependent variable for 
this manager from 3 to 0; if, however, the amount of the average abnormal net purchase in 
year t-2 is less than the absolute value of the sum of abnormal net changes for prior periods or 
the manager is a net seller in year t-2, then the dependent variable remains equaling to 3.
33
  We 
repeat this process for every period for each institutional manager with either holdings or net 
changes not equaling zero during a year.
34
    
Our dependent variable takes values 0 through 5; an ordered probability (logit) model 
is a suitable tool for our analysis.  By using an ordered logit model we estimate change in log 
odds of institutional investors starting to sell earlier in the five-year period preceding 
bankruptcy filings.   
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 The institution would have been either non-trader or net buyer in years -5 and -4. 
33
 Another situation that we encounter when determining the dependent variable for each institutional 
manager in the sample is when a manager becomes, for instance, a net seller for the first time in year -5 
(dependent variable equals to 5), then he or she either does not trade or still sells in years -4 and -3 (in 
this case the dependent variable remains 5), and then buys in year -2; in this situation the “selling 
behavior” is still wiped out if the purchase in year -2 exceeds the absolute value of the sum of all selling 
or non-trading in years -5, -4, and -3; if this is not the case, then the manager’s dependent variable is not 
changed. 
34
 We delete quarters when both holding and net change are zero to prevent comparing zero change in 
the sample’s institutional ownership that is due to zero holding with control sample’s ownership with 
holdings in the same quarter; this comparison would lead to an understatement of abnormal net selling 
for institutions in the sample.  
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We regress our dependent variable on several firm and market characteristics for all 
managers in the sample; subsequently we divide our sample into several sub-samples to assess 
trading behavior of each type of institutional manager in our sample.  We measure our 
independent variables as of the year of the dependent variable.  As explanatory variables we 
choose natural logarithms of total assets (LNAT), market capitalization (LNMKTVL), and 
sales (LNSALES), as well as the following ratios: return on assets (ROA), debt-to-assets 
(LTAT), current ratio (CURR), asset turnover (STOAT), debt-to-equity (DTEQ), and book-to-
market (BM).  We also utilize standard deviation of security returns measured over one year 
period as an annual risk measure (RISK), stock return adjusted for the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq 
value-weighted return (ARVW), and share turnover as trading volume divided by total shares 
outstanding (LQDT).  We include two sets of variables that measure institutional herding 
behavior to describe the relation between trading by other institutions and the possibility of 
managers in the sample initiating selling shares of distressed firms in the earlier years: the 
number of 13f holders in the quarter of institutional trading (NUM13F) within the year of 
dependent variable and its lagged value (NUM13FLAG) in the year prior to the year of 
dependent variable, the total number of shares held by institutions in the quarter of 
institutional trading as a percentage of shares outstanding (IHPC) and its lagged value 
(IHPCLAG), and the number of shares held by the largest ten institutional owners in the 
quarter of institutional trading as a percentage of total shares outstanding (TENPC) and its 
lagged value (TENPCLAG).  Because 13f institutional stock owners are not obligated to 
report their holdings until after the quarter end, we use lagged values to measure effect of 
those holdings on the current quarter’s institutional trading.  However, due to the possibility of 
information sharing among institutions or information leakage, the changes in institutional 
holdings could become known to other institutions (and possibly to the market) during the 
quarter of the trading.  To measure impact of this “preliminary” trading information 
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dispersion, we consider contemporaneous measures of institutional investments and their 
changes.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In Table 7 we report ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients (also known as 
maximum likelihood estimates), odds ratio estimates (for more intuitive interpretation of the 
results), and corresponding p-values (reported in parenthesis).  We categorize results reported 
in the table by manager type and find that they are qualitatively identical, where statistically 
significant, to those for the entire sample.  At the bottom of Table 7 we also present likelihood 
ratios, their degrees of freedom, and associated p-values corresponding to the conclusion that 
at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to zero.  The majority of the 
regression coefficients appears to be significantly different from zero; however, several 
coefficient estimates are not economically material (those with point estimates close to one).   
Institutions start selling securities of firms with smaller asset size earlier in the five-
year period—for  a one unit increase in the natural logarithm of total assets, the odds of 
institutions start selling in the earlier years are 0.91 times lower than for the years closer to the 
quarter of bankruptcy, given all other variables are held constant.  Institutions also sell less 
risky and more levered firms, and firms with lower ROA and current ratios sooner during the 
five-year period (the odds decrease by 0.87 for one unit increase in the risk measure and the 
odds increase by 1.1 for one unit increase in the debt-to-assets ratio; the odds decrease by 0.94 
for one unit increase in ROA ratio and by 0.99 for one unit increase in current ratio).  The 
coefficient estimate on share volume (LQDT) is not different from zero in the regression.  
Based on the regression results, to this point we cannot reject our first hypothesis that 
institutional investors delay selling shares of bankrupt firms that are larger, less levered, and 
operationally stronger, as indicated by higher ROA and current ratios.  However, institutions 
sell shares of less risky firms sooner during the five-year period. 
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Surprisingly, the institutional managers sell firms sooner with a higher natural 
logarithm of sales and asset turnover ratio (for one unit increase in each of these variables the 
odds of selling well in advance of a bankruptcy filing are 1.03 and 1.06, respectively, greater 
than for the later years, holding all other variables constant).  Even more surprising, 
institutional shareholders are likely to sell shares of distressed firms with greater value-
weighted market adjusted abnormal returns sooner during the five-year period (point estimate 
for this variable is economically material 1.3).  Institutions also hold on to the shares of 
distressed firms with smaller market capitalization while sell those with smaller total assets.   
Institutions exhibit herding behavior.  We find that the odds of the institutions selling 
shares of distressed firms during the earlier years of the five-year period rise with greater prior 
quarter’s number of 13f filers (by 1.008 for each unit increase, which is not economically 
material) and percentage of shares held by institutional investors (by an economically material 
1.75); the odds fall with an increase in the current quarter’s number of 13f filers (by 0.99, 
which is not economically material), percentage of shares held by all institutions (by 
economically significant 0.86), and percentage of shares held by the largest ten institutions (by 
also economically significant 0.44).  We find, however, interpretation of the coefficients for 
contemporaneous measures of institutional holdings to be more intuitive; in addition, two of 
the three lagged values of the variables are either statistically or economically insignificant.  
Perhaps, the fact that information on institutional trading becomes known to other institutions 
before the required filing with the SEC may drive our results.  This evidence supports our first 
hypothesis that institutional investors delay selling shares of bankrupt firms that are held by 
other institutional investors. 
In summary, we find that institutional investors delay selling shares of bankrupt firms 
that are larger, with lower debt-to-total assets ratio, higher debt-to-equity, ROA, and current 
ratios, and higher equity risk.  Institutional investors tend to sell shares of distressed firms 
with fewer 13f filers and lower percentage of institutional holdings sooner.  Looking at these 
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findings in aggregate, it seems as institutional investors ignore several important operating and 
market performance indicators and closely follow trading strategies of other institutions 
holding the shares.  Our findings support conclusions made in the extant literature suggesting 
that institutions exhibit herding investment behavior and that the institutional herding is a 
consequence of an irrational psychological behavior resulting in significant capital losses.   
ii. Institutional trading around periods of quarterly abnormal holding period returns 
We now examine the relation between the timing of institutional trading and security 
returns to test our second hypothesis.  Seyhun and Bradley (1997) find that stockholders of 
bankrupt firms suffer significant capital losses in the years before filing and find that corporate 
insiders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions and trading large number of shares sell stock 
before prices fall and buy stock after prices have fallen.  The data in Table 4, however, 
indicate that institutional managers are net buyers of the shares of failing firms during the five-
year period preceding the filings (the average abnormal net number of shares purchased per 
firm for quarterly period -20, -1, inclusive, is a positive 4,863).  Giving institutions the benefit 
of a doubt, we attempt to further investigate this result and find out whether institutional 
selling (buying) of bankrupt firms occurs before (after) stock price declines.  If the institutions 
in our sample do not act strategically and, instead, sell (buy) shares after (before) the prices 
fall, then they would incur capital losses. 
To test our second hypothesis we utilize a modification of the methodology developed 
by Seyhun and Bradley (1997).  First, to measure the timing of institutional trading, we 
partition abnormal holding period returns before and after institutional trading using a dummy 
variable technique.  We begin with calculating quarterly abnormal holding period returns 
between 1988 and 2011 by subtracting quarterly value-weighted market returns from each 
firm’s returns in the same quarter.  Then, for each quarter holding period, we determine the net 
abnormal trading by institutional managers in the quarter preceding the holding period and the 
 34 
 
net abnormal trading by the managers in the quarter immediately following the holding quarter 
period.
35
 
Next we run the following regression for each quarter-manager combination. 
AHPRt = β0 + β1 DBi,t + β2 DAi,t + Ɛ t, for i = 1, 3 and t = -19 to 0, 
where AHPRt = abnormal holding period return in quarter t; DBi,t = dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 if institutional managers are net buyers, 0 if they are non-traders, and -1 if they 
are net sellers during the quarter before the holding period, t; and DAi,t = dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 if managers buy, 0 if they do not trade, and -1 if they sell during the 
quarter after the holding period, t. 
 As Seyhun and Bradley (1997) indicate, if the institutional investors sell shares of 
stocks before their prices fall, then β1 should be positive and significant; if institutions sell 
after the prices fall, then β2 should be positive and significant.  If, however, the institutional 
investors believe that the market price has fallen and that the investment is now undervalued, 
they would be enticed to buy shares of this security; this would result in a negative, 
statistically significant estimate for β2. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Table 8 we report time-series estimates of the coefficients of the estimating 
equation for all institutions in the sample, by manager type, and by year prior to bankruptcy 
filing, with the final rows being for the aggregated five-year period.  The signs of the 
coefficients for before-holding period trading (DB) are mixed during the five-year period we 
analyze.  While one might argue that there is an indication of strategic trading in year t-1 
(DB’s coefficient is 0.007), the overall five-year coefficient is -0.0013 which is significant and 
suggestive, for the period, of purchasing before prices fall.  Further, the estimates for 
coefficients on after-holding-period abnormal trading (DA) are positive from t-4 forward (and 
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 As in Table 4, abnormal trading is calculated as the difference in the net institutional holding changes 
for the sample firms in a certain quarter before filing and the net institutional holding changes for 
corresponding control firm(s) in the same quarter. 
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in aggregate for the entire period), suggesting that institutions sell shares of distressed firms 
after prices fall.  Turning to our results by manager type, we find qualitatively similar results 
as for all managers in the sample.
36
   
To analyze trading size effects of large transactions as more informative trades, we 
compare returns across firms by partitioning the number of shares traded into three groups: 
small, medium, and large.  The upper and lower bounds of each group are determined based 
on the highest and the lowest number of shares traded in each group.  We divided all 
institutional net holding changes onto three groups and find the highest and the lowest number 
of net shares traded in each group as follows: (1) we find absolute values of the net sales, (2) 
we then sort all institutional trades based on their size, (3) we assign the largest 10% of all 
quarterly net changes to the large trading size category, and equally divide the remaining 
transactions between medium (45% of transactions) and small (remaining 45% of 
transactions) categories, finally (4) we assign the smallest transaction in the large trading 
category as a lower bound for this category, amounts of the largest and the smallest 
transactions in the medium trading size category as an upper and a lower bounds, respectively, 
and amount of the largest transaction in the small trading size category as an upper bound.  
We repeat the same partitioning for each manager type.  In the first panel of Table 8(a) we 
present regression results for all institutional managers, categorized by quarter horizon relative 
to the filing and by trading size and in the following five panels we present the same results 
for each manager type.   
[Insert Table 8(a) here] 
Interestingly, in the largest transaction size category the coefficients for before-
holding period trading (DB) are negative and statistically significant for all institutional 
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 Earlier we had found investment funds and their managers (type =3) had, in contrast with all other 
institutions, engaged in heavy selling throughout this time period.  However, their results, as presented 
in Table 8, are not different from other institutions; they do not seem to sell prior to losses the firms 
suffer. 
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investors and manager types 1 (banks), 2 (insurance companies), and 5 (all others) during the 
five-year period we analyze.  While one would expect large trades to be more informative, we 
find that these transactions are indication of institutional share purchases before the prices 
decline.  The overall five-year coefficient is -0.01, which is statistically significant.  The 
estimates for coefficients on after-holding-period abnormal trading (DA) are not different 
from zero.  We reject our second hypothesis that institutional investors sell shares of distressed 
firms to avoid capital losses and that they invest similarly to insiders who sell (postpone 
purchase) shares before significant stock-price decreases and buy (postpone sales) before 
significant price increases. 
iii. Do institutions trade consistently with changes in recommendations issued by 
investment analysts? 
Finally, we consider our third hypothesis relating to institutional trading and analyst 
recommendations.  Do institutions trade consistently with sell-side analyst recommendations 
knowing well that the analysts, especially affiliated ones, have a tendency to issue overly 
optimistic and/or upward biased recommendations?  We answer this question by considering 
the relationship of analysts’ sell recommendations and changes in institutional holdings of 
distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy. 
The bankrupt firms are not a random sample of firms and consequently managers’ 
decisions to trade shares of these firms (ultimately) is endogenously determined.  In addition, 
it is difficult to establish causality between institutional selling of shares of distressed firms 
and changes in analyst recommendations.  Do institutions sell in response to security analysts’ 
bleak outlook on the firms’ future performance or do the analysts cease to follow firms as a 
result of institutional divestiture?  Due to the relationship of an endogenously chosen binary 
treatment (sell recommendations, in our case) with another endogenous continuous variable 
(net changes in institutional holdings), we evaluate the potential impact of selection bias using 
a standard two-stage Heckman model (Heckman (1976), Greene (1997), Chapter 20) for our 
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dependent variable.  In Table 9, Panel A, we first present results of a basic regression (OLS) 
with quarterly net change in institutional holdings as a dependent variable.  Then, in Panel B, 
we report results of a probit regression (in “Probit parameters” columns) that models the 
propensity of a sell-side security analyst to issue sell recommendations for the firms 
approaching bankruptcy filings and results of a cross-sectional regression with the inverse-
Mills ratios,
37
 λ, as an explanatory variable to correct for self-selection bias. 
As indicated above, we use net changes in institutional holdings as our dependent 
variable in both OLS and second-pass Heckman model regressions.
38
  However, prior to using 
this measure in a regression we normalize it for each manager i in a quarter t by subtracting its 
yearly mean (NCi,y(t)) and dividing the difference by its yearly standard deviation (SD(NCi,y(t))):   
NCNORMi,t =  
This normalization allows us to compare trading behavior over time and deals with year-fixed 
effects in the regression framework. 
 Analysts may issue recommendations more frequently than once a quarter, and 
because 13f data are quarterly, we average every quarter’s recommendations to obtain an 
appropriate (mean quarterly) measure for our regressions.  Assuming that institutions 
immediately react to recommendations after their announcement during a quarterly-period, we 
use contemporaneous quarterly mean analyst recommendations as one of our control 
variables.  We create a dummy variable (ARSELL) that takes on a value of 1 if mean quarterly 
recommendations are equal or greater than 3.5 (based on the data obtained from I/B/E/S, mean 
recommendation of 3.5 or greater approach recommendations such as Underperform (4) or 
Sell (5)), and 0 otherwise, and use this variable as an independent variable in our basic 
                                                 
37 Inverse-Mills ratio used to take account of a possible selection bias and is calculated as σ x ρ obtained from the probit 
regression. 
38 We use net holding changes instead of abnormal net changes used in the earlier two regressions because of a different nature of 
analysis we are trying to perform.  Sale, non-trading, or purchase properly measures institutions’ response to analyst sell 
recommendations, while abnormal net changes (vs. other institutions in control firms) in institutional holdings could distort the 
true actions by the institutions as a reaction to the recommendations.  
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regression and as a binary dependent variable in our probit regression in the two-stage 
Heckman model regression.  We also introduce as explanatory variables in the OLS regression 
the percentage quarterly change in the shares outstanding (DSHR), the natural logarithm of the 
market values (LNMKTVL), the quarterly change in the abnormal value-weighted holding 
period returns (DARVW), the quarterly change in the share volume as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding (DLQDT), the quarterly change in the total institutional ownership as a 
percentage of shares outstanding (DIHPC), the risk measure (BETA), and the current quarter’s 
coverage ratio defined as total assets divided by total liabilities (ATLT).  We use these control 
variables in the second-pass Heckman model regression by selecting only those observations 
where binary variable ARSELL equals 1 and including the inverse-Mills ratios, λ.  For control 
variables in the probit model we use normalized lagged value of the net changes in 
institutional holdings (NTNORMLAG),
39
 natural logarithm of the market values 
(LNMKTVL), current quarter’s abnormal value-weighted holding period return (ARVW), 
share volume as a percentage of total shares outstanding (LQDT), total institutional ownership 
as a percentage of shares outstanding (IHPC), beta (BETA), coverage ratio (ATLT), operating 
income divided by revenues ratio (OIREV), and earnings per share (EPS). 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Based on the results reported in Table 9, during the five-year period preceding 
bankruptcy filings institutional managers’ net holding changes are negative in the quarters 
with analyst recommendations of Underperform or Sell (average recommendation of 3.5 or 
higher). The majority of the control variables reported in Table 9, Panel A, are statistically 
significant.  For the five-year period the coefficient estimate on ARSELL is negative and 
significant; net institutional changes in holdings of a firm are negative during periods where 
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 We use the same formula to derive normalized lagged value of net changes in institutional holdings 
as for the normalized net changes in institutional holdings (NCNORMi,t).   This control variable in the 
probit regression measures likelihood of analysts’ issuing a sell recommendation as a reaction to 
changes in institutional holdings. 
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analyst recommendations for the firm are “sell”.  We find that market value and beta are also 
inversely related to the net changes in the institutional holdings with coefficient estimates of -
0.007 and -0.019, respectively.  Net holding changes increase by 8.5 percent (p-value of 
0.0453) with an increase in shares outstanding, by almost 30 percent (p-value of <0.0001) 
with an increase in the percentage of shares owned by institutions (suggestive of herding 
behavior), and by 0.5 percent (statistically significant with p-value of <0.0001, however not 
economically material) with greater debt coverage ratio.  For the most part, estimates of the 
coefficients remain qualitatively consistent from year to year. 
From the “Probit parameters” columns in Table 9, Panel B, we find that analysts are 
less likely to issue sell recommendations when there are positive changes in the prior quarter’s 
institutional holdings.  However, the likelihood of analysts issuing sell recommendation rises 
with greater current quarter’s total shares held by institutions as a percentage of shares 
outstanding.  In addition, the likelihood of issuing a sell recommendation strongly depends on 
and positively relates to firms’ systematic risk.  The analysts are less likely to issue sell-type 
recommendations for the firms with greater market value, bigger coverage ratio, higher share 
volume, and stronger market performance indicated by larger value-weighted abnormal 
holding period returns.  We expected to see an inverse relationship between the dependent 
variable in the probit model and the performance-related explanatory variables such as 
operating income divided by revenues and earnings per share.  Only in year t-5 do we observe 
a negative sign on the EPS variable’s estimate of the coefficient.     
The second-pass Heckman regression coefficient estimates indicate the presence of an 
upward selection bias toward the coefficient on ARSELL in net institutional holding changes: 
the coefficient λ, which is computed from the inverse-Mills ratio based on the probit 
regression, is positive and statistically significant.  More important, the significantly positive 
coefficients on majority of the variables from the OLS regressions remain.  The two 
coefficient estimates, DARVW and DLQDT, that are not different from zero in the earlier 
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OLS regressions, are now statistically significant and equal -0.23 and -15.06 (with p-value of 
<0.0001 for both), respectively.  These results indicate that net institutional holding changes 
decline, indicating smaller purchases or larger sales, with increase in liquidity and abnormal 
holding period returns.  Another puzzling result we observe in the regression for the five-year 
period is that beta and coverage ratio switch signs from the earlier basic regression for the 
same period (although it is consistent with the OLS results in years t-3 and t-2).  These results 
suggest that the institutions prefer riskier firms with higher debt.  In summary, by re-
performing our OLS regressions using two-pass Heckman model, we show that, although 
apparent differences in the net institutional holding changes across different time-windows are 
not explained away by a self-selection bias, there is some sensitivity in our results to the 
selection-bias correction.  Institutions react to analysts’ sell recommendations by either 
reducing purchases or increasing sales of the shares of bankrupt firms. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the investment behavior of institutional managers who hold 
firms which subsequently file bankruptcy petitions.  We find that during the five-year period 
preceding a bankruptcy filing managers are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of 
shares (versus the control sample) traded during the period.  When analyzing institutional 
trading behavior for five years prior to bankruptcy filing we find that institutional investors do 
not sell heavily until the year prior to filing and during the quarter of filing.  As opposed to the 
group as a whole, investment company managers are heavy sellers during the entire period. 
Irrespective of these findings we attempt to assess the likelihood of institutions 
starting to sell earlier during the five-year period preceding a bankruptcy filing in relationship 
to important firm-specific operating and market variables.  The propensity of institutional 
managers to start selling shares of bankrupt firms sooner appears to positively correlate with 
firm’s leverage; it negatively correlates with firm’s size, ROA, market debt-to-equity and 
current ratios, as well as its riskiness.  We observe strong signs of herding when assessing 
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what prompts the institutions to start selling and find that smaller shareholdings of all 
institutional investors and of the largest ten institutional investors, as well as fewer institutions 
owning the same security tend to increase the likelihood of institutional managers to start 
selling shares well in advance of a bankruptcy filing.   
Given institutional managers do not seem to sell early in the pre-bankruptcy process 
we attempt to find signs of a sound logic in the institutions’ investment strategy.  We evaluate 
the timing of institutional managers’ trading and determine whether they sell securities of 
bankrupt firms before the share prices fall significantly avoiding great capital losses.  We fail 
to find evidence that institutional stockholders trade strategically and avoid material price 
declines before they occur. 
We find that institutional managers react to sell recommendations issued by security 
analysts.  However, the sell-side analysts do not start downgrading their recommendations for 
the failing firms until only few months before a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing; consequently, 
the managers’ response to these recommendations may be too-little-too-late.  
In our analysis of institutional investment behavior we do not find convincing 
evidence that would persuade us to believe in sophistication, ingenuity, and astuteness of 
institutions’ investment strategies–at least as it might pertain to firms during the five years 
prior to filing Chapter 11 petitions.  As much and as hard as we have tried finding signs of any 
of these qualities, we disappoint ourselves with findings of irrational herding behavior and 
delayed reaction to the signs of trouble that bankrupt firms start showing several years before 
they file for reorganization.  We provide support for earlier findings that suggest that 
institutional herding is a result of irrational psychological behavior and those managers’ 
herding and feedback trading are a fad possibly encouraged by agency problems. 
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Table 1 
Firms Filing Chapter 11 during Period October 1993-October 2011, Categorized by Year 
 
Year 
No. of Ch 11 
Filings 
Percent 
Mean 
Duration 
(in days) 
Median 
Duration 
(in days) 
Frequency of 
Emergence 
from Ch 11 
Total Assets (in mill.) 
1 yr. prior to filing Chapter 11 
No. of Firms Mean Median Std Dev 
1993 22 1.2 454 404 2 21 313.03 125.79 422.01 
1994 49 2.68 483 389 28 42 176.89 66.60 261.71 
1995 52 2.84 556 482 34 49 436.51 169.84 833.82 
1996 53 2.89 441 344 46 46 274.35 164.10 292.09 
1997 47 2.57 526 364 54 44 337.16 113.10 775.02 
1998 72 3.93 552 351 47 56 540.72 238.50 1,186.77 
1999 114 6.23 474 376 76 96 582.36 166.05 1,087.44 
2000 156 8.52 551 440 110 118 700.93 289.95 1,105.28 
2001 249 13.6 522 427 122 126 1,558.45 316.67 4,561.83 
2002 218 11.91 455 360 226 158 2,387.81 322.76 9,665.54 
2003 158 8.63 444 357 225 118 901.70 200.71 2,473.75 
2004 81 4.42 393 317 167 69 717.71 286.50 2,078.83 
2005 78 4.26 416 363 101 60 2,261.64 148.75 6,121.49 
2006 54 2.95 311 286 88 43 598.14 194.96 1,508.77 
2007 58 3.17 401 358 70 42 1,254.86 62.21 4,014.16 
2008 115 6.28 384 358 70 72 7,895.27 179.43 59,267.13 
2009 171 9.34 316 272 139 139 3,749.37 452.12 15,250.31 
2010 70 3.82 214 161 151 51 819.82 205.00 1,786.10 
2011 14 0.76 144 126 75 12 443.78 391.15 448.06 
All Years 1,831  100 442 352 1,831  1,362 1,697.64 218.87 15,036.25 
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The table presents number of firms filing Chapter 11 annually between October 1993 and October 2011.  The data reported here comes from 
Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum database.  The sample consists of all U. S. firms that filed Chapter 11 and completed reorganization 
during the period regardless of their industry and the regulatory requirements under which they operate (financial and utility firms are included in 
the sample). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Firms 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Time horizon (in years): -5 -4 -3 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Performance indicators: (n=563) (n=636) (n=667) 
Total assets ($ mill) 1,142.690 134.361 1,181.950 134.674 1,316.860 159.204 
Sales ($ mill) 528.105 120.034 536.977 113.172 573.207 124.006 
Sales/totla assets 1.192 1.033 1.141 0.953 1.101 0.901 
Operating ROA -0.294 0.068 -0.108 0.060 -0.123 0.054 
ROA -0.427 0.000 -0.231 -0.012 -0.305 -0.039 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.794 0.639 0.737 0.667 0.888 0.696 
Market debt/equity ratio 9.335 1.095 4.423 1.242 6.473 1.326 
Current ratio 2.698 1.665 2.732 1.669 2.475 1.635 
Cash ratio 0.892 0.169 0.997 0.164 0.865 0.155 
Altman Z-score 2.080 2.357 2.776 2.093 0.951 1.710 
Volatility 0.564 0.574 0.571 0.560 0.671 0.600 
Market-adjusted return -0.002 -0.012 -0.004 -0.014 -0.008 -0.018 
       Market characteristics: (n=225) (n=285) (n=377) 
Market value of equity ($ mill.) 354.965 108.302 373.715 97.463 432.532 85.684 
B/M ratio 0.046 0.523 0.283 0.568 -0.295 0.503 
Trading volume (thousands of shares) 54.506 12.882 61.987 15.196 75.046 17.606 
Share turnover 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Bid-ask spread 0.569 0.305 0.339 0.250 0.388 0.255 
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(Table 2, Panel A continues) 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Time horizon (in years): -2 -1 0 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Performance indicators: (n=656) (n=481) (n=129) 
Total assets ($ mill) 1,545.650 174.900 2,316.000 156.513 844.058 205.622 
Sales ($ mill) 590.159 150.378 788.164 165.593 622.449 284.091 
Sales/totla assets 1.153 0.932 1.342 1.065 1.388 1.255 
Operating ROA -0.369 0.022 -0.710 -0.021 -0.308 0.018 
ROA -0.484 -0.092 -1.165 -0.227 -0.434 -0.300 
Total liabilities/total assets 1.132 0.743 2.081 0.891 1.766 1.096 
Market debt/equity ratio 16.941 2.081 51.869 6.447 213.518 79.535 
Current ratio 2.021 1.542 1.322 0.934 3.407 1.344 
Cash ratio 0.583 0.121 0.331 0.070 1.339 0.131 
Altman Z-score 1.411 1.234 -3.945 -0.158 -5.191 -0.399 
Volatility 0.685 0.635 0.780 0.698 0.786 0.660 
Market-adjusted return -0.036 -0.044 -0.097 -0.103 -0.189 -0.239 
       Market characteristics: (n=446) (n=354) (n=94) 
Market value of equity ($ mill.) 426.250 62.675 349.341 22.526 96.913 4.640 
B/M ratio -1.158 0.457 -11.221 0.240 -82.031 -3.434 
Trading volume (thousands of shares) 99.636 19.941 158.554 23.336 498.382 35.548 
Share turnover 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Bid-ask spread 0.359 0.262 0.285 0.180 0.211 0.188 
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(Table 2, Panels B and C continues) 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
Time horizon (in quarters): -20, -17 (n=582) -16, -13 (n=667) -12, -9 (n=780) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
All 13(f) institutions as a percentage of all shares outstanding 32% 27% 32% 26% 31% 25% 
Largest institution as a percentage of all institutional holdings 37% 28% 38% 29% 41% 32% 
Largest 5 institutions as a percentage of all institutional 
holdings 73% 75% 74% 75% 75% 78% 
Largest 10 institutions as a percentage of all institutional 
holdings 85% 92% 86% 93% 87% 94% 
Panel C: Ownership by Manager Type 
Time horizon (in quarters): -20, -17 (n=582) -16, -13 (n=667) -12, -9 (n=780) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1=Banks 5% 2% 5% 2% 5% 2% 
2=Insurance companies 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 
3=Investment co. and their mgrs 5% 2% 4% 2% 5% 2% 
4=Independent inv. advisors 17% 12% 17% 13% 18% 14% 
5=All others 3% 0% 3% 1% 4% 1% 
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(Table 2, Panels B and C continues) 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
Time horizon (in quarters): -8, -5 (n=885) -4, -1 (n=913) Quarter 0 (n=881) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
All 13(f) institutions as a percentage of all shares outstanding 29% 21% 21% 13% 8% 3% 
Largest institution as a percentage of all institutional holdings 44% 35% 50% 43% 66% 66% 
Largest 5 institutions as a percentage of all institutional 
holdings 77% 82% 83% 91% 95% 100% 
Largest 10 institutions as a percentage of all institutional 
holdings 88% 96% 92% 99% 98% 100% 
Panel C: Ownership by Manager Type 
Time horizon (in quarters): -8, -5 (n=885) -4, -1 (n=913) Quarter 0 (n=881) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1=Banks 5% 2% 4% 2% 2% 0% 
2=Insurance companies 2% 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
3=Investment co. and their mgrs 4% 2% 3% 1% 1% 0% 
4=Independent inv. advisors 17% 13% 14% 9% 6% 2% 
5=All others 5% 1% 4% 1% 1% 0% 
 
This table presents firm characteristics and institutional ownership descriptive statistics for the sample of 124,844 quarterly institutional holding 
observations for 1,142 firms that file Chapter 11 and emerge from bankruptcy reorganization between October 1993 and December 2011.  The 
sample of 13f quarterly holdings is obtained for the period starting in the fourth quarter of 1988 (or five years preceding the earliest Chapter 11 
filing in our sample) through the third quarter of 2011 (or quarter of the latest filing in the sample).  Data on performance characteristics is 
obtained from Compustat and CRSP.  Data on quarterly institutional (13f) holdings comes from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings – 
s34.  Panel A reports total assets (in millions of $), sales (in millions of dollars), and several ratios: sales divided by total assets; operating income 
before depreciation divided by total assets (operating ROA); net income divided by total assets (ROA); total liabilities divided by total assets; total 
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liabilities divided by market value of equity (market debt/equity); current assets divided by current liabilities (current ratio); cash divided by 
current liabilities (cash ratio); and a sum of common equity, deferred taxes, and investment tax credit divided by market capitalization (B/M ratio).  
It also contains Altman’s Z-score defined as 3.3x((pretax income + interest expense)/total assets) + 0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market 
capitalization/total liabilities) + 1.2x(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets), volatility (standard deviation of stock 
monthly returns), market-adjusted abnormal return defined as quarterly holding period return adjusted for the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-
weighted return, share turnover measured as trading volume divided by total shares outstanding, trading volume (in thousands of shares), and bid-
ask spread.  The totals in the panel are provided starting with year 5 before a firm files Chapter 11 and ending with year 0, year of the bankruptcy 
filing.  Panel B includes data on institutional ownership reported for the five time horizons, consisting of four quarters each, and for quarter 0, 
quarter of filing.  The ownership in the panel is reported for all 13f filers as a percentage of shares outstanding, and for three size-type ownership 
categories as a percentage of total shares owned by institutions – the largest, the largest five, and the largest ten.  Panel C breaks down the data by 
time horizons and by manager types: 1=banks, 2=insurance companies, 3=investment companies and their managers, 4=independent investment 
advisors, and 5=all others.  The ownerships for each manager type are reported as percentages of total shares outstanding.  In parenthesis, n is a 
number of observations. 
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Table 3: Net Trading Behavior of Institutional Investors before Filing for a 
Bankruptcy Petition, 1988-2011 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
Total 
sample 
firms 
All sample firms Total 
control 
firms 
All control firms 
Net 
buyers 
Non-
traders 
Net 
sellers 
Net 
buyers 
Non-
traders 
Net 
sellers 
-20, -17 582 312 16 254 3,213 1,453 503 1,258 
-16, -13 667 328 22 317 3,529 1,384 496 1,649 
-12,   -9 780 361 25 394 3,630 1,232 467 1,931 
-8,    -5 885 365 38 482 3,787 1,326 493 1,968 
-4,    -1 913 258 53 602 3,636 1,363 506 1,768 
0 881 88 61 732 2,784 1,179 188 1,417 
 
This table reports number of firms where institutional shareholders are net buyers, non-traders, 
or net-sellers for institutions in the sample and for benchmark group of institutions.  The 
sample of net changes in 13f quarterly holdings is obtained for the period 1988-2011.  Data on 
quarterly institutional (13f) holdings comes from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) 
Holdings – s34.  The results are reported for each quarter horizon preceding a bankruptcy 
filing and for quarter 0, quarter of filing.  Included are total number of institutions by period 
used in determining groups of three types of traders for both sample and control group.  
Institutions are considered as net buyers if the number of shares purchased exceeds the 
number of shares sold, as non-traders if no shares are traded in the quarters with holdings, and 
as net sellers if the number of shares sold exceeds the number of shares purchased. 
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Table 4: Mean Quarterly Abnormal Net Number of Shares Traded per Firm 
over the Indicated Horizon 
 
Quarter 
horizons All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
-20, -17 7,424 -523 6,995 -38,970 9,543 29,443 
 
(<.0001) (0.1379) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-16, -13 5,351 898 14,281 -11,336 6,462 9,953 
 
(<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-12,   -9 -166 -6,010 -2,634 -18,099 -2,118 14,635 
 
(0.4173) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-8,    -5 9,387 4,243 15,162 -23,837 1,330 34,019 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-4 19,489 12,259 4,657 7,373 14,468 45,989 
 
(<.0001) (0.0485) (0.5604) (0.7836) (0.0321) (<.0001) 
-3 -36,519 -20,189 -17,675 -57,494 -32,692 -60,005 
 
(0.0007) (<.0001) (0.0054) (0.0033) (<.0001) (0.2146) 
-2 -17,916 -14,942 -7,683 -90,052 -17,096 -3,407 
 
(<.0001) (0.0003) (0.5705) (0.0026) (0.0006) (0.5111) 
-1 -28,531 -26,455 -25,052 -113,842 -24,702 -13,419 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0088) (0.0935) (0.0001) (0.0477) 
0 -116,389 -60,769 -67,610 -281,639 -159,141 -53,682 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-20,  -1 4,863 2,109 2,433 -15,608 4,356 16,805 
 
(<.0001) (0.0514) (0.1303) (0.0035) (0.0003) (<.0001) 
-16,  -1 2,242 -445 1,619 -23,836 1,683 15,334 
 
(0.1260) (0.8133) (0.4101) (0.0009) (0.3805) (0.0012) 
-12,  -1 -942 -1,478 -2,188 -29,531 -2,809 14,094 
 
(0.5861) (0.4619) (0.3387) (0.0005) (0.2248) (0.0105) 
-8,    -1 450 140 472 -28,399 -1,490 14,547 
 
(0.7971) (0.9145) (0.8565) (0.0014) (0.4197) (0.0267) 
-4,    -1 -4,287 -8,211 -1,837 -55,152 -5,301 12,702 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
-2,    -1 -23,224 -20,699 -16,368 -101,947 -20,899 -8,413 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0476) (0.0057) (<.0001) (0.0529) 
 
Mean quarterly abnormal net number of shares traded per sample firm as compared to that per 
control firm is included in this table.  The data on sample and control net holding changes is 
obtained for the period 1988-2011 from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings – s34.  
The results are reported for each quarter horizon preceding a bankruptcy filing, for quarter 0, 
quarter of filing, and for periods of 20, 16, 12, 8, and 2 quarters before the filing.  The data are 
also categorized by manager types: 1=banks, 2=insurance companies, 3=investment 
companies and their managers, 4=independent investment advisors, and 5=all others.  
Institutional purchases are coded as positive numbers and sales as negative numbers.  The 
sample trades are adjusted by the number of shares traded by institutions holding shares of 
 55 
 
control firms of similar size in the same quarter to arrive at an abnormal net number.  P-values 
are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Number of Managers Going Above and Below the SEC's Threshold for 13f Reporting, Categorized by Manager Type 
 
Quarter Description 
All managers 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
-19 # of managers 5,628 4,131 914 675 320 213 396 273 2,979 2,353 1,019 617 
 
# of shares (in mill.) 865 545 83 38 26 23 80 49 519 338 158 96 
 
Ave. share price 22.04 19.80 21.43 17.07 22.36 19.29 22.39 19.86 22.12 20.29 22.11 21.06 
-18 # of managers 5,255  4,708  892  738  270  230  317  368  2,862  2,592  914  780  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 736 654 52 81 26 20 91 81 448 389 119 83 
  Ave. share price 21.33 21.10 19.47 19.91 22.00 20.10 22.12 19.72 21.51 21.54 22.10 21.70 
-17 # of managers 5,421  4,946  805  795  282  273  384  343  2,918  2,767  1,032  768  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 946 725 51 64 33 27 109 93 542 433 211 107 
  Ave. share price 22.14 19.76 19.98 18.29 21.56 17.23 24.73 20.28 22.19 20.14 22.90 20.59 
-16 # of managers 5,371  5,207  837  844  285  297  388  341  2,834  2,823  1,027  902  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 733 797 48 54 26 30 65 86 442 487 151 140 
  Ave. share price 21.64 20.16 18.98 18.14 21.39 18.13 21.08 20.99 22.31 20.76 22.21 20.50 
-15 # of managers 5,654  5,086  882  814  323  257  389  361  2,913  2,713  1,147  941  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 810 978 60 68 33 41 87 96 451 641 179 131 
  Ave. share price 24.16 18.86 23.86 16.38 23.63 15.29 28.49 17.43 23.69 19.67 24.25 20.18 
-14 # of managers 5,981  5,030  876  779  285  255  440  357  3,178  2,734  1,202  905  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,018 762 61 59 36 22 141 109 584 453 195 119 
  Ave. share price 22.54 20.61 20.29 17.67 21.64 18.35 23.31 20.54 22.89 21.37 23.19 21.51 
-13 # of managers 6,338  5,282  1,007  807  360  261  456  360  3,248  2,784  1,267  1,070  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,112 798 86 70 65 26 113 76 580 461 269 165 
  Ave. share price 22.64 19.64 21.23 18.05 23.86 15.76 25.08 21.91 23.09 19.99 21.40 20.10 
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(Table 5 continues) 
Quarter Description 
All managers 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
-12 # of managers 6,612  5,410  1,035  838  348  281  505  366  3,447  2,891  1,277  1,034  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 937 783 71 64 36 27 105 88 522 458 203 145 
  Ave. share price 21.83 20.84 20.86 20.10 21.38 17.17 24.41 22.73 22.26 21.27 20.58 20.56 
-11 # of managers 7,010  5,887  1,120  870  362  310  501  428  3,644  3,166  1,383  1,113  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,119 928 81 65 42 42 117 114 662 532 217 174 
  Ave. share price 24.11 19.58 23.18 16.55 22.40 18.01 25.62 21.21 24.76 20.24 23.04 19.87 
-10 # of managers 8,098  6,441  1,298  929  430  347  573  440  4,152  3,437  1,645  1,288  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,553 996 133 93 60 28 209 88 828 585 323 203 
  Ave. share price 24.78 21.02 24.37 17.78 24.74 18.44 26.62 23.38 25.68 21.57 22.18 21.77 
-9 # of managers 9,123  6,819  1,332  1,045  465  346  558  474  4,887  3,530  1,881  1,424  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 2,750 1,078 509 92 242 32 330 120 1,203 606 466 228 
  Ave. share price 23.25 20.29 23.25 18.72 21.41 18.40 25.16 20.38 24.11 21.04 20.89 20.00 
-8 # of managers 7,850  7,224  1,164  1,067  439  342  506  509  3,987  3,825  1,754  1,481  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,421 1,108 106 76 39 31 190 113 737 632 349 256 
  Ave. share price 21.59 19.43 20.82 18.46 20.98 17.28 23.99 18.27 22.20 20.45 20.15 18.39 
-7 # of managers 7,665  7,767  1,108  1,113  400  397  458  501  3,901  4,113  1,798  1,643  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,344 1,368 82 91 37 39 123 152 736 783 366 303 
  Ave. share price 20.14 19.32 18.01 17.46 18.75 16.74 19.40 20.71 21.39 19.88 19.23 19.40 
-6 # of managers 7,907  7,886  1,148  1,136  374  411  481  510  4,075  3,873  1,829  1,956  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,551 1,416 101 98 71 43 188 176 806 770 384 329 
  Ave. share price 18.99 17.39 15.99 20.04 17.37 13.72 19.63 15.32 20.18 17.33 18.36 17.26 
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(Table 5 continues) 
Quarter Description 
All managers 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Above 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
Under 
SEC 
thre- 
shold 
-5 # of managers 6,638  8,227  1,016  1,169  330  429  389  532  3,352  4,280  1,551  1,817  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,188 1,575 75 130 33 46 95 185 655 852 329 361 
  Ave. share price 14.47 17.95 12.80 14.40 13.13 13.83 14.59 17.20 15.21 18.46 14.22 20.22 
-4 # of managers 6,047  8,296  899  1,306  265  477  323  519  3,111  4,197  1,449  1,797  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 1,223 1,546 61 130 70 50 106 215 664 821 321 331 
  Ave. share price 10.99 12.68 8.77 10.83 11.13 8.66 10.55 12.19 11.07 13.70 12.26 12.87 
-3 # of managers 4,925  8,057  736  1,301  200  435  244  518  2,466  4,042  1,279  1,761  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 908 2,108 72 157 19 94 93 234 435 1,095 290 528 
  Ave. share price 10.64 9.96 9.00 8.22 8.10 7.36 13.26 9.83 11.17 10.58 10.46 10.52 
-2 # of managers 3,986  8,181  619  1,397  183  515  162  521  1,938  4,013  1,084  1,735  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 807 2,164 41 185 16 127 39 302 422 1,119 289 431 
  Ave. share price 7.06 8.59 5.15 7.12 5.16 6.43 6.04 7.15 7.31 9.09 8.19 9.72 
-1 # of managers 3,145  9,213  507  1,740  100  639  147  560  1,520  4,249  871  2,025  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 817 2,928 70 276 11 142 29 340 437 1,487 269 684 
  Ave. share price 5.78 5.37 4.96 3.81 5.58 3.84 5.68 5.30 5.79 5.91 6.29 6.08 
0 # of managers 1,582  12,716  274  2,751  40  978  75  817  791  5,378  402  2,792  
 
# of shares (in mill.) 483 6,736 14 1,076 4 692 27 996 289 2,744 149 1,228 
  Ave. share price 2.28 4.39 1.49 3.39 2.72 3.71 1.81 4.43 2.05 4.64 3.32 5.10 
 
Number of institutional managers whose shareholdings either fell below or rose above the SEC’s threshold for 13f reporting during period 
analyzed is included in this table.  Number of shares held (in mill.) and share prices for managers’ buy-ins are as of quarter of the buy-ins.  
Number of share held (in mill.) and share prices for managers’ sell-offs are as of quarter prior to the quarter of the sell-offs.  The data are obtained 
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for the period 1988-2011 from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings – s34.  The results are reported for each quarter preceding a 
bankruptcy filing, starting with quarter q-19, and for quarter q=0, quarter of filing.  The data are also categorized by manager types: 1=banks, 
2=insurance companies, 3=investment companies and their managers, 4=independent investment advisors, and 5=all others. 
 
 60 
 
Table 6: Average Analyst Ratings and Average Frequency of Coverage, October 
1993-December 2011 
 
Quarter 
horizons All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
-20, -17 2.2192 2.1883 2.1752 2.1342 2.1797 2.3565 
 
8 8 8 8 8 9 
-16, -13 2.2627 2.2143 2.2183 2.1741 2.2151 2.4388 
 
8 7 8 8 8 9 
-12,   -9 2.3028 2.2656 2.2600 2.2232 2.2623 2.4564 
 
8 8 8 8 8 9 
-8,    -5 2.4050 2.3637 2.3728 2.3522 2.3744 2.5307 
 
10 9 9 9 10 11 
-4,    -1 2.8821 2.8570 2.8757 2.8559 2.8554 2.9734 
 
10 9 9 9 10 11 
-4 2.6965 2.6434 2.6674 2.6444 2.6483 2.8676 
 
3 3 3 3 3 4 
-3 2.7628 2.7579 2.7868 2.7358 2.7365 2.8267 
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
-2 2.8601 2.8412 2.8540 2.8480 2.8419 2.9204 
 
4 3 3 3 4 5 
-1 3.0244 2.9704 3.0200 2.9898 2.9925 3.1370 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 
0 3.5400 3.5440 3.5438 3.5391 3.5401 3.5325 
 
4 3 3 3 4 4 
Before 
filing date 
3.4830 3.4926 3.4860 3.4979 3.4872 3.4491 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
After filing 
date 
3.6454 3.6395 3.6519 3.6159 3.6395 3.6812 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
  
The table reports quarterly averages of analyst ratings and totals of recommendation 
frequencies.  The data on analyst recommendations, frequency of analyst coverage and its 
timing are obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S).  The data are 
reported for each quarter horizon preceding a bankruptcy filing and for quarter 0, quarter of 
filing.  The mean ratings are categorized by manager type: 1=banks, 2=insurance companies, 
3=investment companies and their managers, 4=independent investment advisors, and 5=all 
other. 
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Table 7: Propensity of Institutional Investors to Sell Well in Advance of a Bankruptcy Filing 
 
Variables 
All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates 
Intercept 5 -2.4058 - -2.6923 - -2.2398 - -2.3554 - -2.2576 - -2.5011 - 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept 4 -1.5556 - -1.7932 - -1.4193 - -1.5355 - -1.4434 - -1.5890 - 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept 3 -0.9453 - -1.1757 - -0.8246 - -0.9404 - -0.8477 - -0.9412 - 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0016) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept 2 -0.4131 - -0.6487 - -0.3117 - -0.4215 - -0.3063 - -0.4094 - 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2314) (0.0990) (0.0034) (0.0113) 
Intercept 1 -0.0826 - -0.3181 - -0.0054 - -0.1035 - 0.0236 - -0.0621 - 
 
(0.2431) (0.0480) (0.9835) (0.6853) (0.8216) (0.7007) 
LNAT -0.0973 0.907 -0.1411 0.868 -0.1915 0.826 -0.1078 0.898 -0.0847 0.919 -0.0547 0.947 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0031) (<.0001) (0.0269) 
LNSALES 0.0286 1.029 0.0729 1.076 0.1041 1.110 0.0695 1.072 0.0206 1.021 -0.0268 0.974 
 
(0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0211) (0.0994) (0.1715) 
STOAT 0.0553 1.057 0.0170 1.017 0.0391 1.040 -0.0012 0.999 0.0479 1.049 0.1303 1.139 
 
(<.0001) (0.4202) (0.2662) (0.9719) (0.0005) (<.0001) 
ROA -0.0609 0.941 -0.0332 0.967 -0.0474 0.954 -0.1334 0.875 -0.0493 0.952 -0.1063 0.899 
  (<.0001) (0.1203) (0.1806) (0.0004) (0.0007) (<.0001) 
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(Table 7 continues) 
Variables 
All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates 
LTAT 0.0880 1.092 0.1037 1.109 0.1644 1.179 0.0745 1.077 0.0586 1.060 0.0934 1.098 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1190) (0.0008) (<.0001) 
DTEQ -0.0016 0.998 -0.0024 0.998 -0.0022 0.998 -0.0017 0.998 -0.0020 0.998 0.0001 1.001 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0327) (0.0574) (<.0001) (0.8719) 
CURR -0.0018 0.998 0.0063 1.006 -0.0090 0.991 0.0182 1.018 -0.0116 0.988 0.0101 1.010 
 
(0.5262) (0.3236) (0.4132) (0.0702) (0.0062) (0.1614) 
ARVW 0.2557 1.291 0.3523 1.422 0.4313 1.539 -0.0250 0.975 0.1776 1.194 0.4275 1.533 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0016) (0.8578) (0.0015) (<.0001) 
LNMKTVL 0.0743 1.077 0.0718 1.074 0.0856 1.089 0.0439 1.045 0.0795 1.083 0.0589 1.061 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.0545) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BM 0.0034 1.003 0.0006 1.001 0.0031 1.003 0.0080 1.008 0.0025 1.002 0.0064 1.006 
 
(<.0001) (0.6898) (0.2390) (0.0130) (0.0178) (<.0001) 
LQDT 3.4131 1.511 6.7121 2.674 -6.3675 0.201 6.1301 2.461 -4.6810 0.626 -3.5888 0.728 
 
(0.8566) (0.2174) (0.4639) (0.4565) (0.8910) (0.4621) 
RISK -0.1388 0.870 -0.0937 0.911 -0.0951 0.909 -0.2069 0.813 -0.1172 0.889 -0.2149 0.807 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0046) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
NUM13F -0.0121 0.988 -0.0150 0.985 -0.0101 0.990 -0.0134 0.987 -0.0137 0.986 -0.0057 0.994 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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(Table 7 continues) 
Variables 
All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates Estimates 
Point 
esti- 
mates 
IHPC -0.1520 0.859 0.0393 1.040 -0.7539 0.471 -0.0802 0.923 -0.0204 0.980 -0.4267 0.653 
 
(0.0122) (0.7814) (0.0011) (0.7181) (0.8202) (0.0011) 
TENPC -0.8249 0.438 -1.1398 0.320 -1.2273 0.293 -0.9023 0.406 -0.7692 0.463 -0.3537 0.702 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0028) (0.0245) (<.0001) (0.1729) 
NUM13FLAG 0.0078 1.008 0.0106 1.011 0.0060 1.006 0.0095 1.010 0.0091 1.009 0.0023 1.002 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0007) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0222) 
IHPCLAG 0.5621 1.754 0.5073 1.661 1.2105 3.355 0.5336 1.705 0.3768 1.458 0.7536 2.125 
 
(<.0001) (0.0004) (<.0001) (0.0174) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
TENPCLAG -0.0701 0.932 0.4534 1.574 0.2163 1.241 -0.0259 0.974 -0.2198 0.803 -0.4291 0.651 
 
(0.5205) (0.0757) (0.5915) (0.9474) (0.1623) (0.1033) 
             LogLikelihood 6,364 1,364 476 463 3,284 991 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Degrees of freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18 
No. of observations 203,175 41,448 14,984 14,993 92,170 39,580 
 
Reported are estimates of the coefficients from ordered logit model.  The results are reported for all institutions, and then categorized by manager 
type: 1=banks, 2=insurance companies, 3=investment companies and their managers, 4=independent investment advisors, and 5=all others.  
Dependent variable in the regression is determined based on the quarterly abnormal net trading totals.  The value of dependent variable ranges 
from 0 to 5 depending on when an institution became a net seller for the first time.  Explanatory variables are as follows: natural logarithms of 
total assets (LNAT), market capitalization (LNMKTVL), and sales (LNSALES), return on assets (ROA), debt-to-assets (LTAT), current ratio 
(CURR), asset turnover (STOAT), debt-to-equity (DTEQ), and book-to-market (BM), risk (RISK), value-weighted abnormal return (ARVW), 
share turnover (LQDT), number of 13f holders (NUM13F) and its lagged value (NUM13FLAG), total number of shares held by institutions as 
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percentage of total shares outstanding (IHPC) and its lagged value (IHPCLAG), and number of shares held by the largest ten institutional owners 
as percentage of total shares outstanding (TENPC) and its lagged value (TENPCLAG).  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8: The Timing of Institutional Trading 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
All 
Manager type 
1 2 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
          -20, -17 -0.00367 0.0024 -0.0053 -0.0058 0.0029 -0.0043 -0.0051 0.0043 -0.0066 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0156) (0.0004) (<.0001) (0.0244) (0.0007) 
-16, -13 -0.00551 -0.0008 0.0012 -0.0067 0.0022 0.000002 -0.0081 -0.0022 0.0023 
 
(<.0001) (0.0751) (0.0052) (<.0001) (0.0238) (0.9987) (<.0001) (0.1508) (0.1407) 
-12,   -9 -0.00464 -0.0046 0.0021 -0.0057 -0.0056 0.0014 -0.0079 -0.0028 0.0013 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2290) (<.0001) (0.1237) (0.4896) 
-8,    -5 -0.03684 -0.0020 0.0012 -0.0371 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0395 -0.0044 0.0007 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0163) (<.0001) (0.0770) (0.8752) (<.0001) (0.0179) (0.7154) 
-4,    -1 -0.1047 0.0070 0.0088 -0.1043 0.0099 0.0079 -0.1054 0.0034 0.0092 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.2882) (0.0090) 
-20,  -1 -0.0332 -0.0013 0.0028 -0.0338 -0.0003 0.0025 -0.0348 -0.0019 0.0028 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6208) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0515) (0.0058) 
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(Table 8 continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 
3 4 5 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
          -20, -17 -0.0010 0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0036 0.0019 -0.0052 -0.0018 0.0014 -0.0068 
 
(0.4510) (0.0552) (0.0673) (<.0001) (0.0187) (<.0001) (0.0352) (0.2737) (<.0001) 
-16, -13 -0.0002 -0.0028 0.0036 -0.0039 -0.0012 0.0018 -0.0099 -0.0020 -0.0005 
 
(0.8276) (0.0959) (0.0374) (<.0001) (0.0626) (0.0055) (<.0001) (0.0427) (0.6476) 
-12,   -9 -0.0013 -0.0041 0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0042 0.0036 -0.0076 -0.0051 -0.0010 
 
(0.2447) (0.0333) (0.0302) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3206) 
-8,    -5 -0.0380 -0.0056 0.0006 -0.0362 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0369 -0.0035 0.0033 
 
(<.0001) (0.0037) (0.7678) (<.0001) (0.4852) (0.2020) (<.0001) (0.0010) (0.0026) 
-4,    -1 -0.1079 0.0077 0.0060 -0.1069 0.0073 0.0088 -0.0991 0.0043 0.0101 
 
(<.0001) (0.0229) (0.1102) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0134) (<.0001) 
-20,  -1 -0.0301 -0.0018 0.0035 -0.0322 -0.0008 0.0032 -0.0358 -0.0033 0.0020 
  (<.0001) (0.0866) (0.0011) (<.0001) (0.0354) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0007) 
 
The table reports estimated coefficients from institution-by-institution regressions of actual quarterly holding period returns minus value-weighted 
index return from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) on the abnormal number of shares traded in the quarterly intervals before and 
after the holding period.  The results are reported for all institutions, and then categorized by manager type: 1=banks, 2=insurance companies, 
3=investment companies and their managers, 4=independent investment advisors, and 5=all others.  Abnormal trades are coded as one of the three 
dummy variables: -1 if sales, 0 if no trading, and 1 if purchases.  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8(a): The Timing of Institutional Trading, Categorize by Transaction Size 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
All 
T < 107,500 107,500 <= T < 1,271,050 T >= 1,271,050 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.00385 0.0045 -0.0078 -0.0128 0.0042 -0.0098 -0.0170 0.0109 0.0001 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0276) (<.0001) (0.0020) (0.2846) (0.9900) 
-16, -13 -0.00504 -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0068 -0.0056 -0.0015 -0.0287 -0.0056 -0.0002 
 
(<.0001) (0.0007) (0.4183) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2721) (<.0001) (0.2602) (0.9702) 
-12,   -9 -0.00323 -0.0016 0.0029 -0.0036 -0.0022 0.0054 -0.0040 0.0054 0.0071 
 
(<.0001) (0.0014) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0882) (<.0001) (0.0954) (0.2092) (0.1007) 
-8,    -5 -0.02265 -0.0028 0.0011 -0.0258 -0.0077 0.0038 -0.0184 -0.0056 0.0106 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0529) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0077) (<.0001) (0.2283) (0.0290) 
-4,    -1 -0.0917 0.0055 0.0106 -0.1098 0.0004 -0.00172 -0.1306 -0.0123 -0.0115 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8363) (0.4266) (<.0001) (0.0539) (0.1091) 
-20,  -1 -0.0318 -0.0007 0.0029 -0.0398 -0.0045 0.0002 -0.0561 -0.0084 -0.0041 
  (<.0001) (0.0215) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8167) (<.0001) (0.0037) (0.1815) 
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(Table 8(a) continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 1 
T < 44,473 44,473 <= T < 588,400 T >= 588,400 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.0049 0.0045 -0.0071 -0.0094 0.0094 -0.0057 -0.0081 0.0029 -0.0063 
 
(<.0001) (0.0041) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0151) (0.1377) (0.3760) (0.8515) (0.6799) 
-16, -13 -0.0066 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0085 -0.0025 0.0012 -0.0281 -0.0084 0.0000 
 
(<.0001) (0.4912) (0.5485) (<.0001) (0.3475) (0.6501) (<.0001) (0.2360) (0.9952) 
-12,   -9 -0.0056 -0.0017 0.0028 -0.0038 -0.0017 0.0057 -0.0124 -0.0038 0.0019 
 
(<.0001) (0.1246) (0.0150) (0.0285) (0.5265) (0.0365) (0.0010) (0.5630) (0.7820) 
-8,    -5 -0.0223 -0.0030 -0.0005 -0.0277 -0.0041 0.0007 -0.0266 -0.0063 0.0033 
 
(<.0001) (0.0206) (0.7217) (<.0001) (0.1738) (0.8184) (<.0001) (0.3640) (0.6620) 
-4,    -1 -0.0909 0.0079 0.0091 -0.1076 0.0013 0.0074 -0.1214 -0.0114 0.0062 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7476) (0.1079) (<.0001) (0.3292) (0.6247) 
-20,  -1 -0.0321 0.00012 0.0020 -0.0400 -0.0009 0.0034 -0.0527 -0.0102 0.0009 
  (<.0001) (0.8497) (0.0025) (<.0001) (0.5724) (0.0433) (<.0001) (0.0262) (0.8568) 
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(Table 8(a) continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 2 
T < 32,992 32,992 <= T < 515,080 T >= 515,080 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.0036 0.0082 -0.0072 -0.0141 0.0076 -0.0120 -0.0102 -0.0124 -0.0338 
 
(0.0319) (0.0010) (0.0031) (<.0001) (0.1767) (0.0307) (0.2759) (0.4507) (0.0407) 
-16, -13 -0.0072 -0.0039 0.0007 -0.0109 -0.0034 -0.0015 -0.0273 -0.0041 -0.0098 
 
(<.0001) (0.0306) (0.6884) (<.0001) (0.3381) (0.6756) (<.0001) (0.7395) (0.4340) 
-12,   -9 -0.0059 0.0003 0.0025 -0.0052 -0.0019 0.0044 -0.0091 0.0011 0.0191 
 
(<.0001) (0.8669) (0.2067) (0.0204) (0.6066) (0.2345) (0.1472) (0.9211) (0.0709) 
-8,    -5 -0.0252 -0.0055 -0.0006 -0.0303 0.0005 0.0042 -0.0325 -0.0154 0.0129 
 
(<.0001) (0.0090) (0.7648) (<.0001) (0.9007) (0.3331) (<.0001) (0.1691) (0.2635) 
-4,    -1 -0.0899 0.0027 0.0133 -0.1108 -0.0073 -0.0036 -0.1374 -0.0157 -0.0076 
 
(<.0001) (0.3408) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2148) (0.5893) (<.0001) (0.3903) (0.7158) 
-20,  -1 -0.0324 -0.0013 0.0030 -0.0404 -0.0023 0.0006 -0.0576 -0.0128 0.0001 
  (<.0001) (0.2442) (0.0080) (<.0001) (0.3178) (0.8009) (<.0001) (0.0734) (0.9893) 
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(Table 8(a) continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 3 
T < 98,309 98,309 <= T < 1,440,556 T >= 1,440,556 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.0018 0.0057 -0.0083 -0.0121 0.0029 -0.0066 -0.0317 -0.0263 0.0113 
 
(0.3237) (0.0343) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.6130) (0.2503) (0.0028) (0.1660) (0.5633) 
-16, -13 0.0001 -0.0015 0.0028 0.0032 -0.0056 0.0001 -0.0255 0.0137 -0.0160 
 
(0.9677) (0.4476) (0.1527) (0.1992) (0.1667) (0.9755) (0.0010) (0.3185) (0.2557) 
-12,   -9 0.0007 -0.0033 0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0021 0.0099 -0.0024 0.0114 -0.0016 
 
(0.5636) (0.1030) (0.0882) (0.3840) (0.6192) (0.0171) (0.7138) (0.3520) (0.8982) 
-8,    -5 -0.0220 -0.0053 0.0010 -0.0244 -0.0124 0.0063 -0.0304 -0.0009 0.0092 
 
(<.0001) (0.0236) (0.6638) (<.0001) (0.0062) (0.1570) (<.0001) (0.9402) (0.4640) 
-4,    -1 -0.0917 0.0069 0.0097 -0.1124 -0.0055 -0.0008 -0.1198 -0.0095 -0.0026 
 
(<.0001) (0.0245) (0.0056) (<.0001) (0.3640) (0.9055) (<.0001) (0.5965) 0.8945  
-20,  -1 -0.0279 -0.0004 0.0032 -0.0341 -0.0070 0.0036 -0.0556 0.0002 -0.0069 
  (<.0001) (0.7179) (0.0075) (<.0001) (0.0030) (0.1350) (<.0001) (0.9815) (0.3907) 
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(Table 8(a) continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 4 
T < 86,925 86,925 <= T < 1,141,500 T >= 1,141,500 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.0039 0.0036 -0.0077 -0.0115 0.0026 -0.0113 -0.0198 0.0222 -0.0067 
 
(<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2812) (<.0001) (0.0064) (0.1063) (0.6270) 
-16, -13 -0.0039 -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0035 -0.0059 -0.0023 -0.0264 -0.0129 0.0063 
 
(<.0001) (0.0584) (0.1368) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.1948) (<.0001) (0.0544) (0.3776) 
-12,   -9 -0.0018 -0.0011 0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0043 0.0032 -0.0024 0.01006 0.0137 
 
(<.0001) (0.1372) (<.0001) (0.0152) (0.0111) (0.0620) (0.4605) (0.0758) (0.0185) 
-8,    -5 -0.0214 -0.0004 0.0022 -0.0252 -0.0096 0.0028 -0.0177 0.0036 0.0093 
 
(<.0001) (0.6169) (0.0098) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1335) (<.0001) (0.5976) (0.1890) 
-4,    -1 -0.0927 0.0059 0.0113 -0.1085 0.0038 -0.0033 -0.1337 -0.0083 -0.0129 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1282) (0.2410) (<.0001) (0.3134) (0.1681) 
-20,  -1 -0.0306 0.0002 0.0037 -0.0371 -0.0050 -0.0010 -0.0558 -0.0029 -0.0030 
  (<.0001) (0.5890) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3398) (<.0001) (0.4479) (0.4609) 
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(Table 8(a) continues) 
Quarter 
horizons 
Manager type 5 
T < 46,243 46,243 <= T < 748,100 T >= 748,100 
Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA Intercept DB DA 
-20, -17 -0.0016 0.0042 -0.0078 -0.0121 0.0117 -0.0123 -0.0159 -0.0134 -0.0052 
 
(0.1589) (0.0145) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0558) (0.3117) (0.6944) 
-16, -13 -0.0074 -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0138 -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0254 -0.0062 0.0017 
 
(<.0001) (0.0003) (0.3550) (<.0001) (0.0912) (0.1108) (<.0001) (0.4621) (0.8465) 
-12,   -9 -0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0043 0.0001 0.0047 -0.0142 0.0012 0.0027 
 
(<.0001) (0.0337) (0.7974) (0.0013) (0.9864) (0.0298) (0.0003) (0.8659) (0.6911) 
-8,    -5 -0.0246 -0.0051 0.0013 -0.0236 -0.0060 0.0026 -0.0168 -0.0163 -0.0046 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3121) (<.0001) (0.0136) (0.2841) (<.0001) (0.0271) (0.5551) 
-4,    -1 -0.0880 0.0055 0.0116 -0.0995 -0.0026 0.0012 -0.1185 -0.0152 -0.0164 
 
(<.0001) (0.0006) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4243) (0.7357) (<.0001) (0.1358) (0.1544) 
-20,  -1 -0.0340 -0.0023 0.0022 -0.0407 -0.0047 0.0001 -0.0539 -0.0175 -0.0064 
  (<.0001) (0.0004) (0.0009) (<.0001) (0.0006) (0.9515) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.1942) 
 
The upper and lower bounds of each trading size group are determined based on the highest and the lowest number of shares traded in each group. 
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Table 9: Institutional Response to Analysts’ Sell Recommendations 
 
Panel A: Ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values 
    Quarter horizons 
  Variables 
 
-20, -1 
 
-4,    -1 
 
-8,    -5 
 
-12,   -9 
 
-16, -13 
 
-20, -17 
  OLS model   
OLS 
parameters   
OLS 
parameters   
OLS 
parameters   
OLS 
parameters   
OLS 
parameters   
OLS 
parameters 
 
Intercept  
 
0.047 
 
0.010 
 
0.181 
 
0.115 
 
-0.118 
 
-0.030 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(0.391) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.392) 
 
ARSELL 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.033 
 
0.032 
 
-0.016 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.180) 
 
DSHR 
 
0.085 
 
0.080 
 
0.173 
 
0.075 
 
-0.025 
 
0.630 
   
(0.045) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.533) 
 
(0.705) 
 
(0.007) 
 
LNMKTVL 
 
-0.007 
 
0.002 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.012 
 
0.014 
 
-0.005 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(0.276) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.266) 
 
DARVW 
 
0.002 
 
0.016 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.010 
 
0.064 
 
0.054 
   
(0.817) 
 
(0.366) 
 
(0.549) 
 
(0.587) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.163) 
 
DLQDT 
 
0.568 
 
-0.959 
 
-2.374 
 
1.485 
 
5.276 
 
-7.316 
   
(0.635) 
 
(0.617) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.506) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.228) 
 
DIHPC 
 
0.297 
 
0.416 
 
0.429 
 
0.141 
 
0.523 
 
0.264 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.026) 
 
BETA 
 
-0.019 
 
0.005 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.023 
 
0.028 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.013) 
 
ATLT 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 
0.008 
 
0.006 
 
0.007 
 
0.003 
   
(<.0001) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(0.740) 
              
 
Adj. R
2
 
 
0.0021 
 
0.0044 
 
0.007 
 
0.0031 
 
0.0032 
 
0.0019 
  No. of observations 161,799    30,917    47,648    37,853    26,826    18,555  
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(Table 9 continues) 
Panel B: Two-pass Heckman model regressions (with selection ARSELL=1 for the second-pass) 
Variables 
Quarter horizons 
-20, -1 -4,    -1 -8,    -5 -12,   -9 -16, -13 -20, -17 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
model 
Probit 
para-
meters 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Probit 
model 
Heckman 
para-
meters 
Intercept Intercept -0.366 -0.521 -0.362 -0.678 -0.198 -0.192 -0.241 0.548 0.077 -0.685 -0.888 0.123 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.003) (0.009) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.209) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.031) 
NTNOR- DSHR -0.114 0.118 -0.098 -0.006 -0.094 -0.570 0.028 0.784 -0.169 -0.529 -0.026 2.356 
MLAG 
 
(<.0001) (0.059) (<.0001) (0.933) (<.0001) (0.125) (0.014) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.266) (0.108) (<.0001) 
LN- LN- -0.197 -0.076 -0.181 -0.083 -0.377 -0.074 -0.240 0.128 -0.165 -0.009 -0.095 -0.026 
MKTVL MKTVL (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.175) (<.0001) (0.004) 
ARVW DARVW -0.776 -0.234 -0.067 0.024 -1.902 -0.339 -1.629 0.625 -0.365 0.201 -1.194 0.258 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.301) (0.660) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.003) (0.150) (<.0001) (0.046) 
LQDT DLQDT -34.660 -15.061 -15.372 -11.058 -44.242 0.179 -85.189 -7.935 -67.311 -12.892 8.990 -28.562 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.003) (<.0001) (0.988) (<.0001) (0.336) (<.0001) (0.121) (0.463) (0.039) 
IHPC DIHPC 0.496 0.499 0.549 0.759 1.256 0.203 -0.063 0.517 0.014 0.122 0.210 0.017 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.372) (0.100) (<.0001) (0.738) (0.665) (0.001) (0.867) 
BETA BETA 0.145 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.255 -0.037 0.290 -0.098 0.179 0.091 0.311 0.044 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) (0.000) (<.0001) (0.076) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.023) 
ATLT ATLT -0.057 -0.022 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 0.000 -0.015 0.014 -0.155 -0.057 -0.163 -0.075 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.877) (0.281) (0.688) (0.995) (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
OIREV λ 0.011 0.419 0.009 0.640 0.009 0.272 0.001 -0.483 0.074 0.292 2.264 0.019 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.003) (<.0001) (0.524) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
EPS 
 
0.014 
 
0.003 
 
0.049 
 
0.023 
 
0.082 
 
-0.295 
 
  
(<.0001) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 LogLikelihood -59,677 
 
-13,650 
 
-14,168 
 
-7,721 
 
-12,211 
 
-7,431 
 No. of observations 157,049   30,387   46,474   36,612   25,690   17,886   
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This table reports cross-sectional regressions to explain institutional managers’ reaction to the issuance of sell recommendations.  The data on 
analyst recommendations are obtained from the I/B/E/S.  Market and accounting related measures are obtained from CRSP and Compustat, 
respectively. Dependent variable is a normalized net change in institutional holdings.  The regression results are reported for the entire five-year 
period and for each quarter horizon preceding a quarter of a bankruptcy filing.  Specifications in Panel A are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with heteroskedasticity-consistent robust p-values reported in parentheses under each estimate.  Control variables are as follows: dummy 
variable (ARSELL) that takes on a value of 1 if mean quarterly recommendations are equal or greater than 3.5, and 0 otherwise; percentage 
quarterly change in the shares outstanding (DSHR), a natural logarithm of the market values (LNMKTVL), a quarterly change in the abnormal 
value-weighted holding period returns (DARVW), a quarterly change in the share volume as a percentage of total shares outstanding (DLQDT), a 
quarterly change in the total institutional ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding (DIHPC), a risk measure (BETA), and a current 
quarter’s coverage ratio (ATLT).  Adjusted R2s and number of observations used are reported for each regression.  Specifications in Panel B are 
estimated using two-stage Heckman model regression.  The first regression is a probit regression of the probability that a sell-side analyst issues a 
sell recommendation with ARSELL for dependent variable.  The following additional control variables are used in the probit model that were not 
used in OLS: normalized lagged values of net holding changes (NCNORMLAG); value-weighted abnormal holding period return (ARVW); share 
volume as a percentage of shares outstanding (LIQD); percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions (IHPC); operating income divided 
by revenues (OIREV); and earnings per share (EPS).  The inverse-Mills ratio (λ) is computed from the probit model and used in the second-pass 
Heckman regressions for normalized net institutional holding change.  Independent variables from OLS regression were used in the second-pass 
Heckman model.  LogLikelihood values and number of observations used are reported for the regression.  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the investment behavior of institutional managers who hold 
and trade shares of bankrupt firms shortly before they file for Chapter 11 protection, during 
their reorganization, and after the firms emerge from bankruptcy.  We also investigate whether 
or not institutional ownership is related to performance of bankrupt firms as they attempt to 
reorganize.  We observe that institutional ownership increases in the four quarters following 
the bankruptcy filings.  We find that during the five-quarter period starting in the quarter of 
emergence from Chapter 11 institutional investors are net buyers of firms’ equity with a 
significantly larger positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the period as 
compared to a control sample.  We evaluate institutions’ ability to identify undervalued shares 
of bankrupt firms with a potential of earning positive returns as the firms reorganize, emerge, 
and return to profitability.  We find that only in the quarter of emergence do the managers 
trade strategically.  Institutional ownership negatively relates to bankrupt firms’ post-
emergence operating performance improvement and positively relates to the firms’ post-
emergence market performance recovery.  Although the firms with institutional holdings have 
a better pre-bankruptcy operating performance and are less levered, we find that these 
characteristics do not relate to the firms’ post-emergence operating or market performance 
improvements. 
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I. Introduction 
Why would anyone consider investing in shares of operationally and/or financially 
unhealthy firms?  Do those investors who invest in the risky shares of evidently distressed 
and/or bankrupt firms follow the motto ‘Good things happen to those who hustle’ (Anais 
Nin)
42?  Or are these investors blissfully unaware of the brewing troubles and “unavoidable 
destiny” of the firms?  What about sophisticated and informed investors such as institutions?  
How do their share holdings change as the firms approach and then file for Chapter 11 
protection, work through reorganization, and emerge from bankruptcy proceedings?  And do 
these holdings play a role in the effectiveness of bankrupt firms’ restructuring and their speed 
of returning to profitability?  Although it has been shown that, in general, bankrupt firms 
underperform operationally and in the stock market and investors holding shares of bankrupt 
firms incur significant capital losses, we may find that institutions are capable of identifying 
undervalued equity and timing purchases and sales of distressed securities.   
We investigate whether or not institutional ownership is related to performance of 
distressed firms as they attempt to reorganize.  Another main theme of this paper is to examine 
whether or not institutional managers who acquire shares of bankrupt firms in the quarter prior 
to Chapter 11 filings, during bankrupt firms’ reorganization, or shortly after firms emerge 
from bankruptcy proceedings possess the ability to strategically trade shares of distressed or 
bankrupt firms to achieve positive returns.  In summary, the purpose of this paper is twofold: 
to analyze the relationships between institutional holdings and performance of bankrupt firms 
and to evaluate whether or not institutional investors are capable of identifying undervalued 
investments that results in future positive returns.  We also determine proportions of shares 
outstanding owned by retail investors, corporate insiders, and institutional investors and 
                                                 
42
 Equity of bankrupt firms possesses the key characteristics of lottery-type-stock (Kumar (2009)), with 
a high probability of relatively small loss (in dollars, while a complete loss remains -100%) and a low 
probability of an extremely large gain.   
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analyze how these holdings change as the firms approach bankruptcy filings and emerge as 
reorganized entities.   
The relationship between institutional investment decisions and the operating and 
market performances of struggling firms before, during, and after bankruptcy filings have not 
been systematically analyzed.  We do not know if the operating and stock market 
performances of failing firms with institutional shareholders differ from that of failing firms 
without investments from institutions.  We do know that higher institutional ownership has a 
positive effect on stock prices and returns (Brown and Brooke (1993), Gompers and Metrick 
(1999)).  Does this finding apply to special situations such as institutional investments in 
bankrupt firms?   
Do bankrupt firms with institutional investments shortly before the filings and during 
the reorganization fare better operationally and in the stock market than those without 
institutions as shareholders?  Do firms held by institutional investors shortly after their 
emergence as reorganized enterprises experience the same difficulties as their previously 
bankrupt counterparts without investments from institutions?  Do the firms whose shares are 
held by institutions emerge leaner, with lower debt burden, and more efficient
43
 from 
bankruptcy and return to profitability sooner than do the firms without institutional 
investments?  Do the firms with institutional investments spend less time in Chapter 11, which 
helps them reduce bankruptcy costs?  To answer these questions we analyze how institutional 
investments relate to the operating and stock market performance of distressed firms, 
particularly those acquired and/or held by institutional investors before they file for 
bankruptcy, during their reorganization, and just after they emerge from Chapter 11.  In 
addition, we analyze changes in institutional holdings once the firms emerge from bankruptcy 
and determine whether or not shares of these firms have higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
                                                 
43
 In particular we evaluate firms’ post-emergence sales, total assets, return on assets, cash flow, and 
current and debt ratios. 
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than do firms emerging from bankruptcy without institutional investments.  We expect to 
observe a positive relationship between institutional holdings and distressed firms’ 
restructuring and performance improvement.  We conjecture that the firms with institutional 
holdings reorganize and return to profitability sooner than their counterparts without 
investments from institutions.   
We also analyze whether or not institutional investors tend to acquire and hold firms 
in greater concentration that fare less badly operationally and in the stock market prior to 
petitioning for reorganization and/or recover sooner after emerging from bankruptcy.  
Hotchkiss (1995) finds that about forty percent of firms emerging from bankruptcy continue to 
experience operating losses for several years following emergence.  “The firms showed some 
positive growth in revenues, assets, and number of employees in the post-bankruptcy period, 
but showed little improvement in profitability, especially in comparison to industry groups.” 
(Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), p.84)  Are managers capable of recognizing distressed firms 
that return to or exceed their pre-bankruptcy operating and market performance levels or do 
they acquire securities of firms that continue to struggle after they reorganize and emerge from 
bankruptcy?  Hotchkiss (1995) uses return on assets and profit margin to assess firms’ 
operating performance.  In this study we consider both operating and market performance 
measures of bankrupt firms, and analyze performance changes occurring around bankruptcy 
filing and emergence.   
The existing empirical literature on institutional trading does not, however, provide 
concrete evidence as to how profitable the investment strategies are that institutions employ in 
their overall trading.  While some researchers argue that institutional investors are capable of 
picking winners and exhibit fully rational herding behavior that promotes price discovery and 
predicts stock returns (Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias (2004)), others conclude that 
institutional managers mechanically acquire stocks with certain desirable characteristics and 
price levels (Falkenstein (1996)) and irrationally engage in herding causing temporary price 
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bubbles (Dreman and Lufkin (2000)) and future price correction (Gutierrez and Kelley 
(2009)).  Irrespective of that, we can, to this point, find no empirical evidence relevant to 
profitability of institutional holdings/trading of companies as they approach bankruptcy, 
proceed through reorganization, and emerge from Chapter 11. 
i. Investing in securities of distressed firms 
It is well established that the security returns associated with the immediate period 
around bankruptcy filings are almost always quite negative and investors in filing firms almost 
invariably suffer losses.  Firms usually start experiencing financial difficulties long before 
petitioning for reorganization or liquidation in the Federal court by filing Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 7, respectively, (Altman (1968), Aharony, Jones, and Swary (1980), Clark and 
Weinstein (1983), Campbell et al. (2008)) and investors continue to suffer losses up to the 
time of filing (Clark and Weinstein (1983)).  Consequently, most bankruptcy filings are not 
surprises in that most firms suffer from the throes of financial and/or operating distress for 
some time before the filings; many are rumored to be contemplating this drastic action well 
before the actual physical filing.  That said, one would expect investors, especially those 
perceived as informed, to start to divest themselves of the securities of distressed firms well 
before bankruptcy filings. 
Some firms, however, file for Chapter 11 for reasons other than financial and/or 
operating difficulties.  These firms are usually those facing hundreds and even thousands of 
lawsuits or union disputes.  For example, asbestos lawsuits and labor contract disputes put 
significant financial pressures on the firms and often result in Chapter 11 filings.  These firms 
are often financially and operationally healthy and pursue bankruptcy in order to maintain 
their viability and to enable them to keep operating.
44
  Institutional managers may have a great 
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 For example, W. R. Grace, chemical and building product maker, faced mounting asbestos-related 
liabilities and in 2001 looked to Chapter 11 as a way to maintain its viability (when the firm was close 
to exiting Chapter 11 its share price was around mid to high $90’s).  It took seven years for W.R. Grace 
to complete reorganization and in February 2014 the firm exited bankruptcy and, unlike Federal Mogul, 
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insight about these other reasons and take the opportunity to acquire shares of the filing (but 
not distressed) firms at the time when their shares are more affordable and perhaps 
undervalued. 
Extant literature provides several reasons as to why anyone should be interested in 
trading bankrupt firm securities.  First, the distressed securities market offers an opportunity of 
gaining sizable ownership in a restructured firm.  Buyers of distressed securities may be 
seeking to obtain an equity stake in the distressed firm when they purchase its debt securities 
that are subsequently replaced by new equity with possibly all prepetition equity disappearing.  
As an example, vulture capitalists purchase relatively inexpensive debt of bankrupt firms with 
a goal of taking control of the firms (Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997)).
45
   
Second, investing in bankrupt equity may be a fully rational investment decision.  The 
decision to purchase bankrupt stocks is similar to investing in call options (Li and Zhong 
(2009)).  To some extent the equity of bankrupt firms closely resembles a deep out-of-the 
money option (Merton (1974)).   
A third reason for investing in bankrupt equity is investor irrationality and the human 
propensity to gamble that’s reflected in their investment decisions (Kumar 2009).  Kumar 
(2009) studies the trading of stocks resembling state lotteries—stocks that for a very low cost 
offer a tiny probability of a huge future reward and a large probability of a relatively small 
                                                                                                                                            
Lear, and many other companies, did not wipe out its existing shareholders.  Federal Mogul, Lear, 
Pfizer/Quigley, Kellogg Brown & Root/DII, and Stone and Webster also filed for Chapter 11 as a result 
of asbestos-related litigation liabilities.  While in reorganization, Federal Mogul, for instance, acquired 
companies such as Fel-Pro Inc., Hanauer Machine Works, Inc., Mather Co, Robert G. Evans Co., and 
Metaltec, Inc.  The company emerged from Chapter 11 reorganization in January 2008.  In April 2008, 
it issued Class A common stock on NASDAQ and continued to grow through mergers and acquisitions 
and to expand internationally.  As another example, bankrupt Stone and Webster was bought at auction 
by the Shaw Group and emerged from bankruptcy in late 2003. Under the Shaw Group, Stone & 
Webster became part of a global leader with revenue of over $3.3 billion. 
45
 When in 2002 Kmart filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, Eddie Lampert, ESL Investments 
hedge fund manager, used investment opportunities to acquire the retailer.  He purchased Kmart’s debt 
and then used his control as a creditor to become a controlling equity holder in the firm. 
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loss.
46
  The equity of bankrupt firms possesses the main characteristics of lottery-type-stock 
(Kumar (2009)).  The prices of these securities are usually low (Clark and Weinstein (1983), 
Hubbard and Stephenson (1997), Dawkins et al (2007)) with a high probability of delisting 
and complete devaluation (Hubbard and Stephenson (1997)).  However, the investors may be 
richly rewarded for taking the risk if firms successfully reorganize and emerge from Chapter 
11 and if the old equity holders are not wiped out.  Hubbard and Stephenson (1997) find that 
pre-existing shareholders are rarely left with nothing when the firm emerges from bankruptcy.  
Morse and Shaw (1985) also demonstrate that the stock price generally trend upward as 
companies in Chapter 11 announce the progression of their reorganization process.  They also 
note that, in the case of corporate bankruptcy, secured debt holders are generally the only 
party in favor of firm liquidation over restructuring due to their high standing on the payout 
seniority ladder.  Unsecured creditors, management, and shareholders, by contrast, generally 
favor corporate restructuring over liquidation because it maintains the chance that they will 
receive some kind of payout upon bankruptcy emergence. 
In a more recent study Jory and Madura (2010) observe similar stock market 
performance of equity of firms emerged from Chapter 11 relative to size matched control 
firms and to respective NYSE/AMEX beta decile-portfolios.  They find, among other things, 
that the proportion of equity retained by the pre-Chapter 11 shareholders positively relates to 
the post-emergence stock price performance.  Wold (2007) finds that the returns of common 
stocks issued by firms in Chapter 11 outperform their market competitors and closely match 
the performance of their newly public competitors.  In addition, Eberhart et al (1999) observe 
that the firm starts yielding large positive excess stock returns in the 200-day post-emergence 
period.  
ii. Investors’ reaction to deteriorating performance of distressed firms 
                                                 
46
 However, in aggregate the loss could be substantial for institutions purchasing and holding thousands 
of distressed/bankrupt shares. 
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Different groups of investors react to the deteriorating performance of struggling firms 
differently.  Corporate insiders sell (postpone purchase) before significant stock-price 
decreases and buy (postpone sales) before significant price increases (Seyhun and Bradley 
(1997)).  Retail investors’ reaction is somewhat delayed when it comes to ridding their 
portfolios of shares of failing firms (Coelho et al. (2010)).  They seem to hold on to the shares 
of distressed firms for too long, continuing to incur significant capital losses as a result of a 
rapid decline of security prices that persists over several years prior to a formal bankruptcy 
filing (Li and Zhong (2009), Coelho et al. (2010)).  Individual investors tend to acquire stocks 
with speculative features thereby exhibiting a strong propensity to gamble and they have 
utility functions which accentuate risk-seeking behavior (Kumar (2009), Han and Kumar 
(2009)). 
iii. The trading behavior of institutional investors 
An informed investor is compensated for the costly investigation into an asset’s value 
by his or her ability to identify and acquire assets that yield greater potential returns on the 
investments (Rock (1986)).
47
  Some academics argue that institutional investors are prone to 
behave rationally and to appear as “intelligent” investors who stabilize security prices by 
offsetting irrational trades by individual investors (Lakonishok et al. (1994)).  Because of the 
size of the investments and their time horizons,
48
 institutional investors have strong incentives 
to gather costly information
49
 about firms whose shares they acquire for their portfolios and to 
decide whether contemporaneous weak performance is an indication of poor firm quality or a 
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 Or identify and divest assets that have low or negative potential returns. 
48
 According to Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) who investigate investor composition of 
underperforming firms with earnings below analysts’ expectations, low turnover institutional investors 
(those with average holding period of 3 years or longer) own the greatest percentage of shares 
outstanding (mean of 27.4% and median of 27.5%; high turnover managers, with holding period of less 
than 1.5 years, hold on average 10.8% of shares outstanding (with median of 8.7%).   
49
 Maug (1998) finds that information cost and the cost of monitoring inversely relate to market 
liquidity and that frequently traded shares reduce institutional investors’ incentives to gather 
information through monitoring because they allow institutions to sell their holdings more easily.  We 
believe, consistent with traditional economic theory, that the marginal benefits institutional investors 
gain from information gathering and analysis must exceed their marginal costs for the investors to 
consider these expenditures. 
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result of desirable long-term firm investment (Admati et al. (1994), Maug (1998), Edmans 
(2009)).  If institutional investors do their homework and acquire undervalued shares of 
Chapter 11 firms that have potential for recovering and returning to profitability, these 
investments would result in positive future returns as the firms reorganize and emerge from 
bankruptcy.   
Some institutional shareholders actively monitor firms in which they invest.
50
  
Monitoring is costly and more difficult for smaller investors (Black (1992), Wahal (1996), 
DelGuercio and Hawkins (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000), Noe (2002), Woidtke (2002), 
Cremers and Nair (2005), and Almazan et al. (2005)).  Consistent with the research findings 
that support managers’ superior information and investment abilities, Gompers and Metrick 
(1999) present evidence that the level of institutional ownership forecasts returns, with 
forecasting power the strongest when institutional inflows (both in terms of rising number of 
institutional investors and concentration of holdings among few institutions) are the highest.   
Arbel et al. (1983) find that institutions typically avoid investing in thinly traded 
securities and in firms with small capitalizations.  Institutional investors avoid taking greater 
risks associated with investment in small firms such as greater return volatility and lower 
liquidity.  These constraints that affect investment decisions of institutions may lead to market 
segmentation, herding behavior, and continuous neglect of certain securities (Arbel et al. 
(1983), Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).  Similarly, Falkenstein (1996) believes that managers 
acquire stocks with certain desirable characteristics and price levels.  He observes that 
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 Some institutional investors are “passive” index investors.  These institutions may not actively 
monitor the firms in which they invest, but rather transact as the index changes (with some institutions 
having trading criteria that allow certain exceptions to the index).  Our sample would have very few of 
these institutional managers and many of those who invest in the shares of firms that are highly likely to 
be headed for Chapter 11 filing or are already in reorganization.  
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managers have a preference for stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs and avoid 
investments with low idiosyncratic volatility.
51
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some institutions purchase shares of bankrupt or 
nearly bankrupt firms: On April 13, 1989, the Los Angeles Times reported that institutional 
investors have a great appetite for shares of bankrupt firms and pour hundreds of millions of 
dollars into the companies.  The article says that managers frequently acquire shares of 
bankrupt firms when they believe their asset value exceeds that of the securities and debt they 
hold.
52
  On October 17, 2005, The Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch reported other 
evidence of institutions’ investing in bankrupt firms: the Wintergreen Fund, an open-end 
mutual fund created by a highly respected former fund manager, invested in distressed or 
bankrupt securities which traded at a discount to the firm’s current asset value.  Creation of 
Vega-Chi platform, specifically designed for institutional investors to trade high yield and 
distressed securities,
53
 is the most recent evidence that institutions are interested in investing in 
the equities of bankrupt firms. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows.  In Section II, we describe the 
data and in Section III we present the hypotheses.  We develop test methodology and report 
regression results in Section IV.  Section V concludes our paper. 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
i. Sample description 
We utilize two sources of data to obtain a sample of U.S. non-utility/non-financial 
firms
54
 that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization and emerged from bankruptcy during the 
                                                 
51
 Falkenstein (1996) explains that fund managers take advantage of the option-like payoff to their 
relative performance by avoiding the lowest volatility stocks rather than investing in the most highly 
volatile stocks. 
52
 “Some Funds Pursue Bankrupt Firms”, Los Angeles Times, April 13, 1989. 
53
 The Wall Street Journal’s professional edition with Factiva, November 1, 2012 
54
 Financial and utility firms operate in a highly regulated environment with often very different 
reporting standards.  Including these firms would impair our ability to accurately compare sample 
firms’ characteristics and performance.  
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period of January 1980 through August 2013: Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum 
database and The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD).
55
  The two data 
sources combined consist of 4,086 firms filing for reorganization during this period.  We 
combine firms from the two databases and remove duplicates.  We search for firms’ identifiers 
such as CUSIP, TICKER, and PERMNO on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and eliminate those firms whose identifiers are either missing or inaccurate.  This 
reduces our sample to 1,645 observations.
56
  We further revise the sample by removing firms 
that delisted either prior to filing or while in bankruptcy.
57
  Our sample consists of 499 non-
delisted firms.  In the sample, on the day of Chapter 11 filing, 159 firms are actively trading 
on an exchange (with trading status “A” for active), 28 firms have trading status “X” for 
unknown, and 1 firm’s trading is suspended (with trading status “S” for suspended).  Three 
hundred eleven firms (or 62% of our sample) do not have trading status information on the 
day of the filing.  We retain these firms in the sample because they are not officially delisted 
according to CRSP and may have trading (and other performance related) data for time 
periods other than day of filing.
58
   
Using 13f quarterly filings obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) 
Holdings – s34 we analyze institutional holdings for non-delisted firms filing and emerging 
from bankruptcy between 1980 and 2013 and for the firms that delisted in the process of 
reorganization.
59
  Institutions are required to file 13f forms with the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
55
 For more information refer to http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/. In addition, the SDC database, which we 
used to collect sample firms, does not contain reasons for bankruptcy filings.  
56
 It is possible that most of the excluded firms are either private or have never been on CRSP. 
57
 Our goal is to analyze institutional behavior in firms through the bankruptcy process, including 
emerging from bankruptcy.  We can only do this by using a sample of firms that were listed during the 
entire period.   
58
 For the firms with missing or unknown trading status and no delisting data, it could mean that either 
(1) the firms delisted prior to filing, however delisting data is missing or (2) firms are actively trading, 
however the trading data is missing for the date searched. 
59
 Thomson Reuters adjusts the reported holdings and net changes for stock splits (including reverse 
stock splits which are a more frequent occurrence in the case of bankrupt firms), and we use the split-
adjusted values.   
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Commission (SEC) on a quarterly basis.
60
  We determine quarter-end holdings of institutions 
for all firms in the sample by eliminating all observations from the 13f data file for which 
filing date does not match reporting date, thereby determining the last quarter of actual 13f 
filings.
61
   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Table 1 we describe the sample of 499 firms and a sample of 316 firms that delisted 
during Chapter 11 proceedings.  As presented in Panel B of Table 1, at the end of one quarter 
prior to the quarter of bankruptcy filing, 270 (or 85 percent) of the 316 firms that delisted 
during Chapter 11 had institutional holders, while only 163 (or 33 percent) of the sample firms 
had institutional holders in the that quarter.  These statistics are relatively unchanged in the 
quarter of filing for both groups of firms (86 percent for 316-firm group and 32 percent for 
499-firm sample).  Institutions, on average, hold the same percentage of total shares 
outstanding for the two groups of firms in the quarter preceding the quarter of filing 
(21percent for sample firms vs. 25 percent for delisted-while-in-bankruptcy firms).
62
  While 
these holdings become materially smaller for both groups during the quarter of filing, they are 
                                                 
60 The SEC’s institutional investment manager filing mandate is as follows: “An institutional investment 
manager that uses the U.S. mail (or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce) in the course 
of its business, and exercises investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities 
(explained below) must report its holdings on Form 13F with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).  Form 13F is required to be filed within 45 days of the end of a calendar quarter.  The Form 13F 
report requires disclosure of the name of the institutional investment manager that files the report, and, 
with respect to each section 13(f) security over which it exercises investment discretion, the name and 
class, the CUSIP number, the number of shares as of the end of the calendar quarter for which the report 
is filed, and the total market value.”  The SEC defines an institutional investor as “(1) an entity that 
invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a natural person or an entity that 
exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or entity. Institutional 
investment managers can include investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, 
pension funds, and corporations.” 
61
 Thomson Reuters continues reporting 13f data for several quarters after an institutional manager stops 
filing with the SEC.  The data provider maintains original filing date (date on the holding report in the 
SEC’s EDGAR, the regulator’s electronic record database) and changes reporting date for the repeating 
holdings.   
62
 Based on the facts that during pre-filing and filing quarters more delisted bankrupt firms are held by 
institutions (85 and 86 percent) than non-delisted bankrupt firms (33 and 32 percent), the mean value of 
institutional holdings of non-delisted firms is greater than that of delisted firms, and the percentages of 
shares held by institutions are identical for delisted (25 percent) and non-delisted (21 percent) groups of 
firms in the quarter preceding quarter of the filing, we conclude that institutions hold fewer shares of 
non-delisted firms that are greater in value than the shares of delisted bankrupt firms. 
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greater for sample firms in the quarter of filing than for 316 delisted firms in the same quarter 
(17% vs. 9%, respectively).  Both the mean holding value and number of managers invested in 
the equity of bankrupt firms are significantly greater for sample firms than for the delisted 316 
firms in either the quarter before or the quarter of filing.
63
  Median holding values are identical 
for the two groups of firms in the quarter preceding quarter of filing ($2.17 million for sample 
firms and $2.08 million for delisted bankrupt firms) and bigger for non-delisted ($1.01 
million) than for delisted ($0.21 million) bankrupt firms in the quarter of filing.  The statistics 
in Table 1 demonstrate that although the proportion of firms with institutional investments is 
higher for the firms that end up delisting while in Chapter 11 than for the sample firms, the 
holdings are more substantial in terms of their magnitude and dollar value for the sample firms 
than for the 316 delisted firms.  These values do not change appreciably from one quarter prior 
to filing to the quarter of filing for the sample firms while they decline for the group of 316 
delisted firms.   
ii. Institutional, insider, and retail shareholdings and their changes around filing and 
emergence 
We next report bankrupt stock holdings of institutions, corporate insiders, and 
individual investors and present their ownerships as percentages of total shares outstanding 
during the eight quarters surrounding quarter of filing and the eight quarters surrounding 
quarter of emergence for 499 firms in our sample.  We report the holdings during post-filing 
(in Panel A of Table 2) and pre-emergence (in Panel B of Table 2) periods for firms that are 
still in bankruptcy in a certain quarter.
64
  We obtained quarterly holding data for corporate 
insiders from Thomson Reuters’ Insiders Data.  For the purposes of our analyses, retail 
                                                 
63
 To address the issue of extreme values, we winsorize the data at 1 and 99
th
 percentile. 
64
 For instance, if a firm emerged from bankruptcy in quarter q+2, we would not consider this firm’s 
post-filing holdings for this and the following two quarters (Panel A).  Hence, the holdings are not 
affected by event such as emergence from bankruptcy, which could cause increase in shareholdings.  
Similarly, if a firm still has not filed for bankruptcy in pre-emergence quarter q-3, we would not 
consider this firm’s institutional holdings (Panel B).   
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investors’ proportional holdings are determined as the difference between one hundred percent 
representing total shares outstanding and the sum of percentage shareholdings for institutions 
and corporate insiders. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 As the firms approach bankruptcy, institutional investors gradually reduce their mean 
(median) holdings of distressed equity from 26.2% (17.2%) in the fourth quarter prior to filing 
to 16.8% (9.7%) in the quarter of filing, while mean (median) insider holdings also decline, 
although not continuously, from 7.7% (0.9%) to 5.7% (0.3%)
65
 and individual investments 
increase from 66.1% (81.9%) to 77.5% (90.1%) in the respective quarters.  In general, changes 
in the retail ownership during four quarters prior to filing and quarter of filing are consistent 
with common “street” belief, while institutional trading behavior during the same five-quarter 
period resembles that of a knowledgeable investor.   
Next we turn to the four quarters after filing.  Institutional managers’ ownership 
remains practically unchanged in four quarters following bankruptcy filings.  Managers’ mean 
(median) holdings are 17.7% (8.7%) in the quarter q+1 and 16.2% (7.6%) in the fourth quarter 
from the filing.  Individual investors slightly increase their shareholdings in quarter q+2, and 
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 In Seyhun and Bradley (1997), insiders own shares of 282 firms (90% of 314 firms in their sample) 
during the year preceding bankruptcy filings and 237 firms (75%) in the month of the filings.  In our 
study corporate insiders own shares of 141 firms (28% of 499 firms in our sample) in the fourth quarter 
before bankruptcy filing and 102 firms (20%) in the quarter of filing.  These lower numbers could be 
explained by the fact that we remove all delisted firms from our sample of 499 firms filing for 
bankruptcy over 33 year period, while Seyhun and Bradley (1997) analyze insider trading over shorter 
period of time (1975-1992) and keep these firms in the sample until they get delisted.  In addition, 
Seyhun and Bradley (1997) analyze insider ownership during the pre-Reg FD (Regulation Fair 
Disclosure) period, when the publically traded companies were not mandated to disclose material 
information to all investors at the same time, including information on share trading by companies’ 
executives.  Part of their sample is also before the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 that placed penalties for illegal insider trading 
as high as three times profit gained or loss avoided from the trading.  Our sample includes both pre- and 
post-Reg FD time periods (Reg FD was promulgated by the SEC in August 2000) and is after the Act of 
1988.  In addition, we evaluate insiders’ holdings during a quarterly period of bankruptcy filing rather 
than a monthly period (as Seyhun and Bradley (1997) do) thereby considering longer post-filing time 
period within the quarter for those firms that filed for bankruptcy more than one month prior to the 
quarter-end, the time when ownership likely declines the most.  Finally, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) use 
the original source from the SEC to collect the data and we use Thomson Reuters’ Insiders Data, a 
derived source that does filtering, which results in fewer observations. 
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then divest shares of bankrupt firms during quarter q+3.  Similar to their trading pattern in the 
pre-filing quarters, corporate insiders haphazardly change holdings of their firms’ shares, 
decreasing their ownership in quarters q+1 and q+2 and then more than doubling it in q+3.  
The results presented in Table 2 are also presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figures 1 (a) and (b)] 
We perform similar analyses for the quarters surrounding quarter of emergence for all 
three groups of investors and consider only the firms that are actually in bankruptcy in a 
certain quarter.
66
  For instance, if in quarter q-4 a firm has not filed for bankruptcy yet we 
would not report pre-emergence institutional holdings for this firm until the quarter of filing.  
This situation applies to firms who spent less than a year in bankruptcy proceedings.  Based 
on the statistics in Panel B and Figure 1 (b), institutional managers do not change their 
holdings much during four quarters preceding quarter of emergence and significantly increase 
their holdings to approximately 41% during the following five quarters.  Insiders’ holdings 
increase sharply from quarter prior to emergence (mean (median) holdings of 6.8% (0.4%) in 
q-1) to quarter of emergence (mean (median) holdings of 18.4% (4.5%) in q=0).  This increase 
in insiders’ shareholdings is possibly due to the old shareholders being wiped out and the new 
ones, some of whom are possibly large creditors from pre-bankruptcy who converted in 
reorganization, emerging from reorganization.  These investments then decline in the 
following two quarters to mean (median) of 8.2% (0.8%) in the second quarter following 
emergence and stabilize at around 12% (1.5%) during the last two post-emergence quarters, 
which could be caused by old creditors selling and then being replace by new investors, 
including corporate insiders.  The fact that institutions greatly increase their ownership during 
the post-emergence quarters while insiders either reduce their holdings in quarter q+2 or hold 
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 The four quarters following filing and four quarters preceding emergence overlap for the majority of 
firms which spent less than two years in bankruptcy.  For instance, if a firm emerged from bankruptcy 
seven quarters after the filing then its fourth quarter post-filing quarter holdings are the same as fourth 
quarter pre-emergence holdings.   
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it stable in quarters q+1, q+3, and q+4 is puzzling.  Since both groups of investors are 
considered to be informed, we would expect to observe similar directional changes in their 
holdings.  Retail investors continuously decrease their ownership during the post-emergence 
quarters starting with the quarter of emergence, q=0.  
To summarize the results reported in Table 2 and Figures 1 (a) and (b), we observe 
that small retail investors seem to exhibit reactive investment behavior when it comes to 
trading shares of these distressed firms.  They acquire the equity as it becomes more 
affordable (making it more like a lottery-stock as defined by Kumar (2009)).  The irregular 
changes in insiders’ ownership of bankrupt equity may be due to management turnover that 
occurs during this time period.
67
  Executives’ compensation and its structure also changes as 
the firms attempt to settle their debt obligations and to maintain going concern status (Seyhun 
and Bradley (1997)).  Institutional ownership stays consistent in the post-filing quarters and 
rises in the quarter of emergence and thereafter for a year.  Since institutions frequently hold 
debt and equity of the same firm in their portfolios (Jiang et al (2010)), this increase in the 
holdings could possibly be explained by changes made to firms’ capital structure to reduce 
their leverage and to complete their restructuring.  However, we are cautious to scrap the 
assumption that institutions may be purchasing the risky shares of bankrupt firms in hopes to 
reap a sizable return as the firms emerge.  We further investigate institutional trading behavior 
around quarter of emergence in Table 3 and compare it to institutional investments for a 
subsample of control firms. 
To obtain this subsample of control firms we first collect a sample consisting of all 
other firms not included in the initial sample of all firms filing for bankruptcy between 1980 
                                                 
67
 Hotchkiss (1995) reports “by the month of filing 81 firms (41 percent) have replaced the CEO who 
was in office 2 years prior to filing.  At the time reorganization plan is proposed, 108 firms (55 percent) 
have replaced their CEO.  Further changes in management, often related to implementation of the plan, 
occur when firms exit bankruptcy; following the effective date of the plan, 138 firms (70 percent) have 
replaced their CEO.”  These statistics are even higher in Betker (1993): 51 percent of CEOs are 
replaced prior to filing, 75 percent prior to emergence, and 91 percent following emergence. 
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and 2013.  Frequently, in the empirical literature, a control sample consists of same-industry 
firms of comparable size.  We eschew using this standard method of identifying control firms 
and utilize a modification of the Seyhun and Bradley’s (1997) methodology.  Seyhun and 
Bradley (1997) point out that non-filing firms in the same industry are likely to experience 
financial difficulty along with the filers.  To construct their control sample for each insider 
portfolio (all insiders, executives, and officers), Seyhun and Bradley (1997) calculate the mean 
annual equity values of all firms not in their sample and reporting insider trading activity 
during 1975-1992.  They rank these firms according to their total market equity and divide 
them into deciles.  Then, they calculate insider trading activity over the entire period for each 
size decile.  They obtain 6,480 data points of insider trading activity–one for each of the three 
portfolios, 10 size deciles, and 216 calendar months.  They then compare the insider trading 
activity (for all insiders, executives and officers separately) of each firm for each month with 
the relevant decile in the relevant month. 
 Seyhun and Bradley (1997) build control portfolios based on mean annual equity 
values of all non-filing firms.  In the spirit of their method we size match each firm in our 
sample with all other firms that are not in our sample and whose shares are held by 
institutional investors based on a 90 percent to 110 percent range of our sample firms’ market 
value during the three quarters surrounding quarter of emergence.
68
  The matching 
methodology we utilize is similar to that employed by Seyhun and Bradley (1997) and 
designed to allow us to compare the institutional trading of our sample firms with the 
institutional trading of similarly sized firms which did not file for bankruptcy during the 
period of this study.   
First, we perform the match based on the sample firm’s equity value—many firms in 
the sample are matched with multiple control firms.  Then, we obtain data on institutional 
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 We include market values during quarter of emergence, one quarter preceding the emergence, and 
one quarter following it.  Then, we find three-quarter average market value for each firm in the sample. 
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holdings during 1980-2013 for all control firms.  We identify firms in both sample and control 
groups which either have institutional holdings in a given quarter or report a net holding 
change in the quarter.  We analyze mean net changes in those holdings for firms in the control 
sample during the nine quarters surrounding the emergence of each corresponding sample 
firm.  A summary of the net buying/selling activity for the sample firms and the control firms 
is presented in Table 3.     
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 In Table 3 we report net trading behavior of institutional investors for sample and 
control firms four quarters prior to the quarter of emergence, in the quarter of emergence, and 
four quarters following the emergence.
69
  In each column we report number of firms with 
positive net change in holdings as net buyers, zero change as non-traders, and negative change 
as net sellers.  In each quarter institutional investors appear as net purchasers for sample and 
control firms; however the difference between number of firms with positive net changes in 
institutional holdings and number of firms with negative changes in the holdings for sample 
firms in quarters q-4 through q-2 is small.  During these quarters the firms are most likely in 
the process of preparing their reorganization plans when holdings of pre-existing shareholders 
are less likely to be changed due to debt-to-equity conversion or may have not yet filed for 
bankruptcy.  It is not surprising that we see a more significant difference between number of 
firms with net buyers and number of firms with net sellers in the following quarters as the 
firms have their plans approved and proceed to restructure.  The number of sample firms with 
net buying institutional activities starts exceeding that number with net selling activities by 
close to 100% one quarter before quarter of emergence (78 vs. 40) and this difference 
becomes significantly greater in the following quarters, when conversion of debt to equity is 
most probable.  This may indicate that institutional investors anticipate bankrupt firms’ 
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 For those firms that spent less than four quarters in bankruptcy, in some early quarters these firms 
may have not yet filed for bankruptcy or these quarters may be the quarter of filing. 
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successful emergence from the proceedings and acquire the shares in hopes to earn positive 
return on investments.
70
   
 To test statistical significance of trading by the institutions reported earlier in the 
table, we calculate “abnormal” institutional trading for each firm in the sample and provide the 
results in the second and third last columns of Table 3.  Our measure of “expected” 
institutional quarterly trading activity is net change of institutional holdings for firms in the 
control sample.  Abnormal trading is calculated as the difference in the net institutional 
holding changes for the sample firms in a certain quarter before and after emergence and the 
net institutional holding changes for corresponding control firms in the same quarter.  Sample 
institutional abnormal purchases are positive numbers and abnormal sales are negative 
numbers.  As the results reported in Table 3 indicate, in the quarters preceding quarter of 
emergence the magnitude of sample firms’ net buying is similar to that of control firms’ (most 
of the pre-emergence abnormal net number of shares traded is not statistically significant) and 
it is significantly greater in the quarters following quarter of emergence (starting with the 
quarter of emergence the abnormal net changes are positive and statistically significant)  Mean 
(median) abnormal net number of shares traded is 105,251 (5,297) in the quarter of 
emergence, and 128,259 (40,970) in the following quarter.  In the second, third, and fourth 
quarters after emergence the sample firms’ net buying activities on average exceed control 
firms’ net buying activities by 42,712, 36,817, and 30,724 shares, respectively.   
iii. Do the firms with institutional investments perform better than the firms without 
institutional investments? 
a) Operating performance 
 In Table 4 we report operating performance as measured by relevant accounting 
variables and ratios one year before the year of filing (Panel A) and one year after year of 
emergence (Panel B), categorized by whether or not the firms had  institutional holdings.  
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Eberhart et al (1999) report large, positive excess stock returns in the 200-day post-emergence period. 
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Firms in Group A are those whose shares are held by institutions either one quarter prior to 
bankruptcy, in the quarters of filing and/or emergence.
71
  Firms in Group B do not have 
investments from institutional managers in any of these quarters.  We report market related 
variables for one year preceding the quarter of filing and one year following the quarter of 
emergence in Panels C and D, respectively.  In each panel we also report differences between 
mean and median values of the variables and statistical significance of a two-tailed t-test 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) for difference in their means (medians).  
We utilize Compustat to obtain accounting related variables such as sales, total assets, 
current assets, total debt, current liabilities, pretax income, interest expense, market value of 
equity, retained earnings, and net income.
72
  We derive several performance measure ratios 
using Compustat data: net income divided by total assets (ROA); current assets divided by 
current liabilities (current ratio); total debt divided by total assets (debt ratio); and operating 
income before depreciation and amortization normalized either by total assets (cash flow/total 
assets) or by sales (cash flow/sales).  We calculate Altman’s z-score, a bankruptcy-risk proxy 
(Altman (1968)), which is defined as 3.3x((pretax income + interest expense)/total assets) + 
0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market capitalization/total liabilities) + 1.2x(working 
capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets).   
We use CRSP to find market-to-book and price-to-earnings ratios.  In the panels with 
market related performance data we also list firms’ market capitalization, share price, number 
of shares outstanding, share turnover calculated as trading volume divided by total shares 
outstanding, and market adjusted returns defined as security returns adjusted for the 
NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ equally-weighted returns including dividends.  We use equally-
weighted returns instead of value-weighted returns in calculations of market adjusted returns 
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 Although we cannot distinguish between purchases made prior to emergence from those made 
immediately after, by considering institutional holdings in the quarter of emergence we also capture 
those share purchases that occurred right after firms emerged from Chapter 11.   
72
 We utilize Compustat to obtain quarterly and annual financial reporting figures.  We elect to use 
annual financials because quarterly values are missing for a significant number of firms in the sample. 
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because equal weighting captures the extent of underperformance better than value weighting 
does and this is important given particular nature of bankrupt equity (Gilson (1995), Brav et al 
(2000), Kadiyala and Rau (2004)).  In addition, Brav et al (2000) argue that because small 
stocks are likely to be mispriced more than large stocks, then the power consideration alone 
implies the use of equal weighting. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 One year prior to the year of Chapter 11 filing, firms with investments from 
institutions either right before filing, while in bankruptcy, or shortly after emergence are 
smaller than firms without the investments as measured by total assets and sales: median total 
assets is $341 million for firms with institutional ownership and $660 million for firms 
without institutional ownership; median sales for firms with institutional holdings is $264 
million while for firms without investments from institutions it is $589 million.  These 
differences are statistically different from each other.  In Panel C we report market 
capitalization, another size related variable, one year preceding quarter of filing.  Although 
firms with institutional holdings appear to be larger than those without the holdings with mean 
(median) market values of $285 million ($38 million) and $122 million ($35 million), 
respectively, the differences in these values are not statistically different from zero.  These 
results contradict earlier findings reported in the literature that institutions avoid investing in 
small firms.   
 Not surprisingly, as reported in Panel A of Table 4, firms’ return on assets is negative 
for both sub-groups, with differences in means and medians significant at a five percent level.  
However, firms with institutional investors perform less poorly in the year preceding year of 
filing (mean ROA of -16% and median ROA of -7 reported for those firms while the same 
measures for the firms without investments from institutions are -28% and -16%, 
respectively).   Also not surprisingly, both groups of firms have low Altman z-scores, 
suggestive of a forthcoming failure, with firms lacking institutional investments having 
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significantly lower mean and median z-scores.  We find that current ratio is greater (mean is 
1.5 and median is 1.23) and debt ratio is lower (mean is 0.94 and median is 0.78) for the firms 
with institutional investments than for the firms without the investments (current ratio mean is 
1.29 and median is 0.8; debt ratio mean is 1.17 and median is 0.98), with most of the 
differences significant at conventional levels.  Based on these performance characteristics, 
although both groups of firms perform poorly in the year prior to filing for Chapter 11 
protection, firms with institutional ownership perform less badly than do the firms without 
investments from institutions. 
 We show in Panel B of Table 4 that differences between the two groups of firms 
largely disappear in the year following year of emergence.  Operating performance, as 
measured by average return on assets, remains negative for both groups of firms, with firms 
held by institutions having an insignificantly lower ROA than the firms without institutional 
investments.  We also observe median current ratio of 1.79 and cash flow returns on assets of 
0.11 for the firms without investments from managers exceeding median current ratio of 1.43 
and cash flow returns on assets of 0.08 for the firms with institutional investments at the 
statistical significance levels of five and ten percent, respectively.  In addition, mean and 
median values of debt ratio for the firms with institutional investments now exceed those 
values for the firms without the investments, with differences in both values significant at a 
ten percent level.  Average z-score for the firms without institutional ownership rises to 2.18 
(from -0.34 in the year prior to year of filing), although above the highest point of distress 
zone of 1.80, still within a “grey” zone of 1.81 to 2.99 score range, while mean z-score for the 
firms with investments from institutions remains quite low, at 1.29, versus 1.09 during the pre-
filing year.  To summarize these statistics, we find that firms with institutional investments 
emerge from Chapter 11 more levered, with smaller current assets to meet current obligations, 
and with lower z-score, indicating greater probability of re-entering bankruptcy, than do firms 
without institutional investments.  Thus, operating post-emergence improvements are better 
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for non-institutionally held firms than for the firms with institutional ownership.  In addition, 
we find that firms without institutional investments on average spend fewer days in 
bankruptcy than do firms with the investments.  Mean (median) number of days in bankruptcy 
for the former is 423 (313) and for the latter is 492 (383), with differences in both mean and 
median values significant at a ten percent level.
73
   
Contrary to the belief that managers are sophisticated investors capable of picking 
winners we find little evidence that they focus on the operationally “stronger” firms with 
greater potential to successfully reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy sooner.  We conclude 
that intuitions focus on the “better” firms before bankruptcy, however the firms with far less 
potential on emergence.  
 In Panels C and D of Table 4 we report market related variables four quarters before 
quarter of bankruptcy and four quarters following emergence, respectively.  We categorize the 
market related data based on institutional ownership as described earlier.  
 Mean and median values for the two groups of firms are similar for most variables in 
the four quarters preceding Chapter 11 filings.  Not surprisingly, for both groups of firms we 
observe low market-to-book, negative price-to-earnings and negative market adjusted returns 
during this time period.  During the four quarters following emergence from bankruptcy, we 
find that median market capitalization for the firms without institutional investments ($126 
million) significantly exceeds median market capitalization for the firms with investments 
from institutions ($35 million).  Although values of both market-to-book and price-to-earnings 
rise quite noticeably from the four-quarter period preceding quarter of filing, they do not differ 
from one another for the two groups of firms in the four quarters following emergence.  
During the post-emergence year, as reported in Panel D of Table 4, firms without investments 
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 This statistic is not reported in the tables.  Also, these results are consistent with previous research 
showing that firms usually start emerging from bankruptcy 15 months after their Chapter 11 filings date 
(Denis and Rodgers (2007), Kalay et al (2007)).  Some however find that firms typically spend on 
average longer, about 24 months, in bankruptcy (Eberhart et al (1999), Coelho et al (2010))  
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from institutions also have higher share price, possibly from how recapitalizations were done, 
and turnover than do firms with institutional investments.  However, shares of firms with 
institutional investments perform better during the year following quarter of emergence—
mean daily market adjusted returns for the firms with investments from institutions is 0.56% 
and it is 0.06% for the firms without the investments, with difference in means significant at a 
ten percent level. 
b) Market performance 
 We now turn to evaluating market performance of the bankrupt securities during pre-
filing and post-emergence periods.  We utilize methodology developed by Barber and Lyon 
(1997) who in their study focus on the long run stock performance and compute buy-and-hold 
return (BHR) for firms in the sample.  This methodology is also used by several other studies 
focusing on performance of highly distressed and bankrupt firms (Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), Taffler et al (2004), Ogneva and Subramanyan (2007), and Kausar et al (2009)).  We 
determine BHR as follows:  
BHRi,T =  
where BHRi,T  is a buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i for a time period T,  is the daily 
stock return for firm i on day t, and  is expected return for firm i on day t.  We use 
equally weighted market return, including dividends, for expected return. 
We report the short term abnormal returns around bankruptcy filing.  In Table 5 we 
analyze market-adjusted and buy-and-hold returns during the twenty-one-day window 
surrounding day of Chapter 11 filing.  In Panel A we present daily market adjusted returns 
(MARs) for ten days prior to the filing, the day of the filing, and ten days following the filing.  
To capture the effect of those bankruptcies that were filed after market close, we also 
determine two-day market adjusted returns for days t=0 and t+1 and report them in the panel.  
In Panel A we also report BHRs for several time windows, from day t-10 before bankruptcy 
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filing to time period (-10, +10) around the day of filing.  To avoid considering multiple day 
returns for the firms with missing return data we remove those firms from the calculation of 
the daily market adjusted returns and BHRs on the day their shares are not traded for the first 
time during the twenty-one-day period.  As a result, we lose 33 firms (or 26% of the firms 
with market data) with institutional holdings and 6 firms (or 14%) without investments from 
institutions.  As a robustness check, we also calculate daily abnormal returns and BHRs for the 
firms with missing return data as an average of the succeeding period return over the missing 
period and the succeeding period and report their means in Panels B of Table 5.
74
  Several 
firms (14 firms with institutional holdings and 2 firms without the holdings) stop trading for 
the rest of the twenty-one-day period analyzed, however 19 firms with institutional holdings 
and 4 firms without the holdings return to trading.  In addition, 4 firms with investments from 
institutions had several days of missing returns at the beginning of the twenty-one-day 
window.
75
  As a robustness check, we also determine cumulative market adjusted returns 
(CMARs) using equally weighted, including dividends, market returns.
76
  The results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5.  The results from Table 5, Panel A are also 
provided for the twenty-one-day window surrounding bankruptcy filing in Figure 2 (a). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 There are meaningful differences between abnormal returns around bankruptcy filing 
date for firms with institutional holdings (about three-fourths of the sample) and for those 
firms without institutional holdings.  From Panel A, where we report mean MARs, we observe 
that the abnormal returns for the firms with institutional investments are not significant on all 
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 Peterson (1989) describes both methodologies (removing security from sample and averaging the 
returns over the missing period and the succeeding period) as the ways to address missing return issue.  
The first alternative introduces the potential for a selection bias because the firms removed from the 
calculation of mean returns are likely to have more negative returns around bankruptcy announcement 
dates than the firms, whose shares are trading without interruption, thereby biasing our mean abnormal 
returns upwards.  We partially address this issue by utilizing another method, also described by 
Peterson (1989), where we calculate average raw returns for the non-trading periods. 
75
 This is the reason why we start with 125 firms in Panels A and with 129 firms in Panels B. 
76
 These results are not included in the tables. 
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but one (t-4) pre-filing day; the mean MAR is -2.63% on that day.  MARs for firms without 
institutional investors are not significant on all but two pre-filing days: on day t-3 MAR is -
5.27% (statistically significant at a one percent level) and on day t-1 it is -3.17% (statistically 
significant at a five percent level).  On these two days MARs for firms without institutional 
investments are lower than those for firms with investments from institutions.  In Panel A, 
mean BHRs for firms with institutional investments decline from -1.36% in (-10, -9) to -
9.74% in (-10, -1).  The decline in the pre-filing BHRs is more dramatic for firms without than 
with the investments—it changes from -1.63 down to -14.65% over the same time horizon.   
We find that the two-day abnormal returns for the two groups of firms are quite 
negative, though clearly more so for the firms with investments from institutions (their two-
day mean abnormal return is -15. 56%; the two-day mean market adjusted return is -11.01% 
for the firms without institutional investments), perhaps indicating that institutional share 
selling puts additional downward pressure on firms’ stock prices at the time of bankruptcy 
filings.  In Panel B, these returns are similar for the firms with institutional holdings (-15.10%) 
and are more negative for the firms without the holdings (-13.27%).  In Panel A, on day t+2 
the mean daily abnormal return is approximately 4% for firms with investments from 
institutions, which is statistically significant at a five percent level.  The daily abnormal 
returns for the firms without institutional holdings are negative (-0.75%), however not 
statistically significant, on day t+2, and positive (4.81%) and significant at a ten percent level 
on day t+3.  In contrast, in Panel B, these returns are not statistically significant for either 
group of firms on days t+2 and t+3; post-filing mean daily abnormal returns are 2.81% and 
4.68% for the firms with institutional ownership on day t+5 and for the firms without the 
ownership on day t+4, respectively (both statistically significant at a ten percent level).  In 
Panel A, during the post-filing time window (+2, +10), mean BHRs are 2.23% for the firms 
with institutional holdings and 0.27% for the firms without investments from institutions, 
however both are not statistically significant, thus price adjustment seems complete at t+1.  
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The mean BHRs for twenty-one-day window are economically and statistically material -
27.64% for firms with institutional investments and -32.32% for firms without investments 
from institutions.  In Panel B, the results for mean BHRs are qualitatively similar to those in 
Panel A.  These negative market returns are the result of anticipation of and reaction to 
bankruptcy filings.  
 It is well-known that returns of firms filing for Chapter 11 protection are quite poor 
during the period immediately surrounding the filing.  We find that pre-filing period (-10, -1) 
BHRs reported in Table 5 are consistent with the earlier findings that firms without 
institutional holdings fare worse operationally than those with institutional holdings, 
suggesting that there may be a relationship between firms’ performance and investments from 
institutions.  These returns are however more negative for the firms with than without 
investments from institutions during the two-day filing window.  We speculate that 
institutions as possibly more knowledgeable investors hold shares of better performing firms.  
The post-filing BHRs are not different from zero for either firms with or without the holdings 
indicating market’s proactive rather than reactive response to bankruptcy filings.   
Regrettably, institutional trading data limitations do not allow us to drill down to daily 
changes in institutional holdings so we can compare them to daily share trading performance 
during these few days around filing to better determine managers’ ability to recognize 
undervalued investments and to observe the relationship between institutional trading and 
share prices.  However, we can and do assess how quarterly changes in institutional holdings 
are reflected in mean quarterly abnormal returns and whether or not managers sell prior to 
share price declines and purchase prior to share price increases (as Seyhun and Bradley (1997) 
show insiders do).  From Table 4 we know that firms with institutional investments are 
operationally stronger (based on median ROA) than firms without the investments one year 
prior to bankruptcy filings and they are weaker (based on median operating cash flow returns 
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on assets) one year following emergence from Chapter 11.  We expect to observe changes in 
institutional ownership consistent with the changes in the firms’ operating performance.   
 We now turn to evaluating market adjusted daily returns and buy-and-hold returns 
during eleven days surrounding day of emergence.  We employ the same methodology for 
calculating market adjusted returns and BHRs as in Table 5.  However, we do not make the 
same adjustments to the daily abnormal returns and BHRs in Table 6 as we do in Table 5, 
Panels B, because we don’t lose as many firms to a non-trading in this table as we do in Table 
5 and the firms with missing trading data do not return to trading during the time period 
analyzed.
77
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In Table 6 we present returns during the twenty-one days around the day of 
emergence from Chapter 11.  Similar to Table 5, Panel A, in Table 6 we report returns as 
compared to equally weighted, including dividends, market returns.  To capture the effect of 
those reorganizations where firms emerged after market close, we also determine two-day 
market adjusted returns for days t=0 and t+1 and report them in the panel.  In Table 6 we also 
include BHRs for various short-term periods around day of emergence. 
Mean abnormal returns for firms with investments from institutions are 2.22% and 
2.28% on pre-emergence days t-5 and t-3 (these returns are not statistically significant on all 
other pre-emergence days).  Mean abnormal returns for firms without investments from 
institutional investors are not significant during the pre-emergence period with exception on 
day t-9 when it is -1.68% and statistically significant at a ten percent level.  During ten days 
prior to emergence from bankruptcy firms with institutional holdings have a statistically 
insignificant mean BHR of 5%.  In contrast, the subsample without institutional holdings has a 
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 We lose 5 firms in the subsample of firms with institutional holdings, which is about 5% of the 
subsample.  These firms do not return to trading during twenty-one-day window around emergence.  
Therefore, the robustness check performed in Table 5 would not yield any changes to the number of 
observations in Table 6.  All firms without investments from institutions remain in the subsample. 
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ten-day pre-emergence mean BHR of -3.88%, which is also not statistically significant, further 
confirming possible existence of positive relationship between firms’ market performance and 
investments from institutions.  The difference between the two mean BHRs is -8.88%, which 
is significant at a ten percent level.  
Mean market adjusted return during (0, +1) for firms with institutional investments is 
6.85% and statistically significant at a one percent level.  This market adjusted return for firms 
without investments from institutions is 6.33% and is not statistically significant, however 
economically material.  Post-emergence mean abnormal returns on days t+2, t+3, and t+4 for 
firms with institutional investments are negative, however not significant.  MARs for these 
firms are -1.83% and -1.53% (both statistically significant at a five percent level) on days t+7 
and t+10. Daily mean abnormal return for firms without institutional ownership is -3.49% and 
statistically significant at a ten percent level on day t+5.  Mean BHRs for the post-emergence 
period (+2, +10) are negative but not statistically significant for both groups of firms.  Mean 
twenty-one-day BHRs for firms in the two subsamples of held and non-held firms are 8.80% 
(which is significant at a five percent level) and -8.30% (which is statistically significant at a 
ten percent level), respectively, suggesting once again that market performance of firms with 
investments from institutions exceeds that of firms without the investments.   
We pictorially present results reported in Tables 5 (Panel A) and 6 on Figures 2(a) and 
(b), respectively.  We plot twenty-one-day BHRs for easier interpretation of the results 
included in the two tables. 
[Insert Figure 2 (a) - (d) here] 
Figures 2 (c) and (d) pictorially present share turnover determined as number of shares 
traded divided by number of shares outstanding during the twenty-one-day period around day 
of bankruptcy filing (c) and day of emergence from Chapter 11 (d).  Before bankruptcy filing, 
from t-10 until t-2, there is no discernible difference between trading volumes for firms with 
and without investments from institutions.  Starting on day t-1 until day t+3 we observe an 
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elevated level of trading volume for firms without investments from institutions.  For firms 
with the investments trading volume becomes elevated between days t=0 and t+2.  During the 
two-day filing period, on days t=0 and t+1, trading volumes are elevated for both groups of 
firms.  Trading volume settles to the pre-filing levels after day t+3 for firms without 
institutional ownership and after day t+2 for firms with investments from institutions.  .     
As presented on Figure 2 (d), trading volumes do not change as a result of firms’ 
emergence from bankruptcy for the group of firms with institutional investors.  On most days 
prior to emergence from Chapter 11 and on the day of emergence, t=0, there is no discernible 
difference between trading volumes for firms with and without investments from institutions.  
We observe slight elevations in the trading volume of firms without investments from 
institutions on days t-4, t+1 through t+3, t+5, t+6, and t+8 through t+10.  Trading volume for 
firms with institutional investments remains unchanged during the twenty-one day period.   
We turn now to the medium term abnormal returns around bankruptcy filings and 
emergence from Chapter 11 and report results for several time horizons, from one quarter long 
to one year long, prior to the quarter of bankruptcy filing and following the quarter of 
emergence.
78
  In this analysis we relate quarterly returns to institutional ownership and 
determine whether institutions hold shares of bankrupt firms that perform better in the stock 
market and whether market performances of firms with and without institutional investments 
are different. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 In Panel A of Table 7 we provide pre-bankruptcy buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 
one-, two-, three-, and four-quarter periods.  These negative values are statistically significant 
and economically material.  While mean pre-filing buy-and-hold returns are lower for firms 
with institutional investors than for firms without the investments for each time horizon 
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 For instance, if a firm files for or emerges from Chapter 11 on February 1 (first quarter), then pre-
bankruptcy quarter -1 (in Panel A) starts on October 1 (4
th
 quarter of prior year) and post-emergence 
quarter +1 (in Panel B) starts on April 1 (2
nd
 quarter of the same year). 
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reported, none of the differences in mean returns are statistically significant.  Also, returning 
to operating performance indicators reported in Table 4, Panel A—we found that firms with 
institutional ownership modestly “outperform” firms without investments from institutions.  In 
summary, irrespective of better pre-bankruptcy operating performance, market performance is 
similar for the two groups of firms indicating no real investment advantage from choosing the 
operationally less weak firms.   
 In Panel B of Table 7, we present buy-and-hold returns over one- to four-quarter 
periods for the two sub-groups after their emergence from bankruptcy.  The abnormal returns 
for each post-emergence period for both groups are negative.  While firms without 
institutional ownership consistently have better (though negative) mean buy-and-hold returns 
than do those with institutional ownership starting in the quarter period (+1, +2) (mean of -
4.59% vs. -9.45%) through quarter period (+1, +4) (mean of -8.83% vs. -20.46%), there is a 
lack of consistent statistical significance to the large differences in returns between the two 
groups.  These findings are inconsistent with our initial conjecture about either institutional 
managers’ superior ability to pick stronger and better performing losers or their investments 
positively effecting share performance of the firms.  Stock performance of firms without 
investments from institutions, although negative, is better than performance of firms with the 
investments during the post-emergence quarters.  Our findings are also in contrast to Eberhart 
et al (1999) who observe that the firm starts yielding large positive excess stock returns in the 
200-day post-emergence period.     
III. Development of Hypotheses 
For firms that have institutional ownership during bankruptcy proceedings we find 
that institutional managers are consistent net buyers during the quarter of emergence and 
several quarters following and that the gap between number of net buyers and net sellers starts 
to widen in the quarter before emergence (q-1).  Given the net purchase/selling results to this 
point, it is important to determine how profitable this net trading behavior is during 
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restructuring and shortly after emergence.  Thus, we offer a hypothesis that examines the 
relation between the timing of institutional investors’ trading and security returns.  Although 
we find that, in aggregate, institutions are not in a rush to sell shares of distressed firms, 
perhaps considering these investments undervalued in the market and/or operationally 
underperforming with a good potential for operating and market performance improvements, 
we further analyze institutions’ investment behavior and determine whether they buy (sell) the 
investments before the stock prices rise (decline).  If the purchasing (selling) occurs after the 
prices increase (decline), then the institutional managers would incur losses just as other 
shareholders would with investments in the bankrupt securities of the same firms.  Hence: 
H1: Institutional investors purchase (sell) shares of distressed firms to achieve (avoid) 
capital gains (losses).  This behavior is similar to that of insiders, when they sell (postpone 
purchases) before significant stock-price decreases and buy (postpone sales) before significant 
price increases. 
From the summaries of performance related data presented in Tables IV-VII we 
observe that although one year prior to year of filing firms whose shares are held by 
institutional investors are operationally less weak than firms whose shares are not part of 
institutional portfolios, these results reverse as the firms emerge from bankruptcy and operate 
for a year following emergence.  Firms without institutional ownership improve their post-
emergence performance more than do firms with investments from institutions.  In addition, 
market capitalization and share turnover are significantly greater for the firms without 
investments from institutions than for the firms with the investments one year following 
quarter of emergence.  Post-emergence BHRs (as reported in Table 7) are less negative for the 
firms without institutional investments than for the firms with institutional investments.  
However, when analyzing short-term BHRs, we find that market performance of firms with 
institutional investments exceeds performance of firms without the investments during the pre-
filing time period.  These returns are however more negative for the firms with than without 
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investments from institutions during the two-day filing window.  We investigate whether the 
firms with institutional holdings perform better and return to profitability sooner than do the 
firms without the investments.  To make this determination we develop and test our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Operating and market performances of bankrupt firms improve as their shares 
become part of institutional investors’ portfolios.  The firms with institutional holdings 
reorganize and return to profitability sooner than their counterparts without investments from 
institutions. 
IV. Test Methodology and Presentation of Regression Results 
At this point we attempt to determine whether or not institutional managers possess 
the ability to timely recognize undervalued investments held in their portfolios or acquired 
close to the day of filing, during reorganization, or shortly after emergence.  Subsequently, we 
also measure the relationship between institutional trading on firms’ post-bankruptcy 
recovery. 
i. Institutional trading around periods of quarterly abnormal holding period returns 
We now examine the relation between the timing of institutional trading and security 
returns to test our first hypothesis.  Seyhun and Bradley (1997) find that stockholders of 
bankrupt firms suffer significant capital losses in the years before filing and find that corporate 
insiders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions sell stock before prices fall and buy stock after 
prices have fallen.  The summary of data presented in Table 3 indicates that institutional 
managers are purchasers of the shares of previously failed firms during the quarters following 
emergence.  In addition, as is reported in Table 7, Panel B, abnormal returns, in aggregate but 
with a great variation, continue to be negative post-emergence.  We now attempt to find out 
whether institutional buying (selling) of bankrupt firms occurs before (after) the stock prices 
rise.  If the institutions in our sample do not act strategically and, instead, buy (sell) share after 
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the prices have risen (fallen), then they would not earn capital gains expected from savvy and 
informed investors. 
To test our first hypothesis we utilize the methodology developed by Seyhun and 
Bradley (1997).  First, to measure the timing of institutional trading, we partition abnormal 
holding period returns before and after institutional trading using a dummy variable technique.  
We begin with calculating quarterly abnormal holding period returns between 1980 and 2013 
by subtracting quarterly market returns from each firm’s returns in the same quarter.  Then, for 
each quarter holding period, we determine the net abnormal trading by institutional managers 
in the quarter preceding the holding period and the net abnormal trading by the managers in 
the quarter immediately following the holding quarter period. 
Next we run the following regression for each quarter-manager combination. 
BHRi,t = β0 + β1 DBi,t-1 + β2 DAi,t+1 + Ɛ t, for t = -3 to +3 
where BHRi,t is buy-and-hold abnormal holding period return for firm i in quarter t (t=0 for 
quarter of emergence); DBi,t-1 is dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if institutional 
managers are net buyers, 0 if they are non-traders, and -1 if they are net sellers for firms i 
during the quarter before the holding period, t-1; and DAi,t+1 is dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if managers buy, 0 if they do not trade, and -1 if they sell equity of firm i during the 
quarter after the holding period, t+1.
79
 
 As Seyhun and Bradly (1997) indicate, if the institutional investors believe that the 
market price has fallen and that the investment is now undervalued, they would be enticed to 
buy shares of this security; this would result in a negative, statistically significant estimate for 
β2.  If, however, the institutional investors sell shares of stocks before their prices fall, then β1 
should be positive and significant; if institutions sell after the prices fall, then β2 should be 
positive and significant. 
                                                 
79
 We do not size-partition our sample to run the same regression for small, medium, and large size net 
change in institutional holdings, as Seyhun and Bradley (1997) did for insider trading, due to small size 
of our sample. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Table 8 we report time-series estimates of the coefficients of the estimating 
equation for all institutions in the sample by quarter prior to and following completion of 
reorganization.  The signs of the coefficients for before-holding period trading (DB) are mixed 
during the seven-quarter period we analyze.  During quarter q-2, institutions appear to exercise 
an inferior judgment when trading bankrupt equity—they sell shares of bankrupt firms after 
their prices fall (parameter on DA variable for this quarter is statistically significant 0.003).  
We find that during the quarter of emergence coefficient for DB is positive and statistically 
significant at a ten percent level; during second quarter following emergence, it is negative 
and statistically significant at a five percent level.  Although we do not know exactly when in 
the quarter of emergence institutions sell the bankrupt (or reorganized) equity, before or after 
prices fall,
80
  we speculate, based on the net quarterly trading activities around quarter of 
emergence, that institutions may trade the shares strategically.  In the second quarter following 
emergence, however, institutions purchase shares of reorganized firms after their prices 
increase (DB’s coefficient is negative and statistically significant) and sell the shares after 
their prices fall (DA’s coefficient is positive and statistically significant at a five percent level) 
indicating that institutional managers are incapable of identifying undervalued securities when 
adding shares of formerly bankrupt firms to their portfolios.  Based on these results we 
conclude that the only time when institutions transact strategically is right around firms’ 
quarter of emergence from Chapter 11. 
ii. How does operating and market performance of firms with institutional holdings 
differ from that of firms without investments from institutions? 
Now we consider our second hypothesis related to the impact institutional trading has 
on performance of distressed firms.  We utilize logistic regression model to compare changes 
in firms’ operating and market performances from one year preceding the filing to one year 
                                                 
80
 We utilize quarterly 13f trading data for this analysis. 
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following the emergence and whose shares are held by institutions to changes in performance 
of those firms during the same time periods and who do not have investments from 
institutions.  To do so we design the following dependent variable: 
 
where i indexes firms, t indexes time,  is the dependent variable of interest (cash flow, 
which is defined as the firms’ operating income before depreciation and amortization 
normalized either by sales (CFS) or by total assets (CFA), or market adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal return),
81
  and  are firms’ cash flows or market returns in the years 
following year of emergence and preceding year of filing, respectively.  We then derive the 
binary dependent variable as follows: if changes in cash flow or abnormal market returns are 
positive, indicating firm’s operating or market performance improvement from the pre-filing 
period to the post-emergence period, then we assign 1 to the variable, if it is negative, the 
dependent variable equals 0.
82
  To test whether or not institutional holdings relate to changes 
in firms’ performance we use two dummy variables.  One of the variables is IHD_BK that 
equals 1 if bankrupt securities are held by institutional investors either shortly before 
bankruptcy filings (one quarter before quarter of bankruptcy filings) or during quarter of the 
filings , and 0 otherwise.  The other variable is IHD_REO that equals 1 if bankrupt securities 
are held by institutional investors either in the quarter of emergence or one quarter following 
and 0 otherwise.  In the model we control for firm size measured as natural logarithm of total 
assets, profit margin, and Altman’s z-score.  All dependent variables are as of one year prior to 
bankruptcy filing.   
                                                 
81
 Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and Healy et al (1992) use 
accounting measures of profitability in their studies to determine improvement in performance 
following events such as buyouts and mergers.  
82
 We also ran OLS regressions with the changes in cash flow and abnormal market returns as 
dependent variables and were unable to obtain robust enough results. 
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 The calculation of cash flow does not consider interest expense, dividends, or taxes, 
and does not reflect differences in capital structure.  In addition, the measure of operating 
income before depreciation and amortization normalized by sales (CFS) is less affected by 
asset write downs and divestitures, common changes reported for bankrupt firms in the extant 
literature, than CFA (Hotchkiss (1995)).  We first use CFA to define our dependent variable 
and then, as robustness checks, we run the same regression with a binary dependent variable 
determined based on changes in CFS and abnormal returns. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Based on the results reported in Table 9 we observe that that institutional holdings are 
related to reorganized firms’ performance (dummy variable IHD_BK is statistically significant 
and economically material in two out of three regressions, while dummy variable IHD_REO is 
not significant in the regressions).  We find that institutional investments negatively relate to 
firms’ likelihood to improve their post-emergence operating performance.  This finding is not 
consistent with the earlier, unrelated to bankruptcy, evidence in the literature that higher 
institutional ownership has a positive effect on stock prices and returns (Brown and Brooke 
(1993), Gompers and Metrick (1999)).  Investments from institutions positively relate to 
changes in market buy-and-hold abnormal returns, indicating that the likelihood of firms 
improving its market performance rises with the presence of investments from institutions as 
the firms approach and file for bankruptcy.  Large firms are more likely to recover from 
bankruptcy and to improve their operating performance (measured by CFA and CFS dummy 
variables) as shown by the positive coefficient on variable LNAT, significant at a five percent 
level.  However, small firms are more likely to improve their market performance (measured 
by buy-and-hold return dummy variable) as shown by the negative coefficient on the size 
related variable.    Finally, the changes in reorganized firms’ operating and market 
performances do not depend either on the firms’ pre-bankruptcy operating performance 
 114 
 
measured by profit margin or the probability of the firms falling into distress and bankruptcy 
measured by z-score. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between institutional holdings and 
performance of distressed firms and evaluate whether or not institutional investors 
strategically trade shares of bankrupt firms, identifying undervalued investments and timing 
their trading, which would lead to future positive returns.  We find that retail investors and not 
institutional investors are majority holders of distressed and bankrupt equity.  However 
institutional ownership grows as the firms progress through restructuring and emerge from 
bankruptcy.  When analyzing institutional trading behavior for eight quarters surrounding 
quarter of emergence we find that institutional investors are net buyers of these firms’ shares 
and increase their acquisitions significantly during the quarter of emergence and four quarters 
following.     
Given institutional managers’ interest in the bankrupt firms we attempt to discern 
whether the institutions have superior timing ability when trading shares of bankrupt firms.  
We evaluate the timing of institutional managers’ trading and determine whether they acquire 
securities of bankrupt firms after the share prices have fallen and sell them before the prices 
fall.  We find that institutions transact strategically by selling shares of bankrupt firms before 
the prices fall right around firms’ emergence from Chapter 11.  We fail, however, to find any 
evidence of managers’ superior trading strategy during any other time period reviewed.  
We find that firms with institutional holdings are smaller and less levered than firms 
without the investments in the year preceding filing for Chapter 11 protection.  These firms’ 
pre-bankruptcy operating performance is also stronger than that of bankrupt firms without 
institutional ownership.  Firms with institutional ownership also have higher pre-filing current 
ratio and Altman’s z-score.  However, one year following the emergence, firms without 
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institutional investments are less levered and have higher z-score and current ratio than do 
firms with investments from institutions. 
As to the market performance measures, they do not vary significantly between the 
two groups of firms until after they emerge from Chapter 11.  In the year following quarter of 
emergence share price and trading volume for firms without institutional investments exceed 
those for firms with the investments.  However, mean market adjusted return during this year 
is lower for the former than for the latter.  Although negative for both groups of firms, short-
term buy-and-hold abnormal returns around day of bankruptcy filing are greater for the firms 
with institutional investments than for the firms without investments from institutions, 
indicating that institutions hold the firms with better market performance.  We further 
investigate the relationship between institutional trading and bankrupt firms’ performance and 
find that institutional holdings at the time when the firms file for bankruptcy negatively relate 
to their operating recovery and positively relate to the firms’ changes in the market 
performance as they emerge from Chapter 11.  Large firms tend to recover operationally better 
than small firms, while the small firms are more capable than the large firms of improving 
their pre-filing market performance levels as they emerge from Chapter 11.  
In our analysis of institutional investment behavior we do not find convincing and 
consistent evidence that would persuade us to believe in sophistication, ingenuity, and 
astuteness of institutions’ investment strategies–at least as it might pertain to the firms during 
the time shortly before filing for Chapter 11 protection, during reorganization, and shortly 
after emergence.  However, there is a time when institutions trade strategically by selling 
equity of bankrupt firms around quarter of emergence before the stock prices fall.  Institutional 
ownership negatively relates to firms’ achievements of pre-bankruptcy performance results 
after they emerge from Chapter 11.  
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Table 1 
Sample formation and institutional holdings for the firms filing for Chapter 11 between 1/1/1980 and 08/31/2013 
 
Panel A: Sample description 
  
 
Number 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings from SDC; excludes utilities and financial firms 
 
3,243 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings from Lopucki's Database; excludes utilities and financial firms 843 
Non-duplicating Chapter 11 filings from both data sets with accurate identifiers (Permno, CUSIP, Ticker) and emergence dates; 
excludes utilities and financial firms 1,645 
Firms delisted before or on the day of bankruptcy filing 
 
830 
Firms delisted during reorganization proceedings 
 
316 
   Total firms in the sample* 
 
499 
     with active ("A") trading status on the day of bankruptcy filing 
 
159 
     with unknown ("X") trading status on the day of filing 
 
28 
     with suspended ("S") trading status on the day of filing 
 
1 
     with missing trading data on the day of filing   311 
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(Table 1 continues) 
Panel B: Institutional holdings (IH) description for firms that did not delist prior to filing 
 
For 316 firms 
that delisted 
during Ch. 11 
For 499 firms 
that did not delist 
in Ch. 11 
Percentage of firms with institutional holdings one quarter prior to filing in relation to total firms in each 
sub-sample 85% 33% 
Percentage of firms with institutional holdings in the quarter of filing in relation to total firms in each sub-
sample 86% 32% 
Percentage of shares held by managers one quarter prior to filing in relation to total shares outstanding 25% 21% 
Percentage of shares held by managers in the quarter of filing in relation to total shares outstanding 9% 17% 
Mean IH value one quarter prior to filing (in $mill) 15.32 213.85 
Median IH value one quarter prior to filing (in $mill) 2.08 2.17 
Mean IH value in the quarter of filing (in $mill) 2.07 193.59 
Median IH value in the quarter of filing (in $mill) 0.21 1.01 
Mean number of managers holding shares of the same distressed firm one  
quarter prior to filing 24 32 
Mean number of managers holding shares of the same distressed firm in the  
quarter of filing 12 27 
 
The table presents number of firms filing Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2013.  The data reported here comes from Thompson Financial Services 
SDC Platinum and Lopucki’s Bankruptcy database.  The sample consists of all U. S. non-utility and -financial firms that filed for Chapter 11 and 
completed reorganization during the period.  For the firms with missing or unknown ("X") trading status and no delisting data, it could mean that 
either (1) firms delisted prior to filing, however delisting data is missing, or (2) firms are actively traded, however trading data is missing for that 
date.  Institutional holding (IH) value is number of shares held by institutions multiplied by share price. 
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Table 2 
Shareholdings of corporate insiders, institutional managers, and retail investors during the year prior to and subsequent to bankruptcy 
filing and the year prior to and subsequent to emergence 
 
Panel A: Holdings around quarter of bankruptcy filings 
Quarter 
horizons 
Institutions Corporate insiders Retail investors 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
-4 160 26.2% 17.2% 141 7.7% 0.9% 160 66.1% 81.9% 
-3 162 24.5% 16.9% 147 8.8% 1.0% 162 66.7% 82.1% 
-2 160 22.8% 13.0% 131 5.4% 0.5% 160 71.8% 86.5% 
-1 163 20.8% 13.4% 122 4.9% 0.3% 163 74.3% 86.3% 
0 146 16.8% 9.7% 102 5.7% 0.3% 146 77.5% 90.1% 
1 119 17.7% 8.7% 76 4.8% 0.4% 119 77.4% 90.9% 
2 101 16.4% 8.6% 56 3.8% 0.2% 101 79.7% 91.2% 
3 85 16.8% 7.8% 50 9.3% 0.1% 85 73.8% 92.1% 
4 67 16.2% 7.6% 49 7.0% 0.5% 67 76.8% 91.9% 
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(Table 2 continues) 
Panel B: Holdings around quarter of emergence from Chapter 11 
Quarter 
horizons 
Institutions Corporate insiders Retail investors 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
Mean 
ownership 
%-age 
Median 
ownership 
%-age 
-4 86 15.4% 7.5% 47 6.3% 0.2% 86 78.3% 92.3% 
-3 98 16.2% 8.2% 57 4.7% 0.5% 98 79.1% 91.3% 
-2 111 16.2% 7.4% 67 7.1% 0.2% 111 76.8% 92.4% 
-1 135 15.7% 7.3% 83 6.8% 0.4% 135 77.5% 92.3% 
0 193 19.0% 8.1% 159 18.4% 4.5% 193 62.6% 87.5% 
1 203 28.3% 19.2% 156 13.1% 2.3% 203 58.6% 78.5% 
2 208 35.0% 28.8% 148 8.2% 0.8% 208 56.8% 70.3% 
3 214 37.3% 31.3% 151 12.0% 1.6% 214 50.6% 67.1% 
4 210 40.9% 37.1% 156 12.3% 1.4% 210 46.8% 61.5% 
 
The table presents mean and median percentages of institutional, corporate insider, and retail investor ownerships four quarters before, quarter of, 
and four quarters following bankruptcy filing (Panel A) and Chapter 11 emergence (Panel B).  Quarters 0 are quarters of filing and emergence in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively.  We provide number of firms with institutional, insider, and retail holdings.  We obtained quarterly holding 
data for corporate insiders and institutions from Thomson Reuters’ Database.  Retail investors’ proportional holdings are determined as a 
difference between one hundred percent representing total shares outstanding and the sum of percentage shareholdings for institutions and 
corporate insiders. 
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Figure 1 (a) and (b) 
Corporate insider, institutional and retail share holdings: 
(a) Around quarter of bankruptcy                  (b) Around quarter of emergence 
 
 
On Figure 1 we plot share holdings as percentages of total shares outstanding for three groups of investors: corporate insiders, institutions, and 
retail investors. 
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Table 3  
Number of firms where institutional holders are net buyers, non-traders, or net sellers during eight quarters surrounding quarter 
of emergence, 1980-2013 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
No. of 
firms with 
holdings 
All sample firms All control firms Mean abn. net 
# of shares 
traded 
Median abn. net 
# of shares 
traded 
P-value Net 
buyers 
Non-
traders 
Net 
sellers Net buyers 
Non-
traders 
Net 
sellers 
-4 151 76 20 55 89 6 56 -9,720 -2,679 0.0656 
-3 147 66 24 57 81 7 59 1,749 -1,553 0.8132 
-2 145 60 29 56 87 9 49 1,382 -1,190 0.6928 
-1 146 78 28 40 90 8 48 -931 -1,152 0.9161 
0 193 130 29 34 134 9 50 105,251 5,297 <.0001 
+1 203 161 16 26 142 4 57 128,259 40,970 <.0001 
+2 208 164 15 29 145 6 57 42,712 9,545 <.0001 
+3 214 156 19 39 145 2 67 36,817 7,806 0.0002 
+4 210 163 14 33 144 3 63 30,724 4,260 0.0095 
 
Table 3 reports net trading behavior of institutional investors for sample and control firms four quarters prior to quarter of emergence, in the 
quarter of emergence, and four quarters following the emergence.  In each column we report number of firms with positive net change in holdings 
as net buyers, zero change as non-traders, and negative change as net sellers.  The last three columns are associated with mean and median 
abnormal net number of shares traded determined as difference between net changes in institutional holdings of bankrupt firms and those of 
control firms.  Quarter horizon 0 corresponds to quarter of emergence from Chapter 11. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics, categorized by firms with and without institutional holdings 
 
Panel A: Accounting variables one year prior to the year of bankruptcy 
Variable 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Sales ($mill) 77 1,016.50 264.13 126 1,859.92 588.59 843.40 0.0148 324.47 0.0048 
Total assets ($mill) 77 1,266.78 341.09 126 2,345.02 659.53 1,078.20 0.0359 318.44 0.0028 
ROA 77 -16% -7% 126 -28% -16% -12% 0.0304 -9% 0.0354 
Z-score 60 1.088 1.021 93 -0.337 0.179 -1.425 0.0036 -0.842 0.0028 
Current ratio 68 1.501 1.230 117 1.289 0.797 -0.212 0.3651 -0.433 0.0040 
Debt ratio 77 0.942 0.782 125 1.170 0.983 0.228 0.0538 0.201 <.0001 
Cash flow/total assets 76 0.004 0.052 125 0.003 0.043 -0.001 0.9803 -0.009 0.7085 
Cash flow/sales 76 -0.069 0.040 124 -0.021 0.049 0.048 0.5265 0.010 0.9138 
Panel B: Accounting variables one year after emergence from bankruptcy 
Variable 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Sales ($mill) 51 1,481.94 383.50 129 1,637.43 462.87 155.50 0.7799 79.37 0.3112 
Total assets ($mill) 51 1,314.67 268.13 130 1,965.40 449.52 650.70 0.4558 181.38 0.1152 
ROA 51 -5% 1% 129 -1% 2% 5% 0.3359 1% 0.2847 
Z-score 40 1.285 1.482 110 2.181 2.019 0.896 0.0858 0.537 0.1705 
Current ratio 46 1.766 1.432 121 2.165 1.795 0.400 0.1932 0.363 0.0309 
Debt ratio 51 0.791 0.779 129 0.689 0.669 -0.102 0.0797 -0.110 0.0969 
Cash flow/total assets 51 0.038 0.082 126 0.070 0.109 0.032 0.3418 0.028 0.0628 
Cash flow/sales 49 0.025 0.071 126 0.048 0.092 0.023 0.7811 0.021 0.2368 
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(Table 4 continues) 
Panel C: Market related variables one year prior to quarter of bankruptcy 
Variable 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Market value ($mill) 141 284.73 37.68 47 121.98 34.54 -162.75 0.1329 -3.14 0.8454 
Market-to-book 62 0.7158 0.7081 24 1.0722 0.4522 0.3564 0.6769 -0.2559 0.4614 
Price-to-earnings 62 -1.7504 -1.1699 21 -1.4130 -0.3969 0.3374 0.8328 0.7731 0.2386 
Price 141 7.39 3.61 47 4.79 3.59 -2.60 0.0118 -0.02 0.1968 
Volume 141 0.50% 0.30% 47 0.58% 0.34% 0.08% 0.5675 0.04% 0.3727 
Shares outstanding (in 1,000) 144 33,655 10,815 51 35,645 17,104 1,990 0.8567 6,289 0.3227 
Market adj. return 141 -0.17% -0.22% 47 -0.13% -0.19% 0.04% 0.5960 0.02% 0.4842 
Panel D: Market related variables one year after quarter of emergence 
Variable 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Market value ($mill) 119 492.76 35.24 155 557.77 126.11 65.02 0.5987 90.87 0.0001 
Market-to-book 40 1.1458 1.3078 91 1.6751 1.1350 0.5293 0.3837 -0.1729 0.7892 
Price-to-earnings 40 2.6025 -0.2874 93 7.2936 6.4419 4.6911 0.2246 6.7293 0.4455 
Price 119 9.62 3.27 155 12.37 8.52 2.75 0.0923 5.24 <.0001 
Volume 117 0.44% 0.27% 155 0.70% 0.46% 0.26% 0.0130 0.19% <.0001 
Shares outstanding (in 1,000) 137 39,098 14,755 159 49,291 18,122 10,193 0.3872 3,367 0.2978 
Market adj. return 119 0.56% 0.03% 155 0.06% -0.004% -0.49% 0.0775 -0.04% 0.2308 
 
Mean and median annual operating and market related performance statistics are included in this table.  Accounting related data are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and reported in Panels A and B for one year prior to year of filing and one year following year of emergence, respectively.  Market 
related data are from CRSP and reported in Panels C and D for one year prior to quarter of filing and one year after quarter of emergence.  We 
obtain sales, total assets, current assets, total debt, current liability, pretax income, interest expense, market value of equity, retained earnings, and 
net income from COMPUSTAT.  We derive several performance measure ratios using accounting data: net income divided by total assets (ROA); 
current assets divided by current liabilities (current ratio); total debt divided by total assets (debt ratio); and operating income before depreciation 
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and amortization normalized either by total assets (cash flow/total assets) or by sales (cash flow/sales).  Altman’s z-score, bankruptcy-risk proxy 
(Altman (1968)), is defined as 3.3x((pretax income + interest expense)/total assets) + 0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market capitalization/total 
liabilities) + 1.2x(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets).  Panels C and D include market related data: firms’ market 
capitalization, market-to-book and price-to-earnings ratios, share price, number of shares outstanding, share turnover calculated as trading volume 
divided by total shares outstanding, and market adjusted returns defined as security returns adjusted for the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq equally-weighted 
returns including dividends.  Extreme values are censored.  In each panel we also report differences between mean and median values of the 
variables and statistical significance of a two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) for difference in their means (medians). 
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Table 5 
Changes in market performance around day of bankruptcy filing 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) for firms with continuous 
trading 
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR) for firms with continuous trading 
Day 
Firms with IH Firms without IH Time 
horizons 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) 
Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. 
-10 125 -0.51% 0.6763 43 0.14% 0.9107 Day -10 125 -0.51% 0.6763 43 0.14% 0.9107 
-9 125 -0.28% 0.7595 43 -1.52% 0.2543 (-10,-9) 125 -1.36% 0.2330 43 -1.63% 0.2463 
-8 125 -0.19% 0.8173 43 -1.66% 0.2529 (-10,-8) 125 -1.53% 0.2774 43 -3.30% 0.0711 
-7 125 -0.16% 0.8830 43 1.66% 0.2435 (-10,-7) 125 -1.32% 0.4851 43 -2.01% 0.3187 
-6 125 -1.54% 0.1504 43 -0.60% 0.6625 (-10,-6) 125 -3.50% 0.0594 43 -2.40% 0.3764 
-5 124 0.38% 0.6779 43 -0.50% 0.6532 (-10,-5) 124 -3.54% 0.0654 43 -2.99% 0.3021 
-4 123 -2.63% 0.0092 43 -1.98% 0.1110 (-10,-4) 123 -6.28% 0.0012 43 -4.34% 0.2469 
-3 121 0.03% 0.9806 43 -5.27% 0.0004 (-10,-3) 121 -6.47% 0.0013 43 -9.37% 0.0114 
-2 121 -1.36% 0.3190 43 -1.88% 0.2794 (-10,-2) 121 -7.70% 0.0010 43 -12.10% 0.0004 
-1 121 -0.60% 0.6354 42 -3.17% 0.0442 (-10,-1) 121 -9.74% <.0001 42 -14.65% <.0001 
0 109 -10.06% <.0001 40 -7.48% 0.0303 (-10, 0) 109 -19.86% <.0001 40 -22.42% <.0001 
1 97 -4.74% 0.0577 38 -3.02% 0.5255 (-10,+1) 97 -25.19% <.0001 38 -28.01% <.0001 
(0, +1) 97 -15.56% <.0001 38 -11.01% 0.0210 (-10,+2) 96 -24.75% <.0001 38 -31.11% <.0001 
2 96 4.19% 0.0239 38 -0.75% 0.8034 (-10,+3) 96 -25.15% <.0001 38 -28.70% <.0001 
3 96 0.09% 0.9486 38 4.81% 0.0875 (-10,+4) 96 -26.48% <.0001 37 -26.92% <.0001 
4 96 -1.09% 0.4616 37 3.89% 0.1768 (-10,+5) 96 -25.41% <.0001 37 -27.89% <.0001 
5 96 2.05% 0.2445 37 -0.25% 0.8738 (-10,+6) 95 -24.49% <.0001 37 -27.36% <.0001 
6 95 1.60% 0.2383 37 0.35% 0.8379 (-10,+7) 94 -25.58% <.0001 37 -29.75% <.0001 
7 94 -1.38% 0.3092 37 -2.38% 0.0839 (-10,+8) 94 -24.98% <.0001 37 -31.53% <.0001 
8 94 1.43% 0.1841 37 -1.63% 0.2815 (-10,+9) 94 -25.60% <.0001 37 -29.83% <.0001 
9 94 -0.27% 0.8365 37 2.18% 0.2943 (-10,+10) 92 -27.64% <.0001 37 -32.32% <.0001 
10 92 -1.93% 0.0898 37 -2.24% 0.2112 (+2,+10) 92 2.23% 0.5243 37 0.27% 0.9526 
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(Table 5 continues) 
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) for all firms Panel B: Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR) for all firms 
Day 
Firms with IH Firms without IH Time 
horizons 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) 
Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. 
-10 129 -0.46% 0.6985 43 0.14% 0.9107 Day -10 129 -0.46% 0.6985 43 0.14% 0.9107 
-9 129 -0.21% 0.8068 43 -1.52% 0.2543 (-10,-9) 129 -1.23% 0.2721 43 -1.63% 0.2463 
-8 129 -0.33% 0.6780 43 -1.66% 0.2529 (-10,-8) 129 -1.56% 0.2549 43 -3.30% 0.0711 
-7 129 -0.31% 0.7613 43 1.66% 0.2435 (-10,-7) 129 -1.51% 0.4101 43 -2.01% 0.3187 
-6 129 -1.55% 0.1367 43 -0.60% 0.6625 (-10,-6) 129 -3.67% 0.0417 43 -2.40% 0.3764 
-5 128 0.32% 0.7144 43 -0.50% 0.6532 (-10,-5) 128 -3.76% 0.0444 43 -2.99% 0.3021 
-4 128 -2.56% 0.0082 43 -1.98% 0.1110 (-10,-4) 128 -6.49% 0.0005 43 -4.34% 0.2469 
-3 127 -0.06% 0.9512 43 -5.27% 0.0004 (-10,-3) 127 -6.59% 0.0006 43 -9.37% 0.0114 
-2 127 -1.37% 0.2891 43 -1.88% 0.2794 (-10,-2) 127 -7.85% 0.0004 43 -12.10% 0.0004 
-1 127 -0.69% 0.5673 43 -3.38% 0.0303 (-10,-1) 127 -9.90% <.0001 43 -15.44% <.0001 
0 123 -9.54% <.0001 43 -8.38% 0.0109 (-10, 0) 123 -19.49% <.0001 43 -23.60% <.0001 
1 117 -5.41% 0.0113 42 -4.69% 0.2854 (-10,+1) 117 -24.79% <.0001 42 -29.64% <.0001 
(0, +1) 117 -15.09% <.0001 42 -13.27% 0.0039 (-10,+2) 116 -25.38% <.0001 42 -32.68% <.0001 
2 116 2.22% 0.1753 42 -0.83% 0.7655 (-10,+3) 116 -26.20% <.0001 42 -30.90% <.0001 
3 116 -0.69% 0.5774 42 3.67% 0.1609 (-10,+4) 116 -27.31% <.0001 42 -28.75% <.0001 
4 116 -0.79% 0.5270 42 4.68% 0.0705 (-10,+5) 116 -25.83% <.0001 42 -29.58% <.0001 
5 116 2.81% 0.0906 42 -0.22% 0.8951 (-10,+6) 114 -25.31% <.0001 42 -29.68% <.0001 
6 114 1.14% 0.3447 42 -0.65% 0.6813 (-10,+7) 113 -25.63% <.0001 42 -31.11% <.0001 
7 113 -0.20% 0.8704 42 -0.90% 0.5599 (-10,+8) 113 -24.41% <.0001 42 -32.37% <.0001 
8 113 2.38% 0.0345 42 -0.69% 0.6398 (-10,+9) 113 -25.41% <.0001 42 -30.45% <.0001 
9 113 -1.07% 0.3572 42 2.46% 0.2107 (-10,+10) 111 -27.10% <.0001 41 -32.62% <.0001 
10 111 -1.35% 0.1822 41 -2.18% 0.1813 (+2,+10) 111 1.39% 0.6513 41 1.35% 0.7492 
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Reported are short-term market adjusted (MAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHR), categorized by firms with and without institutional 
ownership.  We utilize equally weighted, including dividends, CRSP market returns for computations of the returns.  We evaluate returns during 
twenty-one-day window surrounding day of Chapter 11 filing.  In Panel A, we present MAR and BHR for firms with continuous trading during ten 
days prior to bankruptcy filing, on the day of filing (Day 0), and ten days following bankruptcy filing.  In Panel B we report MAR and BHR for all 
firms during various short-term horizons.  P-values are reported for each category of firms. 
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Table 6 
Changes in market performance around day of emergence from bankruptcy proceedings 
 
Market Adjusted Returns (MAR) Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR) 
Day 
Firms with IH Firms without IH Time 
horizons 
Firms with IH Firms without IH 
Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. Number Mean p-stat. 
-10 104 0.65% 0.5132 43 -1.72% 0.1860 Day -10 104 0.65% 0.5132 43 -1.72% 0.1860 
-9 104 -0.94% 0.3072 43 -1.68% 0.0766 (-10,-9) 104 -0.36% 0.7823 43 -3.04% 0.0095 
-8 104 0.54% 0.5519 43 -0.83% 0.3815 (-10,-8) 104 0.26% 0.8815 43 -3.82% 0.0132 
-7 104 0.79% 0.5132 43 1.90% 0.2392 (-10,-7) 104 0.94% 0.6754 43 -2.27% 0.2288 
-6 104 -0.31% 0.8049 43 -1.13% 0.3012 (-10,-6) 104 -0.17% 0.9405 43 -3.31% 0.1340 
-5 104 2.22% 0.0728 42 0.98% 0.4646 (-10,-5) 104 1.81% 0.4771 42 -3.00% 0.3322 
-4 104 0.88% 0.4422 42 0.55% 0.7058 (-10,-4) 104 2.34% 0.3805 42 -1.88% 0.6630 
-3 103 2.28% 0.0660 42 -0.89% 0.5006 (-10,-3) 103 5.42% 0.1537 42 -2.12% 0.7020 
-2 103 0.51% 0.6978 42 0.77% 0.6278 (-10,-2) 103 5.13% 0.1421 42 -2.00% 0.7171 
-1 103 0.85% 0.4490 42 -0.47% 0.7922 (-10,-1) 103 5.00% 0.1094 42 -3.88% 0.3716 
0 103 3.53% 0.0032 42 4.78% 0.0466 (-10, 0) 103 7.79% 0.0093 42 1.11% 0.8452 
1 102 2.93% 0.0688 42 1.54% 0.6326 (-10,+1) 102 11.11% 0.0016 42 1.72% 0.7742 
(0, +1) 102 6.85% 0.0006 42 6.33% 0.1020 (-10,+2) 101 10.15% 0.0038 42 2.47% 0.6270 
2 101 -0.98% 0.3888 42 1.92% 0.3975 (-10,+3) 99 10.16% 0.0052 42 0.60% 0.9094 
3 99 -1.05% 0.1920 42 -2.28% 0.1264 (-10,+4) 99 9.24% 0.0096 42 1.61% 0.7558 
4 99 -0.75% 0.4648 42 1.96% 0.2639 (-10,+5) 99 10.38% 0.0045 42 -2.55% 0.5874 
5 99 1.81% 0.1982 42 -3.49% 0.0697 (-10,+6) 99 9.97% 0.0056 42 -3.63% 0.4336 
6 99 0.16% 0.8323 42 -0.74% 0.5299 (-10,+7) 99 8.02% 0.0274 42 -6.17% 0.2050 
7 99 -1.83% 0.0378 42 -2.39% 0.2837 (-10,+8) 99 8.14% 0.0173 42 -5.28% 0.2585 
8 99 0.06% 0.9536 42 2.88% 0.1787 (-10,+9) 99 9.61% 0.0113 42 -5.56% 0.2351 
9 99 0.61% 0.5294 42 -1.06% 0.4910 (-10,+10) 99 8.80% 0.0159 42 -8.30% 0.0863 
10 99 -1.53% 0.0349 42 -2.27% 0.2616 (+2,+10) 99 -2.80% 0.1994 42 -6.51% 0.1404 
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Reported are short-term market adjusted (MAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHR) for firms with continuous trading, categorized by 
firms with and without institutional ownership.  We utilize equally weighted, including dividends, CRSP market returns for computations of the 
returns.  We evaluate returns during twenty-one-day window surrounding day of emergence from Chapter 11.  In the Table we present MAR and 
BHR for ten days prior to emergence from bankruptcy, on the day of emergence (Day 0), and ten days following emergence from bankruptcy.  P-
values are reported for each category of firms. 
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Figure 2 (a) - (d) 
Buy-and-hold market adjusted abnormal returns and share trading volumes for firms with and without institutional holdings for 
21-day periods: 
(a) Around day of bankruptcy filing                    (b) Around day of emergence from bankruptcy 
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(Figure 2 (a) - (d) continues) 
          (c) Around day of bankruptcy filing                   (d) Around day of emergence from bankruptcy 
 
 
On Figure 2 in addition to plotting BHRs for the (-10,+10) day period surrounding days of bankruptcy filing (a) and emergence (b), we plot 
trading volumes, determined as share turnover divided by total shares outstanding ((c) and (d)).  Figure 2 (a) plots BHRs ten days prior to 
bankruptcy filing, on the day of filing (day t=0), and ten days following bankruptcy filing.  Figure 2 (b) plots BHRs ten days prior to emergence 
from bankruptcy, on the day of emergence (day t=0), and ten days following emergence from bankruptcy.  Figure 2 (c) plots share turnover ten 
days prior to bankruptcy filing, on the day of filing (day t=0), and ten days following bankruptcy filing.  Figure 2 (d) plots share turnover ten days 
prior to emergence from bankruptcy, on the day of emergence (day t=0), and ten days following emergence from bankruptcy. 
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Table 7  
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns, categorized by firms with and without institutional ownership 
 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold abnormal return prior to quarter of bankruptcy filing 
Quarter 
period 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Quarter-1 130 -28.31%*** -27.61%*** 43 -19.54%*** -30.65%*** 8.78% 0.1735 -3.04% 0.4791 
(-2,-1) 138 -43.15%*** -50.17%*** 45 -32.43%*** -44.34%*** 10.72% 0.1822 5.83% 0.3237 
(-3,-1) 139 -58.69%*** -67.95%*** 47 -51.12%*** -63.13%*** 7.56% 0.3208 4.82% 0.2475 
(-4,-1) 139 -71.77%*** -75.41%*** 47 -64.36%*** -76.47%*** 7.40% 0.3790 -1.06% 0.4426 
Panel B: Buy-and-hold abnormal return following quarter of emergence from bankruptcy 
Quarter 
period 
Firms with IH (A) Firms without IH (B) Difference (B-A) 
No. of firms Mean Median No. of firms Mean Median Mean P-value Median P-value 
Quarter+1 82 -5.70% -7.26% 65 -7.37%* -8.83%* -1.66% 0.7850 -1.57% 0.8622 
(+1,+2) 95 -9.45%** -11.43%** 108 -4.59% -9.94% 4.86% 0.4287 1.49% 0.3610 
(+1,+3) 139 -13.20%*** -20.02%*** 47 -1.82% -10.48% 11.47% 0.1049 9.54% 0.0907 
(+1,+4) 139 -20.46%*** -29.79%*** 47 -8.83% -18.30% 11.63% 0.1539 11.49% 0.1965 
  
The table reports buy-and-hold abnormal returns for several time horizons, from one quarter to one year prior to quarter of bankruptcy filing 
(Panel A) and following quarter of emergence (Panel B).  Quarter -1 is one-quarter period prior to quarter of bankruptcy, quarter horizon (-2, -1) is 
two-quarter period prior to quarter of bankruptcy, (-3, -1) is three-quarter period prior to quarter of bankruptcy, and (-4, -1) is four-quarter period 
prior to quarter of bankruptcy.  Quarter +1 is one-quarter period following quarter of emergence, quarter horizon (+1, +2) is two-quarter period 
following quarter of emergence, (+1, +3) is three-quarter period following quarter of emergence, and (+1, +4) is four-quarter period following 
quarter of emergence.  In each panel we also report differences between mean and median values of the variables and statistical significance of a 
two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) for difference in their means (medians).  ***, **, and * denote that the value is significantly 
different from zero at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
The timing of institutional trading in relationship to emergence from bankruptcy 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
Intercept DB DA R
2
 
No. of 
observations 
-3 0.0015 0.0009 -0.0016 0.021 99  
 
(0.2627) (0.4820) (0.2231) 
  -2 0.0048 -0.0003 0.0028 0.029 101 
 
(0.0060) (0.8473) (0.0999) 
  -1 0.0027 -0.0017 0.0008 0.031 86 
 
(0.0149) (0.1262) (0.4647) 
  0 0.0018 0.0013 0.0005 0.059 68 
 
(0.0144) (0.0767) (0.4915) 
  +1 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.011 117 
 
(0.4199) (0.3539) (0.7480) 
  +2 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0013 0.064 145 
 
(0.2236) (0.0170) (0.0157) 
  +3 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002 0.013 147 
  (0.1639) (0.1817) (0.6228)     
 
The table reports estimated coefficients from regressions of quarterly market adjusted 
abnormal returns on the abnormal number of shares traded in the quarterly intervals before 
and after the holding period.  Abnormal trades are coded as one of the three dummy variables: 
-1 if sales, 0 if no trading, and 1 if purchases.  Quarter 0 is quarter of emergence.  P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Propensity of institutional holdings to impact bankrupt firms' post-emergence 
performance 
 
Variables 
CFA CFS Buy-and-hold return 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Intercept  -3.929 
 
-3.823 
 
2.163 - 
 
(0.0540) (0.0647) (0.3828) 
IHD_BK -0.497 0.608 -0.775 0.461 1.418 4.129 
 
(0.2637) (0.0857) (0.0208) 
IHD_REO 0.297 1.346 0.310 1.363 0.741 2.097 
 
(0.4999) (0.4881) (0.2419) 
LNAT 0.205 1.227 0.208 1.231 -0.211 0.810 
 
(0.0420) (0.0424) (0.0822) 
PRMGN -0.214 0.808 -0.081 0.922 0.233 1.263 
 
(0.3298) (0.6681) (0.4855) 
ZSCORE -0.033 0.968 -0.048 0.953 0.077 1.079 
 
(0.2531) (0.2033) (0.3032) 
       Likelihood Ratio 14.819 19.474 17.920 
  (0.0112) (0.0016) (0.0030) 
 
Table contains results of logistic regression model that we use to compare operating and 
market performance changes from one year preceding the filing to one year following the 
emergence between the firms with and without institutional holdings.  Dependent variable is 
changes in cash flows measured by the firms’ operating income before depreciation and 
amortization normalized either by sales (CFS) or by total assets (CFA), or market adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal return: if cash flow or abnormal market return is positive, then we 
assign 1 to the variable, if it is negative, the dependent variable equals 0.  As a control, we use 
two dummy variables: IHD_BK equals 1 if bankrupt securities are held by institutional 
investors in the quarters before or of bankruptcy filings, and 0 otherwise, and IHD_REO 
equals 1 if bankrupt securities are held by institutional investments in quarter of reorganization 
or in the following quarter, and zero otherwise.  We also control for firm size measured as 
natural logarithm of total assets, profit margin, and Altman’s z-score.  All variables are 
measured as of one year preceding year of Chapter 11 filing.  We first use CFA to define our 
dependent variable and then, as a robustness check, we run the same regression with a binary 
dependent variable determined based on changes in CFS and abnormal returns.  
LogLikelihoods are reported for each regression at the bottom of the table.  P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
 139 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Acquisitions of Bankrupt and Distressed Firms 
 
 
by 
Elena Precourt
83
; Henry R. Oppenheimer
84
 
 
will be submitted to Review of Financial Studies 
                                                 
83
 PhD Candidate, College of Business Administration, The University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 
02881, Email: elena_precourt@my.uri.edu 
84
 Associate Professor, College of Business Administration, The University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 
RI 02881, Email: hroppenheimer@mail.uri.edu 
 140 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we focus on acquisitions of bankrupt firms and firms that recently 
emerged from Chapter 11 and compare these firms with acquired distressed firms to determine 
whether or not transaction timing plays a role in the outcomes of the mergers.  We analyze 
deal premiums (or lack thereof) and evaluate post-merger operating cash flows to determine 
whether or not timing of the transactions impacts their effectiveness and success.  We also 
examine characteristics of acquirers and targets, evaluate their stock price reactions to the 
announcements of acquisitions, and analyze how institutional investors trade shares of 
bankrupt and distressed targets.  We find that distressed targets sell their assets at a premium 
or at a discount smaller than bankrupt firms do, thereby benefiting from acquisitions more 
than bankrupt targets.  We also find that abnormal post-merger cash flow and cumulative 
abnormal return changes are more pronounced for bankrupt than distressed firms, indicating 
that acquisitions in Chapter 11 add greater economic value for both target and its acquirer than 
do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy.  Insurance companies and, to a lesser extent, 
independent investment advisors recognize the acquired bankrupt firms’ post-merger 
operating and market performance improvements and increase their ownership in the firms 
starting two to three quarters prior to the acquisition announcements.  However we find post-
merger market performance improvements for bankrupt and not distressed firms.  In summary, 
distressed firms get a merger announcement premium and bankrupt firms give it away to their 
acquirers whose shareholders benefit from acquisition premiums in a year after the mergers. 
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I. Introduction 
Distressed firms often choose Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a mechanism to effectively 
redeploy their assets, to reduce debt burden, or to change their strategic focus.  These firms 
emerge from Chapter 11 as independently reorganized companies, either private or publicly 
traded, convert to Chapter 7 and subsequently liquidate, or are acquired by other public or 
privately operating companies, creditors, or private investors.  It has been shown that 
acquisitions of bankrupt firms create value, provide an efficient mechanism for asset 
redeployment, and result in a better performing enterprise than when bankrupt firms 
reorganize independently (Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998).  
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) observe that the combined post-acquisition cash flows of the 
merged firms increase by more than is observed for transactions that do not occur under 
Chapter 11.  In addition, Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that in high-growth industries 
the productivity of the assets sold by bankrupt manufacturing firms increases under new 
ownership, evidencing efficient redeployment of assets to more productive uses.  As a result 
of Chapter 11, capital structure of filing firms changes—in addition to likely asset sales, firms 
reduce their leverage as a result of debt-to-equity conversions and debt forgiveness. 
In general, several researchers analyzing returns resulting from M&A transactions 
reveal that they are material and significant, despite variations in time period, type of deal 
(merger, acquisition, tender offer, etc.), and observation period.  In short, the M&A 
transactions deliver a premium return to target firms’ shareholders (Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1988), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Kuipers, Miller, and 
Patel (2003)) and mixed market-based returns to buyer firms’ shareholders (Roll (1986), 
DeLong (2001), Kuipers et al. (2003), Loderer and Martin (1990), Kohers and Kohers (2000), 
and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)).  Roll (1986), DeLong (2001) and Kuipers et al. (2003) report 
negative returns to buyer firms’ shareholders, while Loderer and Martin (1990) and Kohers 
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and Kohers (2000) report zero or positive returns to acquirers and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 
find significant positive abnormal returns to acquiring firm shareholders.  As part of the 
“hubris hypothesis” of corporate takeovers85 Roll (1986) argues that the average increase in 
the target firm’s market value as a result of the merger is more than offset by the average 
decrease in the value of the acquirer, wiping out all the gains available to the acquirer’s 
shareholders.  Roll (1986) concludes that the reason why a merger results in a loss to the 
bidding firm’s shareholders is because on average acquirers pay too much for their targets. 
According to the Wall Street Journal’s article “Buyers’ Fading Remorse” on March 
10, 2014, industries such as broadcasting, telecommunications, paper container and packaging, 
and pharmaceutical are currently experiencing the greatest increase in M&A.  “Investors are 
rewarding U.S. companies for making acquisitions… Typically shareholders have punished an 
acquirer for making an acquisition.  Between 1995 and 2011, the stock price of acquirers 
averaged a loss every year… Yet at a time when companies are increasingly struggling to 
increase their earnings and sales, investors are applauding companies for making 
acquisitions.”86   
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here] 
In Figure 1a we present annual volumes of all M&A announcements (U.S. targets) 
and Chapter 11 filings for the period between 1993 and 2013 and determine whether or not the 
two events correlate.  In Figure 1b, we plot annual numbers of acquisition announcements of 
bankrupt and distressed firms
87
 during the same annual period.  Data for both figures are 
                                                 
85
 To explain the corporate takeover phenomenon Roll (1986) in the “hubris hypothesis” describes 
bidders/managers as being convinced that valuation of the target is accurate and that the market does 
not reflect the full economic value of the merged firm: “If there are actually no aggregate gains in 
takeover, the phenomenon depends on the overbearing presumption of bidders that their valuations are 
correct.” (p. 200) 
86
 “Buyers’ Fading Remorse” By Maureen Farrell, The Wall Street Journal, Money and Investing 
section of online subscription, March 10, 2014. 
87
 Distressed firms are those with Altman z-score (Altman (1968)) of less than 1.8.  The difference 
between distressed and bankrupt firms is that these firms, in spite of low z-score, have not filed for 
bankruptcy at any point during the period analyzed. 
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obtained from Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum database.  We also provide a 
correlation matrix for the four variables plotted on the two figures.   
From Figure 1a we observe that annual volumes of M&A transactions are 
significantly greater than annual volumes of bankruptcy filings in each year reported.  In the 
late 1990’s we observe the greatest increase in M&A volume.  This wave peaked in 1998 and 
then the M&A volume declined in 2001 and even more so in 2002.  Number of bankruptcy 
filings started to rise in 1998 and following the dot-com bubble climaxed in 2001.  In the late 
2000’s we observe the next M&A wave with the highest volume of announcements in 2007.  
In 2009, bankruptcy filing volume peaks as a result of the latest economic recession following 
the mortgage meltdown.  Although it may seem as the two events are diametrically opposed, 
there are several years when volumes of M&A announcements and Chapter 11 filings increase 
or decrease simultaneously: in the periods from 1994 to 1995, from 1997 to 1998, and again 
from 2006 to 2007 volumes of M&A and Chapter 11 rise, and from 2001 to 2002 they both 
fall.  In all other annual time horizons, when M&A volume rises, number of Chapter 11 filings 
declines, and vice versa.  In addition, the correlation between the two events is -0.33, 
indicating weak inverse relationship between the two events.   
From Figure 1b, it is evident that more distressed than bankrupt firms are acquired in 
almost every year reported.  Although correlation between the two events is weak (0.25), it is 
positive.  Correlation between number of M&A announcements and number of bankrupt firm 
acquisition announcements is negative and strong (-0.65), indicating that with the increase in 
the overall volume of M&A the number of bankrupt firm acquisitions declines.  In addition, 
during good economic times, when M&A activities increase and number of bankruptcy filings 
drops, the market become less saturated with bankrupt targets and bidders can afford to spend 
more on acquisitions.  Correlations between number of bankruptcy filings and numbers of 
bankrupt and distressed firm acquisition announcements are positive and strong (0.71 and 
0.47, respectively), indicating bidders’ interest in affordable (but risky) acquisitions. 
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In this paper we focus on acquisitions of bankrupt firms and firms that recently 
emerged from Chapter 11 and compare these firms with acquired distressed firms to consider 
whether or not acquisition transaction timing plays a role in the outcomes of the mergers.  
Although we do not know if the distressed firms would have filed for bankruptcy if they did 
not get acquired or if they would have recovered from their distress outside of bankruptcy, 
these firms are directly comparable (based on a low Altman z-score, size, and industry of 
operation) to the bankrupt firms in our sample.  Distressed firms in general may subsequently 
file for Chapter 11, get acquired, extricate themselves from their distress outside of 
bankruptcy, or remain in a state of distress for quite some time.  As part of our research one of 
the questions we answer is: Is acquisition a better alternative to bankruptcy?  We analyze deal 
premiums (or lack thereof) and evaluate post-merger operating cash flows to determine 
whether or not timing of the transactions impacts their effectiveness and success.  We also 
examine characteristics of acquirers and targets and evaluate their stock price reactions to the 
announcements of acquisitions.   
In addition, we provide analysis of institutional trading of shares of distressed and 
bankrupt firms and determine how changes in managers’ shareholdings relate to the likelihood 
of firms’ acquisitions.  We evaluate whether institutions behave consistently with a superior 
information hypothesis and acquire shares of distressed firms in advance of public 
announcements of the M&A deals.  We also analyze executive officers and directors’ 
shareholdings to determine whether their sizable ownership relates to acquisitions.  This is the 
first research to analyze either the effects of timing of bankrupt firm acquisitions or 
institutions’ trading of shares of these firms that are acquired either before they file for 
bankruptcy or while in reorganization. 
i. Evidence of effectiveness of bankrupt firm acquisitions vs. reorganizations under 
Chapter 11 
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 Although a key goal of Chapter 11 is to provide economically viable firms an 
opportunity to reorganize, while leading to liquidation of  those that are not viable, Hotchkiss 
(1995) finds that about forty percent of firms emerging from bankruptcy continue to 
experience operating losses for several years following emergence and more than one third 
undergo a second restructuring.  In addition, Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) examine 
measures of productivity of capital and operating cash flow for plants of bankrupt 
manufacturing firms and find that asset sales and plant closures, and not efficiency of retained 
assets, explain changes in bankrupt firms’ performance.88  Because the manufacturing firms 
retain their least profitable assets, their operating performance does not improve from pre-
bankruptcy levels.   
Not all firms petitioning for Chapter 11 however succeed in their attempts to 
reorganize.  Based on the National Chapter 11 Filing and Confirmation Figures (Excluding 
North Carolina and Alabama) by Year since 1990 report issued by Executive Office for 
United States Trustees
89
 at least 55 to 60 percent of cases are closed without confirmation.
90
  
Firms that are liquidated or dissolved also include firms that convert from Chapter 11 to 
Chapter 7.  The firms that convert to Chapter 7 after failed efforts to reorganize are typically 
smaller firms (Hotchkiss (1995)).     
The structure of Chapter 11 makes acquisitions of bankrupt firms more cumbersome, 
because they cannot occur without creditor approval (Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998)) and 
management support (Baird (1993)).
91
  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that industry 
                                                 
88
 Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that plants that are not sold by the manufacturing firms have 
lower productivity compared to those that are sold off.   
89
 For information refer to http://www.justice.gov/ust/. 
90
 Confirmation figures for time period from 1990 to 2003 include not only those for publicly traded 
companies, but also those for privately held firms.  In addition, firms are liquidated under either Chapter 
11 or 7 in the closed without confirmation cases.  
91
 Virtually all mergers outside of bankruptcy also require management support and many require 
creditor approval or waiver of covenants of loan agreements or bond indentures.  However, a potential 
acquirer of a bankrupt firm must negotiate with each creditor group not only the sale price but also the 
distribution of the proceeds from the sales.  Baird (1993) also observes that managers often cannot be 
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conditions may also deter an acquisition and affect the type of bidders and the prices paid for 
distressed firms.  Finally, Gertner and Picker (1992) argue that asymmetric information may 
also impede acquisitions of bankrupt firms. 
Although fairly infrequent,
92
 acquisitions are an effective mechanism for reducing 
debt burden and effectively redeploying assets of Chapter 11 firms: Hotchkiss and Mooradian 
(1998) observe that the combined post-acquisition operating cash flows of the merged firms 
increase by more than is observed for transactions that do not occur under Chapter 11.  In 
addition, Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that in high-growth industries the productivity 
of the assets sold by bankrupt manufacturing firms increases under new ownership, evidencing 
efficient redeployment of assets to more productive uses.  Shrieves and Stevens (1979) also 
provide evidence of resolution of financial crisis among failing firms through the merger 
process to have value-adding qualities.  The researchers’ findings are consistent with 
bankruptcy avoidance rationale for mergers hypothesis.  Shrieves and Stevens (1979) 
conclude that mergers contribute to the efficiency with which resources are reallocated to 
more productive ends.     
In summary, acquisitions of bankrupt firms create value, provide an efficient 
mechanism for asset redeployment, help reduce debt, and result in a better performing 
enterprise than when bankrupt firms reorganize independently (Hotchkiss and Mooradian 
(1998), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998).  Managers of Chapter 11 firms do not have necessary 
incentives to allocate corporate resources to their highest-valued uses (Bradley and 
Rosenzweig (1992), Baird (1993)).  Bradley and Rosenzwieg (1992) demonstrate that under 
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978) managers of financially troubled and 
not economically viable firms are more likely to choose reorganization than liquidation.  Baird 
                                                                                                                                            
counted on to conduct a sale of the firms even if it is in the interest of shareholders and creditors to do 
so. 
92
 Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) report that about 32 percent of bankrupt firms in their sample 
merge.   We report 31 percent of bankrupt firms in our sample merging.   
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(1993) states that “those in control often lack the incentive to act in a way that is in everyone’s 
interest and that, even if they did, they might not be able to persuade third parties that they 
wanted an early sale to save the costs of bankruptcy...” (p.3) 
ii. Post-merger performance 
Researchers evaluating post-merger performance measured by profit margins, growth 
rates, and returns of assets, capital, and equity report mixed results.
93
  Meeks (1977), for 
example, explores gains from merger by looking at the change in return on assets (ROA) and 
comparing it to the change in ROA for the buyer’s industry.94  He finds that ROA declines for 
acquirers following the transaction and that for nearly two-thirds of acquirers, performance is 
below the standard of the industry.  Mueller (1980) also finds that in several instances 
acquirers report worse returns in the years after acquisition than their non-acquiring 
counterparts.  He analyzes changes in size, risk, leverage, and profitability of merged firms 
and concludes that “mergers would appear to result in a slight improvement here, a slight 
worsening of performance there.  If a generalization is to be drawn, it would have to be that 
mergers have but modest effects, up or down, on the profitability of the merging firms in the 
three to five years following merger.  Any economic efficiency gains from the mergers would 
appear to be small.” (p. 306)  Similarly, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that profitability 
is one to two percentage points less for acquirers than for control firms and that entry into new 
(diversifying) lines of business are associated with material and significant decreases in 
profitability.
95
   
In contrast, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) find that asset productivity improves 
significantly for firms following acquisition, which contributes to higher operating cash flow 
returns relative to their non-acquiring peers.  The authors observe that acquirers maintain their 
                                                 
93
 In this section I summarize studies that do not necessarily relate to acquisitions in bankruptcy. 
94
 Meeks (1977) defines return on assets as pre-tax profits (after depreciation, but before taxes) divided 
by the average of beginning and ending assets for the year. 
95
 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use the ratio of operating income to assets as a measure of firms’ 
profitability and control for industry effects, accounting method choices, and market shares. 
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rates of capital expenditure and R&D relative to their industries, suggesting that the improved 
performance is not at the expense of fundamental investment in the business.  Healy et al 
(1992) further find that the announcement stock returns of the merging firms are significantly 
associated with the improvement in post-merger operating performance, suggesting that 
anticipated gains drive the share prices at announcement.  Similarly, acquisitions in 
bankruptcy produce economic gains, facilitate an efficiency-enhancing redeployment of 
assets, and result in improved post-merger performance (Hotchkiss (1995), Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998)).  Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) find 
that increase in profitability for bankrupt targets is associated with a decrease in operating 
expenses and decreases in employment. 
iii. Institutional trading 
An informed investor engages in the costly investigation into an asset’s value to 
identify and acquire assets that yield greater potential returns on the investments than do 
uninformed trades (Rock (1986)).
96
  Some academics argue that institutional investors are 
prone to behave rationally and to appear as “intelligent” investors who stabilize security prices 
by offsetting irrational trades by individual investors (Lakonishok et al. (1994)).  Because of 
the size of the investments and their time horizons,
97
 institutional investors have strong 
incentives to gather costly information
98
 about firms whose shares they acquire for their 
portfolios.  Irrespective of that, we can, to this point, find no empirical evidence relevant to 
                                                 
96
 Since research findings on the positive and significant target share abnormal returns are practically 
uniform, in this study we focus on institutional trading of shares of target firms. 
97
 According to Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) who investigate investor composition of 
underperforming firms with earnings below analysts’ expectations, low turnover institutional investors 
(those with average holding period of 3 years or longer) own the greatest percentage of shares 
outstanding (mean of 27.4% and median of 27.5%; high turnover managers, with holding period of less 
than 1.5 years, hold on average 10.8% of shares outstanding (with median of 8.7%).   
98
 Maug (1998) finds that information cost and the cost of monitoring inversely relate to market 
liquidity and that frequently traded shares reduce institutional investors’ incentives to gather 
information through monitoring because they allow institutions to sell their holdings more easily.  We 
believe, consistent with traditional economic theory, that the marginal benefits institutional investors 
gain from information gathering and analysis must exceed their marginal costs for the investors to 
consider these expenditures. 
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institutional trading of the shares of distressed and bankrupt companies that are about to be 
acquired.   
In the existing empirical literature on institutional trading there is no concrete 
evidence as to how sophisticated the investment strategies are that institutions employ in their 
overall trading.  While some researchers argue that institutional investors are capable of 
picking winners and exhibit fully rational herding behavior that promotes price discovery and 
predicts stock returns (Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias (2004)), others conclude that managers 
mechanically acquire stocks with certain desirable characteristics and price levels (Falkenstein 
(1996)) and irrationally engage in herding causing temporary price bubbles (Dreman and 
Lufkin (2000)) and future price correction (Gutierrez and Kelley (2009)).   
Arbel et al. (1983) find that institutions typically avoid investing in thinly traded 
securities and in firms with small capitalizations.  Institutional investors avoid taking greater 
risks associated with investment in small firms such as greater return volatility and lower 
liquidity.  These constraints that affect investment decisions of institutions may lead to market 
segmentation, herding behavior, and continuous neglect of certain securities (Arbel et al. 
(1983), Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).  Similarly, Falkenstein (1996) believes that managers 
acquire stocks with certain desirable characteristics and price levels.  He observes that 
managers have a preference for stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs and avoid 
investments with low idiosyncratic volatility.
99
 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows:  In Section II, we present the 
hypotheses and in Section III we describe the data and sample selection.  We develop test 
methodology and report regression results in Section IV.  Section V concludes our paper. 
II. Development of Hypotheses 
                                                 
99
 Falkenstein (1996) explains that fund managers take advantage of the option-like payoff to their 
relative performance by avoiding the lowest volatility stocks rather than investing in the most highly 
volatile stocks. 
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Since acquisitions of bankrupt firms have been found to be an effective way to 
reorganize, an important question arises concerning timing of acquisitions.  Is acquisition a 
better alternative to reorganization in Chapter 11?  Consequently, could distressed firms 
negotiate better acquisition terms than could firms in bankruptcy?  And do acquisitions of 
distressed firms create more value and result in a better performing firm than do acquisitions 
of bankrupt firms?  In the extant literature, researchers do not evaluate the importance of 
acquisition timing,
100
 if it influences acquisition terms, and if and how the timing impacts 
outcome of the transactions.  Although we cannot state with absolute confidence that the 
distressed firms we use to compare to the bankrupt firms in our sample would have filed for 
bankruptcy if they were not acquired, we make this assumption based on their low z-score and 
weak market and operating performances.  Distressed firms in general may subsequently file 
for Chapter 11, get acquired, extricate themselves from their distress outside of bankruptcy, or 
remain in a state of distress for quite some time.   
When firms enter the state of operating and/or financial distress they become more 
vulnerable to a merger, an acquisition or a takeover as potential acquirers expect to pay lower 
price for the firms’ assets than the average price paid for all other acquired firms in the same 
industry.  According to the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers (Roll (1986)), 
acquisitions of bankrupt or distressed firms can be a direct result of acquirer’s overconfidence 
in the accuracy of target firm’s valuation.  In addition, because acquisitions of distressed, 
bankrupt, or poorly performing firms are riskier than acquisitions of healthy firms, one would 
expect potential buyers, depending on the hubris of the acquirers’ management, to prefer the 
“better performing” 101 failing firms over all other failing firms, even if it means paying a 
higher price (although not as high as they would have paid for a healthy target).  We expect 
                                                 
100
 Lambrecht (2004) and Harford (1999) assess timing of acquisitions at a macro level, looking at 
merger waves and evaluating their causes, and do not relate it to distressed or bankrupt firms. 
101
 The “better performing” failing firms are those with higher than average of all failing firms’ 
operating cash returns on assets and sales, return on assets, and profit margin.  These firms also have 
lower than the average debt ratio. 
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distressed firms to be those “better performing” targets, again depending on the acquirers’ 
hubris.  We also expect firms with greater officer, director, and institutional shareholdings to 
consider merger as a reorganization alternative sooner due to anticipation of appreciation of 
the share prices than firms with the low officer, director, and institutional ownerships.  We 
anticipate greater transaction discounts for bankrupt than for distressed firms caused by the 
weakening power to bargain as the firms enter bankruptcy.  After evaluating characteristics of 
both bankrupt and distressed firms, we determine attributes that contribute to the likelihood of 
the firms to be acquired outside of bankruptcy.  We then evaluate the importance of these 
attributes in cases when the firms are acquired by another operating company and investors.
102
  
Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Firms that are larger, less levered, less distressed, and with higher returns on 
assets and operating cash flow returns on sales reorganize via merger or acquisition 
outside of Chapter 11 and not while in bankruptcy or shortly after emergence.  In 
addition, firms with greater officer, director, and institutional ownerships are more 
likely to choose acquisition outside of bankruptcy as a method of reorganization.  
These conjectures are irrespective of acquirer type: operating firm or investor. 
Researchers in the M&A literature demonstrate that acquisition of bankrupt firms is a 
positive occurrence that results in a better performing enterprise than those firms that 
reorganized independently.  We make a contribution to the analysis of acquisitions of 
bankrupt firms by evaluating not whether or not bankrupt firms should consider merger to 
independent reorganization, but whether or not this consideration should come before the 
struggling firms file for bankruptcy protection versus while they are in Chapter 11 or during 
the first year as reorganized entities.  We compare post-merger performance of bankrupt firms 
                                                 
102
 “Creditors” is another group of acquirers, however they acquire very few distressed and many more 
bankrupt firms.  Creditors also become bankrupt firms’ owners in cases when firms’ debt is converted 
to equity as part of reorganization under Chapter 11.  We do not perform logistic regression analysis for 
this acquirer type due to the unusual nature of these acquisitions common primarily to bankrupt firms. 
 152 
 
or firms that just emerged from Chapter 11 with that of distressed, but not bankrupt, firms.  
We anticipate distressed firms to have a better post-merger performance than bankrupt firms 
due to their better pre-merger conditions, highlighting the importance of the firms’ 
reorganization via merger outside of bankruptcy.  We develop our second hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2: Acquisitions of firms outside of bankruptcy result in a better post-merger 
operating cash returns on sales and cumulative abnormal returns than do acquisitions 
in bankruptcy.  
III. Sample Selection and Data Analysis 
i. Sample selection 
We utilize two sources of data to obtain a sample of U.S. non-utility/non-financial 
firms
103
 that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization and emerged from bankruptcy during the 
period of January 1992 through December 2013: Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum 
database and The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD).
104
  The two data 
sources combined consist of 4,086 firms filing for reorganization during this period.  Next, we 
combine firms from the two databases and remove duplicates.  We search for firms’ identifiers 
such as CUSIP, TICKER, and PERMNO on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and eliminate those firms whose identifiers are either missing or inaccurate.  This 
reduces our sample to 1,381 firms.
105
  We further revise the sample by retaining the firms that 
were acquired while in reorganization or one year following their emergence.  Our sample 
consists of 428 firms with 483 acquisition announcements
106
 and effective dates classified as 
follows: (1) 58 acquisition announcements preceding bankruptcy announcements with 
                                                 
103
 Financial and utility firms operate in a highly regulated environment with often very different 
reporting standards.  Including these firms would impair our ability to accurately compare sample 
firms’ characteristics and performance.  
104
 For more information refer to http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.  
105
 It is possible that most of the excluded firms are either private or have never been on CRSP. 
106
 Several firms in our sample had multiple acquirers in the same transaction with different 
announcement dates. 
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effective dates either during bankruptcy or following the emergence, (2) 335 acquisition 
announcements while in bankruptcy with effective dates either during Chapter 11 proceedings 
or following the emergence, and (3) 90 acquisition announcements and effective dates within 
one year following emergence from bankruptcy.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Table 1, Panel A, we describe the sample of 428 firms that were acquired from the 
time they file for Chapter 11 until one year following emergence from bankruptcy 
proceedings.  About 12 percent of our sample has acquisition announcement dates preceding 
bankruptcy filings.  Firms usually start experiencing financial difficulties long before 
petitioning for reorganization or liquidation in the Federal Court by filing Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 7, respectively, (Altman (1968), Aharony, Jones, and Swary (1980), Clark and 
Weinstein (1983), Campbell et al. (2008)) and investors continue to suffer losses up to the 
time of filing (Clark and Weinstein (1983)).  Consequently, most bankruptcy filings are not 
surprises in that most firms suffer from the throes of financial and/or operating distress for 
some time before the filings; many are rumored to be contemplating this drastic action well 
before the actual physical filing.  In cases when acquisition announcements come shortly 
before Chapter 11 filings, the targets may have made a last attempt at reorganizing outside of 
bankruptcy and if the attempt
107
 has failed they petition for Chapter 11 protection.  In cases 
when acquisition announcements follow emergence from bankruptcy (19 percent of our 
sample), the reorganized firms may have failed to return to the state of going concern and 
instead of reentering bankruptcy considered acquisition.  The bidders in this case may have 
timed their acquisition and have waited for the firms to emerge from Chapter 11 with less debt 
and more favorable capital structure.  It is also possible that, according to the hubris 
                                                 
107
 For instance, necessary creditors’ consent was not achieved, or management was not fully onboard 
with acquisition as a method of reorganization, or perhaps the acquirer was not willing to accept all 
targets’ liabilities.  While in Chapter 11 bankruptcy court can use “cram-down” provision to enforce 
reorganization via acquisition so long as the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is equitable with 
respect to each class of claims. 
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hypothesis (Roll (1986)), the bidders are overly confident in their accuracy of the target firms’ 
valuations.  The majority of our sample firms however have acquisition announcements during 
Chapter 11 proceedings (almost 70 percent of the announcements).   
In Table 1, Panel B, we report 38 percent of the sample firms are acquired by creditors 
and 30 percent by investors.  To compare these statistics and later to determine importance of 
acquisition timing, we create a group of control firms as follows.  We first determine all other 
firms that are not already part of our sample and were acquired between January 1992 and 
December 2013.  We then calculate Altman z-score
108
 in the year preceding acquisition 
announcement date for each of these firms and retain those with the z-score of less than 1.81, 
where 1.81 is the highest point of distress zone with probability of filing for bankruptcy within 
two years is very high.
109
  We match the distressed firms with the firms in the sample based on 
the two-digit Securities Data Corporation (SIC) codes, acquisition announcement date, and 
size measured by market capitalization.  Our initial match based on two-digit SIC codes and 
acquisition announcement dates result in one bankrupt firm being matched to several 
distressed firms.  We then pick a single matched distressed firm closest in market 
capitalization to the bankrupt firm.  Our one-to-one match yields a total of 306 control 
firms.
110
  Creditors acquire only 4 percent of distressed firms and almost ten times as many 
bankrupt firms (38 percent of bankrupt firms are acquired by creditors or bondholders).  
Operating companies acquire more distressed (60 percent) than bankrupt firms (32 percent); 
                                                 
108
 Altman’s z-score, bankruptcy-risk proxy (Altman (1968)), is defined as 3.3x((pretax income + 
interest expense)/total assets) + 0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market capitalization/total liabilities) + 
1.2x(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets). 
109
 To evaluate distribution of z-scores for both sample and control firms and to ensure that this 
distribution does not create a bias in our analysis, we partition both groups of firms on quartiles and 
analyze minimum and maximum values in the lowest and the highest quartiles, respectively.  We find 
that although the minimum values in the lowest z-score quartile are identical for bankrupt and distressed 
firms (-29.28 and -33.95, respectively), there are 13 bankrupt firms (out of 345 firms for which we 
calculate z-score) in the highest quartile with the z-scores exceeding 1.8 (four of these firms have z-
scores of 3 or higher).  By including these few non-distressed bankrupt firms in our sample we 
potentially biasing our results upwards when comparing characteristics and performance of bankrupt 
and distressed firms.  
110
 Several sample firms are matched to the same control firm.  In order to avoid comparing different 
sample firms to the same control firms, we eliminate these duplicates from our analysis. 
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however the percentage of acquisitions within the same industry (as measured by the two-digit 
SIC code) are nearly identical for the two groups of firms (66 percent for distressed and 60 
percent for bankrupt firms).
111
  Acquirers operating in the same industry as the target are more 
likely to find the best use of the target’s assets and benefit from consolidation of the 
operations.  Buyers also gain a greater post-acquisition ownership percentage
112
 of the 
bankrupt targets (85 percent with 33 percent of bidders acquiring less than 100 percent of 
targets’ assets) than they do of distressed firms (67 percent with 48 percent of bidders 
acquiring less than 100 percent of targets’ assets).  The average value of the transaction113 is 
also higher for bankrupt firms than for distressed firms ($440 million vs. $202 million).   
ii. Financial and operating characteristics of sample and control targets and their 
acquirers 
We compare characteristics of the firms in the sample by splitting them into three sub-
samples—one with announcements during Chapter 11 proceedings, another one with 
announcements before bankruptcy filings, and the third one with announcements during the 
year after emergence from bankruptcy.     
[Insert Table 2 here] 
                                                 
111
 These results are similar to those of Clark and Ofek (1994) and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) 
who find that acquirers of distressed firms are frequently in the same industry. 
112
 Per SDC, “Percent Owned by Acquirer Post Merger: The percentage of a company held by the 
acquirer upon completion of a merger. This data item will be populated if the merger results in the 
formation of a new company and the percentages held by former target and acquirer shareholders have 
been disclosed, or in reverse takeovers. In reverse takeovers, if the post merger percentage owned is not 
disclosed, Thomson Financial will calculate the percentage if the number of shares issued and current 
number of shares outstanding is available in public disclosure.” 
113
 Per SDC, “Value of Transaction ($ mil): Total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding 
fees and expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock 
equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six 
months of the announcement date of the transaction. Liabilities assumed are included in the value if 
they are publicly disclosed. Preferred stock is only included if it is being acquired as part of a 100% 
acquisition. If a portion of the consideration paid by the acquiror is common stock, the stock is valued 
using the closing price on the last full trading day prior to the announcement of the terms of the stock 
swap.  If the exchange ratio of shares offered changes, the stock is valued based on its closing price on 
the last full trading date prior to the date of the exchange ratio change. For public target 100% 
acquisitions, the number of shares at date of announcement (CACT) is used.” 
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In Table 2, we report characteristics of sample firms categorized by acquisition 
announcement timing relative to bankruptcy filings.  We utilize COMPUSTAT to obtain 
financial reporting data.  Group 1 contains firms with acquisition announcements before 
Chapter 11 filings, Group 2 contains firms with acquisition announcements either on the day 
of bankruptcy filings or while in bankruptcy, and Group 3 includes firms with the 
announcements either on the day of emergence from bankruptcy or during the first year 
following emergence.  All variables for sample firms are measured as of one year preceding 
bankruptcy filings.
114
  We also provide statistical significance tests for differences between 
means (two-tailed t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) reported in the panels at 
conventional levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent indicated by a, b, and c, respectively.  Group 1 
contains difference significance indicators when comparing means and medians for firms with 
acquisition announcements before the filings (Group 1) to those for firms with the 
announcements while in bankruptcy (Group2); Group 2 contains the indicators when 
comparing firms with acquisition announcements in bankruptcy (Groups 2) to firms with 
acquisition announcements following emergence (Group 3); and Group 3 contains the 
indicators when comparing means and medians for firms with the announcements following 
emergence (Group 3) to those for firms with the announcements preceding bankruptcy filing 
(Group 1).   
From Table 2 we find no significant differences between means and medians of the 
variables reported in the panel for firms with acquisition announcements outside of 
bankruptcy (Groups 1 and 3).  Hence, firms in these two groups are qualitatively similar.  
                                                 
114
 To stay consistent, for bankrupt firms we choose to measure variables as of one year prior to 
bankruptcy filings.  Mean (median) number of days between acquisition announcement and bankruptcy 
filing for the firms with the announcements following the filings is 213 (109).  Mean (median) number 
of days between acquisition announcement and bankruptcy filing for the firms with the announcements 
preceding the filings is 82 (45).  Mean (median) number of days between acquisition announcement and 
emergence from bankruptcy for the firms with the announcements following the emergence is 144 
(133) and mean (median) number of days between acquisition announcements and bankruptcy filings 
for the same firms is 593 (498).   
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Firms with the announcements while in bankruptcy (Group 2) are significantly smaller as 
measured by mean and median total assets and median sales, less distressed as measured by 
median z-score, and have worse operating cash flow returns on assets and sales than the firms 
with the announcements outside of bankruptcy (Groups 1 and 3).  
Because we have three types of acquirers—operating companies, creditors, and 
investors
115—we also provide analysis of bankrupt and distressed firms based on acquirer 
type.  As in Table 2, we report descriptive statistics for the sample firms as of one year 
preceding bankruptcy filings.  For control firms, the same statistics are reported as of one year 
preceding acquisition announcements.  In addition, we report statistical significance tests for 
differences between means (two-tailed t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) of 
variables reported in the table.  We compare means and medians for all bankrupt and all 
distressed firms, for bankrupt and distressed firms acquired by investors, for bankrupt and 
distressed firms acquired by creditors, and for bankrupt and distressed firms acquired by other 
operating companies. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In Table 3 we compare firms acquired in Chapter 11 to acquired distressed firms.   
In Panel A we provide pre-bankruptcy/pre-announcement financial data for sample and 
control firms.  The sample firms are significantly different from control firms on many 
reported measures.  Although, financial condition and operating performance are poor for both 
groups of firms, surprisingly, distressed firms significantly underperform bankrupt firms as 
shown by differences in means of performance related variables such as operating cash flow 
returns and profit margin.  However, median ROA and profit margin are lower for acquired 
bankrupt firms than for acquired distressed firms.  Bankrupt firms are more levered, and have 
greater assets and sales and lower market capitalization and market-to-book ratio than 
                                                 
115
 Based on acquirers’ business description, these firms are primarily investment firms, investment 
holding companies, and private equity funds. 
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distressed firms.  Bankrupt firms acquired by investors also have greater median assets and 
sales, lower marker capitalization, and better cash flow returns on assets and ROA than do 
investor acquired distressed firms.  Bankrupt firms acquired by creditors are more levered and 
better performing as measured by medians of debt ratio, profit margin, and ROA, than 
distressed firms acquired by creditors.
116
  Similarly, operating company acquired bankrupt 
firms are larger than their distressed counterparts (as measured by medians of assets and 
sales), have lower market capitalization and market-to-book ratio, greater leverage, and better 
mean cash flow returns on sales.  These firms however have lower median profit margin and 
mean and median ROA than do distressed firms acquired by other operating companies.  None 
of the differences between Altman z-scores are statistically significant.  Contrary to our 
expectation distressed firms’ pre-acquisition operating performance is generally worse than 
that of bankrupt firms.
117
  They are smaller and less levered than their bankrupt counterparts.   
In Panel B of Table 3 we present CEO turnover and officers and directors’ stock 
ownership.  We utilize COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp and Thomson Reuters’ Insider Data to 
gather management turnover and investment data available for bankrupt and distressed 
firms.
118
  The variable “CEO replaced through bankruptcy filing” indicates whether the CEO 
in office during the two years prior to filing is still in office at the time of filing.  We subtract 
730 days from the filing data and determine whether or not firms have the same CEOs during 
this two-year period.  CEO turnover we report in Panel B is 44 percent, slightly lower than the 
levels found in previous studies of distressed firms.
119
  The variable “CEO replaced through 
acquisition” indicates whether the CEO in office during the two years prior to acquisition date 
                                                 
116
 As we already report in Table 1, creditors acquire many more bankrupt than distressed firms.  
117
 As discussed earlier the paper, we have 13 bankrupt firms in our sample with z-scores of above 1.8.  
To verify robustness of our data we remove these firms from our analysis and re-calculate means and 
medians for the performance related variables.  The statistics we obtain are identical to those reported in 
Table 3, Panel A. 
118
 The sources used to gather the data do not have comprehensive coverage of the variables reported in 
Panel B of Table 3.  In addition, COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp only provides data on the top officers for 
the S&P 1500 Index active, inactive, current, and previous members. 
119
 About 50-51% of CEOs are replaced by the time of bankruptcy filing (Betker (1994), Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998)). 
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is still in office at the time of announcement.  We find that fewer distressed firms’ CEOs are 
replaced as a result of acquisition than CEOs of bankrupt firms.
120
  Interestingly, this 
percentage is higher for distressed firms acquired by another operating firm (34 percent) than 
it is for bankrupt firms acquired by another operating firm (27 percent).  It appears that CEOs 
in these distressed firms who have been with the company for less than two years are more 
likely to consider merger as a method of reorganization.  Firms with higher CEO turnover 
during two years prior to acquisition by creditors and investors are less likely to reorganize via 
M&A outside of bankruptcy (mean CEO turnovers for bankrupt firms acquired by creditors 
and investors are 45 and 30 percents, respectively, and mean CEO turnovers for distressed 
firms in the same acquirer type categories are only 7 and 11 percent, respectively).  The level 
of officers and directors’ stockholdings is similar between bankrupt and distressed firms, 
suggesting officers and directors are no more or less invested in the firms for the acquired 
distressed firms than for acquired bankrupt firms.  However, officers and directors’ ownership 
is significantly larger for bankrupt than distressed firms acquired by creditors.  Median 
percentage of CEO holdings is higher for bankrupt firms than for distressed firms, with the 
firms acquired by creditors and other operating companies contributing the most to this 
difference.  Similar to CEO turnover for firms acquired by investors and creditors, firms with 
a higher CEO ownership are less likely to merge with another operating firm or to be acquired 
by creditor outside of Chapter 11. 
Next, we provide summary of characteristics of the acquirers.  We evaluate available 
financial and market data for the acquirers that are publicly traded operating firms.  In Table 4 
we report acquirers’ characteristics one year prior to acquisition announcements.  In the table, 
we provide available data for publically traded operating firm acquirers. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
120
 However, CEO turnover percentages due to acquisition are possibly inflated for bankrupt firms with 
bankruptcy filings preceding acquisition announcements because these percentages may measure 
effects of the filings and not of the announcements on the CEO replacement. 
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As shown in Table 4, both groups of operating firms, those acquiring bankrupt firms 
and those acquiring distressed firms outside of Chapter 11, are larger, less levered, less 
distressed and better performing than the firms they acquire.  Negative mean values of the 
firms’ performance related measurements are due to the fact that majority of the acquirers (60 
percent for bankrupt firms and 66 percent for distressed firms, as reported in Table 1) are 
operating in the same industry and likely experiencing similar difficulties as their less 
fortunate counterparts.  When comparing two groups of acquirers in Table 4 we find that mean 
assets, sales, and market values are significantly greater for firms acquiring distressed firms 
than for acquirers of bankrupt firms.  We also observe that the acquirers of distressed firms 
have significantly lower probability of becoming bankrupt (with mean (median) z-score of 
3.38 (2.29)) than do the acquirers of bankrupt firms (with mean (median) z-score of only 0.56 
(1.82)).  The two groups of acquirers are identical from profitability perspective. 
iii. Analysis of merger transactions 
Table 5 provides a detailed description of acquisition types, methods of financing, 
firm and deal valuations, and discounts and premiums.  We report characteristics of the 
acquisitions for both bankrupt and distressed firms and categorize them based on type of 
acquirer.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In Panel A of Table 5 we report transaction types, number and percentage of targets 
with multiple bidders and investments from the government.  We obtained these data from 
Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum Database.  Not surprisingly, for 63 percent of 
bankrupt firms and 54 percent of distressed firms transaction type is “Acquisition”.121  
However, 53 percent of distressed firms merge with (rather than acquired by) other operating 
                                                 
121
 Often the two terms “merger” and “acquisition” are used interchangeably.  However, from the legal 
point of view there is a clear distinction between the two types of transactions: merger is a consolidation 
of two companies into one entity (combination of two “equals”), and acquisition is a transaction where 
one firm takes over another firm and establishes itself as the controlling entity.  See McBride (1996) 
also provides information on the law with respect to acquisitions in Chapter 11.     
 161 
 
companies.  Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) analyze firms acquired in Chapter 11 which 
filed for reorganization between October 1979 and December 1992 and find multiple bidders 
for almost 33 percent of their bankrupt targets.  We however observe only 3 percent of targets 
with multiple bidders for both sample and control firms.  This percentage is slightly higher for 
distressed and bankrupt firms acquired by other operating companies (7 percent for bankrupt 
and 4 percent for distressed firms).  In addition, 3 percent of acquired distressed firms have 
government ownership as opposed to 1 percent of bankrupt firms.  All bankrupt firms with 
government owned involvement are acquired by creditors or investors and nearly all distressed 
firms with government ownership are acquired by other operating firms. 
There are several different ways to finance acquisition of a target.  Buyers, for 
instance, may use all cash, all securities, or a combination of cash and securities.  In Panel B 
we list financing methods used by acquirers to complete the transaction.
122
  We report most 
commonly used financing methods and find that fewer bankrupt firm acquirers utilize these 
methods than do distressed firm acquirers.  For instance, only 7 purchases of bankrupt targets 
(or 2 percent) are financed with stock, and 1 percent with either debt securities, internal 
corporate funds, or via borrowing.  Acquirers of 42 distressed firms (or 14 percent) utilize 
internal corporate funds and acquirers of 27 distressed firms (or 9 percent) borrow money to 
complete the acquisitions.  In total, 69 distressed firms (or 23 percent) are acquired for cash. 
In Panel C of Table 5 we report available statistics on firm and deal valuations at the 
time of acquisitions.  Deal value and firm market and book values are greater for bankrupt 
firms than for distressed firms.  However, when analyzing these values for each sample and 
control subcategories we observe that mean and median deal and firm values of the distressed 
and bankrupt firms acquired by another operating company are identical.    
                                                 
122
 SDC does not provide data on mixed methods of financing, for example, cash and stock or cash and 
debt.  Although we assume that the remaining percentages belong to mixed sources of financing, we do 
not report them in the table. 
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In Panel C we also report that relative to distressed firms, both means and medians of 
deal and enterprise values as multiples of either sales or book value of total assets are lower 
for bankrupt targets.  In addition, mean (median) deal value divided by common equity and 
mean (median) offer price divided by book value are 2.0 (1.1) and 1.7 (1.0), respectively, for 
bankrupt firms and 5.7 (2.1) and 4.9 (1.8), respectively, for distressed firms.  These 
differences remain when comparing bankrupt and distressed firms categorized based on 
acquirer type.
123
  In summary, enterprise and deal value multiples are higher for distressed 
than for bankrupt firms, suggesting greater valuation of distressed firms and possibly their 
ability to secure better acquisition prices than bankrupt firms. 
As part of our analysis we evaluate whether or not distressed firms negotiate better 
prices than do firms merging in bankruptcy.  This is also important in determining whether 
timing of acquisitions plays an important role.  Jensen (1986b) analyzes the premium paid 
relative to the pre-offer share price of the target.  However, this measure is not meaningful for 
transactions involving bankrupt and distressed targets.  Bankrupt target shareholders, for 
instance, receive little or no distribution as the result of the transaction.  In addition, the 
common stock of many distressed and bankrupt targets ceases trading.  For our purposes of 
determining premiums and/or discounts that acquirers pay for bankrupt and distressed firms’ 
assets we utilize a modified methodology of Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998).  They find that 
the price paid for the assets of the struggling firms relative to a benchmark is a more useful 
measure.  First, we select the benchmark to compare the price paid for the sample and control 
firms to all other acquisitions in the same industry
124
 reported by SDC within one year
125
 of 
the sample transaction.  The price paid for a target is defined as transaction price (total value 
                                                 
123
 Due to the small subsample size for distressed firms acquired by creditors, two tailed t-test and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test failed to identify apparent differences between the means and the 
medians as statically significant.  
124
 As in Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), we base our analysis on the three-digit SIC code. 
125
 The period includes one year prior to, day of, and one year following the sample and control 
transactions. 
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of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses) plus all liabilities assumed 
by the acquirer (the price paid is equal to the enterprise value).  We then calculate industry 
median price paid as a multiple of sales or total assets for the benchmark firms.  This multiple 
times the bankrupt or distressed target’s sales or total assets yields the price that would have 
been paid for the bankrupt or distressed firm if it had been valued similarly to all other firms 
in the industry.  Transaction premium (+) or discount (-) is the percentage difference between 
the actual price paid for the target and the “industry benchmark price.”  We use the following 
formula to calculate transaction premiums and discounts. 
   or   
 
where  and  are enterprise values of target and benchmark, respectively;  and are 
sales of target and benchmark, respectively; and and are total assets of target and 
benchmark, respectively. 
In Table 5, Panel D, we demonstrate that relative to the industry benchmark, acquirers 
pay substantially lower multiples of sales and book value for bankrupt firms than they do for 
distressed firms.  Regardless of the benchmark multiple used, bankrupt targets are purchased 
at a deep discount: -29 percent when measuring  against industry’s median of enterprise value 
divided by sales and -37 percent when measuring against industry’s median of enterprise value 
divided by total assets.  These discounts are the highest for the bankrupt firms acquired by 
other operating companies and the lowest for the bankrupt firms acquired by creditors.  
Creditors acquire bankrupt firms at a -19 percent discount when measuring against industry’s 
median of enterprise value divided by sales and at a -28 percent discount when measuring 
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against industry’s median of enterprise value divided by total assets, indicating that these 
transactions are more likely involuntary conversions of firms’ debt to equity.126   
Distressed firms are sold at a premium or at a discount smaller than that of bankrupt 
firms.  Median discounts when using benchmark enterprise values relative to sales and total 
assets are -12 and -20 percent, respectively.  Although medians of these values are negative, 
indicating discounted sales, they are greater than those for bankrupt targets (hence, sales are 
less discounted).  Similarly, three subgroups of distressed firms are sold at a discount (as 
measured by the median values) significantly smaller than that secured by bankrupt firms in 
the respective subcategory.  In addition, creditors acquiring distressed firms pay the lowest 
price for the eleven targets in the sub-sample (-45 and -39 percent acquisition discounts when 
measuring against industry’s median of enterprise value divided by sales and assets, 
respectively), suggesting that these acquisitions are very different from those of bankrupt 
firms, where creditors may be forced to accept less favorable acquisition terms in order to 
avoid 100% loss on their investments.  The differences in sale terms between bankrupt and 
distressed firms lead us to believe that time plays an important role in securing a better price 
for target’s assets: the sooner the firms are acquired (while in distress and not bankruptcy), the 
better price they can get for their assets or the worse off the target.  Bankrupt firms may not 
have as much leverage in negotiating better deal terms with the bidders once they enter 
Chapter 11 and may benefit from reorganizing via M&A prior to entering Chapter 11.  
Another reason why bankrupt firms’ assets are sold at a discount may be acquirers’ inability to 
pay a premium for the firms’ assets or consider purchasing firms other than those sold at a 
bargain price.  As we observe from Table 4, the operating firm acquirers of bankrupt firms are 
smaller and have significantly lower z-scores (mean of 0.56, well below 1.81, the threshold of 
                                                 
126
 For median discount of -19 percent, 58 percent of the firms are acquired at a discount and for median 
discount of -28 percent, 67 percent of the acquisitions are at a discount. 
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high probability of failure, and median of 1.82) than do acquirers of distressed firms (mean of 
3.38 and median of 2.29). 
iv. Market reaction to acquisition announcements 
We now turn to analyzing the market reaction to announcements of acquisitions of 
bankrupt and distressed firms.  Day 0 is the day of acquisition announcement.  We present 
market adjusted and cumulative market adjusted returns and abnormal trading volumes for 
days -10 through +10 surrounding the announcement day.  Market adjusted returns are defined 
as security returns adjusted for the NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ equally-weighted returns 
including dividends.  Brown and Warner (1985) describe “market adjusted returns” (p. 7) as 
one of the methods and models of the return-generating process.  We use equally-weighted 
returns instead of value-weighted returns in calculations of market adjusted returns because 
equal weighting captures the extent of underperformance better than value weighting does and 
this is important given particular nature of bankrupt equity (Gilson (1995), Brav et al (2000), 
Kadiyala and Rau (2004)).  In addition, Brav et al (2000) argue that because small stocks are 
likely to be mispriced more than large stocks, then the magnitude of mispricing consideration 
alone implies the use of equal weighting.  We utilize CRSP to gather market related data.  We 
expect to observe a more favorable market reaction to acquisition announcements of distressed 
than bankrupt firms.  In case of acquisitions of bankrupt firms there is an increased possibility 
of the demise of existing shareholdings or their more massive dilution than distressed firms’ 
shareholders face.   
To determine abnormal trading volumes we utilize volume event study (Sanders and 
Zdanowicz (1992), Meulbroek (1992)).  Trading volume data are highly non-normal (Ajinkya 
and Jain (1989)).  To address the issue of non-normal distribution we use the following 
transformed volume variable to perform volume event study: 
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where  is raw trading volume of firm i at time t.  Trading volume data also exhibit 
significant positive serial correlation (Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Sanders and Zdanowicz 
(1992), Meulbroek (1992)).  We adjust for positive serial correlation by utilizing lagged firm 
trading volume to the model.  Finally, there are day-of-the-week patterns in volume (Mulherin 
and Gerety (1991),  Meulbroek (1992)).  To account for day-of-the-week effect in volume data 
we include day-of-the-week dummies in our model.  In our volume event study we use an 
OLS regression of the following form to analyze relationship between trading volumes over 
the two periods: one period begins on 250
th
 day before the announcement date and ends on 
30
th
 day before the announcement date and the other period begins on 10
th
 day before 
acquisition announcement date and ends on 10
th
 days after the announcement date.  The first 
period is the estimation period reflecting expected trading volumes and the second period 
includes trading volumes around the event date: 
 
where is a natural logarithm transformed trading volume of firm i at time t, is 
lagged transformed trading volume of firms i at time t-1, and  is day-of-the-week 
indicator dummy variables for Monday through Thursday, and is a residual term.  In 
addition 
 over the interval (-250, -30) 
We use coefficients from the above estimation equation in the calculation of abnormal 
transformed trading volumes.  We calculate daily abnormal trading volume AVi,t in relation to 
the estimated expected volume for each trading day in the interval beginning 10 trading days 
before the announcement date and ending 10 trading days after the announcement date as 
follows.  We then determine and report changes (in multiples) between AVi,t and ΔVi,t: 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
In Panel A of Table 6 we present abnormal returns and volume analysis.  The volume 
analysis consists of the difference between natural log transformed volumes during the event 
period and the estimated expected trading volumes for all bankrupt targets and their publically 
traded operating firm acquirers.  Daily and cumulative abnormal returns are statistically 
insignificant for both targets and acquirers on most of the days prior to the announcements.  
Bankrupt targets’ mean CMAR is -1.86 percent and not statistically significant for the pre-
announcement period t-10 through t-1.  Bankrupt firm acquirers’ CMAR for the same pre-
announcement period is 2.54 percent, which is also not statistically significant.  This indicates 
that there is little or no information leakage prior to bankrupt firms’ M&A being formally 
announced.  On the day of acquisition announcement, bankrupt targets’ mean daily abnormal 
return is -8.5 percent and it is 3.85 percent for their acquirers, both statistically significant.  
The two-day mean abnormal returns are -9.6 (significant at a ten percent level) and 5.1 
(significant at a five percent level) for bankrupt targets and acquirers, respectively.  The daily 
mean abnormal returns are negative for the bankrupt targets three days following the 
announcement, with mean abnormal return of -3.5 percent on day t+2 being statistically 
significant at a 5 percent conventional level.  Post-announcement CMARs (for days t+2 to 
t+10) are not statistically significant for bankrupt targets and their acquirers. 
Abnormal trading volumes for bankrupt targets are statistically significant on most of 
the days, and the highest on the day of the announcement and on the following day.  Trading 
volumes are approximately 9 times the estimate of expected volume, which depends on 
sensitivity of the prior day’s log transformed volume and the day of the week, for bankrupt 
targets on days t=0 and t+1.  These abnormal volumes are not statistically significant for 
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bankrupt targets’ acquirers for most of the pre-announcement days.  Acquirers’ abnormal 
trading volumes are positive and statistically significant on days t=0 and t+1, perhaps in 
response to the merger announcements and their share volumes are 95 and 56 percent higher 
on days t=0 and t+1, respectively, than estimated expected volumes.      
In Table 6, Panel B, we describe results of the analysis of market reaction to 
acquisition announcements for distressed firms and their acquirers.  We observe a very 
different market reaction for distressed as opposed to bankrupt targets.  Distressed targets and 
their acquirers’ pre-announcement abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant 
starting on days -4 and -1, respectively, perhaps due to merger rumors, positive news 
announcements, and/or insider trading.
127
  The pre-announcement CMARs for targets and 
their acquirers (for period from t-10 to t-1) are 1.85 percent (statistically significant at a 10 
percent level) and -0.42 (not statistically significant), respectively.  Market participants 
possibly anticipate resolution of distress through acquisitions and react positively to 
announcements of the transactions: daily abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant for distressed targets starting several days prior to the announcements.  Distressed 
targets’ mean abnormal return on the day of the announcement is economically and 
statistically significant 12 percent; their acquirers’ mean daily abnormal return is 2.7 percent 
on the day of the announcement.  The two-day mean abnormal return (time window 0, 1) is 
18.8 percent (significant at a one percent level) for distressed targets and 2.9 percent 
(significant at a five percent level) for their acquirers.  On day t+3 mean abnormal daily 
returns are 0.69 and -0.73 for distressed targets and their acquirers, respectively, which are 
statistically significant at a five percent level; these returns are not significant on day t+2 for 
either targets or acquirers.  Post-announcement CMARs for distressed targets and their 
acquirers are not statistically significant for the time period (+2, +10). 
                                                 
127
 Keown and Pinkerton(1981) find that market reaction to intended mergers begins prior to the public 
announcement of the merger.  They observe trading on this non-public (insider) information as early as 
12 trading days prior to the announcement. 
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As in the case of bankrupt firms and their acquirers, abnormal trading share volumes 
of distressed firms and their acquirers are the highest on announcement day and they are 
higher for targets than they are for acquirers.  The higher trading volumes for the targets 
compared to that for their acquirers are possibly due to the targets usually being much smaller 
than acquirers; therefore, the announcements have a much more material impact for targets’ 
shareholders than they do for acquirers’ shareholders.  During the pre-announcement period 
abnormal trading volumes for distressed targets are on average 35 percent higher than the 
estimated expected trading volume.  On the day of the announcement their trading volume is 
more than 8 times the amount of estimated expected volume, and on the following day it is 9 
times the expected volume.  For the acquirers’, trading volume is almost twice the estimated 
expected level on days t=0 and t+1.  
In summary, abnormal trading volumes are much higher for bankrupt and distressed 
targets than for their acquirers.  Share prices change in response to trading behavior, which 
depends on the news and its evaluation by the investors.  For bankrupt targets we observe a 
massive sell-off, perhaps in anticipation of demise of the existing shareholdings and/or their 
dilution, which drives the firms’ share price down.  Investors acquire shares of distressed 
targets, possibly in anticipation of distress resolution and future gains, driving the price up.   
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b here] 
 On Figures 2a and b we pictorially present results from Table 6, Panels A and B, for 
easier interpretation of the analysis.  On Figure 2a we plot CMARs and on Figure 2b we plot 
abnormal trading volumes during 21 days surrounding day of acquisition announcement for 
bankrupt and distressed targets and their acquirers.  Day 0 is the day of acquisition 
announcement.  From Figure 2a we observe a steep decline in CMARs of bankrupt targets and 
increase in CMARs of distressed targets on day t=0, while changes in CMARS are smaller for 
bankrupt and distressed firm acquirers on that day.  From Figure 2b we observe more 
significant changes in trading volumes for targets than for acquirers on days t=0 and t+1. 
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a. Announcement abnormal returns of bankrupt firms categorized by the timing of 
acquisition announcements relative to bankruptcy filings  
Previously in Table 6 we observed positive market reaction to acquisition 
announcements of distressed firms and negative reaction to acquisition announcements of 
bankrupt targets.  In Table 5 we also found that firm and deal valuation multiples are higher 
for distressed firms than for bankrupt firms.  Finally, we observed that distressed firms sell 
their assets at a premium while their bankrupt counterparts sell them at a discount.  Based on 
these results we continue to believe that whether the firms are acquired in or outside of 
bankruptcy matters when it comes to choosing acquisition as a method of reorganization.   
However, negative market reaction to the acquisition announcements of bankrupt 
firms might be due to the timing of these announcements, especially if they take place on the 
day of bankruptcy filings.  That said, to strengthen our evaluation of market reaction to the 
announcements of bankrupt firms’ acquisitions we further analyze the abnormal returns by 
categorizing our sample firms based on the timing of acquisition announcements in relation to 
bankruptcy filings and emergence.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In Table 7 we report mean daily market adjusted returns and CMAR for four groups 
of bankrupt targets, categorized by the timing of acquisition announcements in relation to 
bankruptcy filings.  Firms in the first group have acquisition announcements before Chapter 
11 filings,
128
 firms in the second group have announcements on the date of the filings, firms in 
the third group have announcements while in bankruptcy, and firms in the last group have 
announcements during one year following emergence.   
                                                 
128
 We have searched LexisNexis Academic for the official acquisition announcements and news 
articles around the same time for the 26 firms with the announcements preceding bankruptcy filings to 
see if there were any statements made regarding the upcoming bankruptcy filings.  Although the stock 
market may have anticipated the filings, the firms have not made information about the bankruptcy 
filings official until the actual filings.  
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Pre-announcement MARs and CMARs for the group of firms with acquisition 
announcements before Chapter 11 filings are not significant.  Market reaction to the 
acquisition announcements of these firms is negative, perhaps in anticipation of bankruptcy 
filings (the mean market adjusted return on the announcement day for these firms is an 
economically material -14.5 percent; the mean abnormal returns are 3.16 percent and -4.35 
percent on days t+1 and t+2, respectively).  Considering the effect of acquisition 
announcements made after the market close, the two-day (days t=0 and t+1) mean abnormal 
return for the firms in the first group is -11 percent.  Post-announcement mean daily MARs 
and CMARs are not statistically significant for the firms with the announcements preceding 
bankruptcy filings. 
For the firms with acquisition announcements on the day of the filing pre-
announcement MARs and CMARs are negative and statistically significant starting on day t-3.  
CMAR for the time period from t-10 through t-3 is -12.75 percent and statistically significant 
at a ten percent level, and it declines to -13.93 percent during the pre-announcement period 
from t-10 through t-1, which is also significant at a five percent level.  Not surprisingly, on the 
announcement date the mean daily market adjusted return for bankrupt firms with the same 
acquisition announcement and bankruptcy filing dates are the most negative (approximately -
30 percent).  The two-day mean abnormal return is -40 percent and on day t+2 it is -17 percent 
for this group of firms.  Post-announcement CMARs are negative and statistically significant 
for the firms with the same announcement and filing dates. 
On day t-5, pre-announcement MAR for the group of firms with acquisition 
announcements while in bankruptcy is -2.16 percent and statistically significant at a ten 
percent level.  Their CMAR is -7.06 for the pre-announcement period t-10 through t-4, and 
also statistically significant at a ten percent level.  Although day t=0’s mean abnormal return is 
also negative for the group of bankrupt firms with acquisition announcements while in 
reorganization (-3.12 percent), it is not statistically significant.  The two-day announcement 
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period CMAR for these firms is -2.6 percent, which is also not significant.  For the firms with 
acquisition announcements while in reorganization post-announcement CMAR (for the time 
period from t+2 through t+10) is not significant. 
Finally, we observe positive pre-announcement run-up for the firms with acquisition 
announcements during the year following emergence from Chapter 11.  Mean MAR on days t-
2 is 3.19 percent, which is statistically significant at a five percent level.  Mean CMAR is 
approximately 10 percent and statistically significant at a five percent level for the pre-
announcement period from t-10 through t-1.  The two-day CMAR (for days t=0 and t+1) is 
approximately 12 percent, which is economically material and statistically significant at a ten 
percent level for the firms with the announcements during the year following emergence from 
bankruptcy.  Post-announcement CMAR (for the period from t+2 through t+10) for these 
firms is not different from zero.  
In summary, for the first three groups of firms we observe negative abnormal returns: 
mean abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant on the announcement day for 
the first two groups with the mean daily and cumulative abnormal returns for the second group 
of firms being the lowest.  Although negative, cumulative abnormal returns for the group of 
firms with acquisition announcements while in bankruptcy are not statistically significant.  
Based on the analysis of timing of acquisition announcements in relation to bankruptcy 
announcements we find that bankruptcy (or anticipation of it) leads to a negative market 
reaction to otherwise good news of the firms being acquired.  From examining daily mean 
abnormal returns we observe three vastly different responses to acquisition announcements—
significantly negative, negative, and positive.  For easier interpretation of changes in the 
abnormal returns we plot CMARs from Table 7. 
[Insert Figures 3] 
From the figure we observe that as the firms move closer to the announcement date, 
their CMARs become more visibly different, suggesting that market reaction to acquisition 
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announcements depends on the timing of bankruptcy filings.  We find that CMARs for firms 
with the announcements at the time of filings are the most negative and CMARs for firms with 
the announcements in the first year of emergence are positive.  Post-acquisition CMARs for 
the firms with announcements before filing and while in bankruptcy do not seem to change as 
much as for the firms with announcement either at the time of Chapter 11 filing or after 
emergence from bankruptcy.  These CMAR results once again confirm that we have three 
vastly different responses—extremely negative, somewhat negative, and positive.   
v. Post-acquisition performance 
To measure post-acquisition performance we use pretax operating cash flow returns.  
Operating cash flows are earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA).  To provide measures comparable across sample and control firms we deflate 
EBITDA by sales.  When using operating cash flows to measure firm performance some 
researchers scale EBITDA by assets to obtain cash flow returns on assets.  Return on sales 
however is not affected by differences in accounting treatment across transactions and 
differences in the degree of asset writedowns, which can be substantial for distressed and 
bankrupt firms.  The operating cash flow ratios are calculated as the sums of target and 
acquirer’s EBITDA divided by the sums of target and acquirer’s sales revenues for three years 
before the acquisition.  After the acquisition, we use the acquirers’ operating cash flow ratios.  
We analyze operating cash flow ratios only for those bankrupt and distressed firms acquired 
by another operating firm for which accounting data is available.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Table 8, Panel A, we report median levels of bankrupt and distressed firms’ 
operating cash flow ratios from three years before the effective date of acquisition to three 
years after the effective day of acquisition.  For the firms acquired in Chapter 11 or during the 
first year following their emergence, the combined target and acquirer’s cash flow returns 
increase from year -3 to year -2 and then in year -1 fall back almost to the same level as in 
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year -3.  Bankrupt firms’ post-merger operating cash flow returns improve substantially, 
peaking at almost 18 percent in year +2.  For distressed firms, the level of these combined 
returns declines somewhat in the years prior to the acquisition, and improves in the two post-
acquisition years.  Distressed firms’ combined pre-acquisition cash flow returns are higher 
than those of bankrupt firms in two of the three years and slightly lower in each of the three 
years following effective year of acquisition. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows changes in bankrupt and distressed firm operating cash 
flows relative to the year prior to their acquisitions.  For bankrupt firms, we observe positive 
and significant changes from the year prior to acquisition to years +1, +2, and +3, with the 
change for the time window -1, +2 being the highest (0.11), although not significantly 
different from the changes for the other two time windows (0.096 for the time window -1, +1 
and 0.107 for the time window -1, +3).  For distressed firms these performance changes, 
although positive, are not significantly different from zero in each period with exception of the 
period from year -1 to year +3.  During the last time horizon the median performance change 
for distressed firms is 0.01, which is not economically material, while for bankrupt firms it is 
almost 0.11.  Clearly, post-acquisition performance of firms merged with bankrupt firms is 
better than post-acquisition performance of firms merged with distressed firms.  However, in 
Table 6 we find that bankrupt targets’ shareholders incur negative and significant losses 
around the announcement, while distressed targets’ shares have positive abnormal returns 
around that time.  Hence, acquisitions of bankrupt firms add greater economic value than do 
acquisitions of distressed firms acquired outside of bankruptcy.  It is possible that operating 
firm acquirers of bankrupt targets select firms likely to experience improved performance.   
In summary, we analyzed market reaction to acquisition announcements for targets 
and their acquirers and changes in firms’ post-merger operating performance.  Price changes 
around the announcements should reflect anticipated changes in future cash flow, which 
accrue to firms’ shareholders.  One must also note that we have fewer bankrupt than distressed 
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targets that are acquired by other operating companies.  Surprisingly, negative market reaction 
to bankrupt targets’ merger announcements reported in Tables 6 and 7 does not accurately 
reflect positive changes in the post-merger operating cash flows and vice versa, positive 
market reaction to distressed targets’ announcements does not reflect quite weak positive 
changes in the post-merger operating cash flow returns.   
vi. Institutional trading of shares of acquired distressed and bankrupt firms 
Using 13f quarterly filings obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) 
Holdings–s34 we analyze institutional holdings for acquired bankrupt and distressed firms.129  
Institutions are required to file 13f forms with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) on a quarterly basis.
130
  We determine quarter-end holdings of institutions for all 
distressed and bankrupt firms by eliminating all observations from the 13f data file for which 
filing date does not match reporting date, thereby determining the last quarter of actual 13f 
filings.
131
   
Regrettably, due to the 13f quarterly data limitations we cannot observe daily changes 
in institutional shareholdings around acquisition announcement dates and therefore cannot 
accurately assess institutions’ ability to predict the upcoming event and to take advantage of 
                                                 
129
 Thomson Reuters adjusts the reported holdings and net changes for stock splits (including reverse 
stock splits which are a more frequent occurrence in the case of bankrupt firms), and we use the split-
adjusted values.   
130 The SEC’s institutional investment manager filing mandate is as follows: “An institutional 
investment manager that uses the U.S. mail (or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce) 
in the course of its business, and exercises investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 
13(f) securities (explained below) must report its holdings on Form 13F with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).  Form 13F is required to be filed within 45 days of the end of a calendar 
quarter.  The Form 13F report requires disclosure of the name of the institutional investment manager 
that files the report, and, with respect to each section 13(f) security over which it exercises investment 
discretion, the name and class, the CUSIP number, the number of shares as of the end of the calendar 
quarter for which the report is filed, and the total market value.”  The SEC defines an institutional 
investor as “(1) an entity that invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a natural 
person or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or 
entity. Institutional investment managers can include investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, 
broker-dealers, pension funds, and corporations.” 
131
 Thomson Reuters continues reporting 13f data for several quarters after an institutional manager 
stops filing with the SEC.  The data provider maintains original filing date (date on the holding report in 
the SEC’s EDGAR, the regulator’s electronic record database) and changes reporting date for the 
repeating holdings.   
 176 
 
positive abnormal returns in case of distressed firms and bankrupt firms acquired after they 
have emerged from bankruptcy or to avoid the negative abnormal returns in case of bankrupt 
firms acquired in bankruptcy.  Instead, we analyze quarterly institutional holdings of target 
firms’ shares for four quarters preceding and for four quarters following the quarter of 
announcement of their acquisitions.   
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In Table 9 we report mean quarterly institutional holdings and number of bankrupt 
and distressed firms with investments from institutions in a particular quarter.  We report 
institutional shareholdings for all bankrupt and distressed firms from four quarters before 
(quarters -4 to -1) the quarter of acquisition announcement (quarter 0) to four quarters 
following (quarters 1 to 4), and categorize them by institutional manager type.
132
  We consider 
only targets’ institutional investments for quarters -4 through -1.  For quarters starting with the 
quarter of the announcement, we report mean institutional holdings as a sum of the holdings 
for both target and acquirer,
133
 depending on the quarter of the acquisition effective date.  If in 
a particular post-announcement quarter institutional manager reports the same shareholdings 
and net holding changes for both target and acquirer, we do not sum up the holdings and 
instead use reported numbers for the target.  For instance, 213 bankrupt and 274 distressed 
firms have announcement and effective dates in quarter q=0.
134
   
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here] 
For easier interpretation of Table 9, we plot mean quarterly institutional holdings in 
Figure 4.  Institutional shareholdings are relatively unchanged for all bankrupt acquired firms 
                                                 
132
 In Thomson Reuters’ 13f Database manager types are delineated as:  1 = Banks, 2 = Insurance 
companies, 3 = Investment companies and their managers, 4 = Independent investment advisors, and 5 
= All others. 
133
 For acquirer’s post-acquisition institutional holdings we only consider those managers who held 
shares of the target prior to acquisition’s effective date. 
134
 In Table 9 we report institutional holdings for totals of 309 bankrupt and 301 distressed firms in the 
quarter of announcement.  We report combined target and acquirer’s institutional holdings for 213 
bankrupt and 274 distressed firms with the announcement and effective dates in quarter q=0.  We report 
institutional holdings for targets only for the remaining 96 bankrupt and 27 distressed firms. 
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during the eight-quarter period, but this does not accurately portray the different actions of 
different manager types.  Banks, manager type 1, decrease holdings of the bankrupt firms from 
quarter -4 to quarter -2 and then again from quarter q-1 to quarter 0; they increase their post-
announcement holdings from the quarter of announcement to quarter 2 and then decrease it 
again from quarter 2 on.  Insurance companies, manager type 2, consistently increase holdings 
of the merged bankrupt firms.  From quarter -4 to quarter -3 this increase in ownership is 
about 37 percent, then from quarter -3 until quarter 2 it becomes rather gradual.  Insurance 
companies’ increase in shareholdings of bankrupt targets becomes more dramatic in the last 
two post-merger quarters.  We also observe somewhat continuous increase in the investments 
of independent investment advisors, although their ownership declines close to the level of 
insurance companies’ holdings in the last post-merger quarter.  This demonstrates that the two 
types of institutional managers, insurance companies and independent investment advisors, 
increase their ownership in merged bankrupt firms possibly in anticipation of improved 
performance.  In addition, not all bankrupt firms are financial distressed—those firms that file 
as a result of multiple lawsuits and/or union disputes might be operationally healthy and 
financially viable.  Insurance companies and independent investment advisors may be aware 
of the firms’ quality and acquire undervalued shares of these firms in hopes to earn positive 
return on their investments.  These institutional investors could also have held bankrupt firms’ 
debt that was exchanged for shares of bankrupt firm’s acquirer thereby increasing institutions’ 
shareholdings of the merged firms.  Holdings of investment companies and their managers rise 
from quarter -4 to quarter -3, then again from quarter -2 to quarter -1, and then shrink 
drastically from quarter -1 to quarter 2, perhaps in anticipation of a bankruptcy filing or as a 
reaction to the filing. 
Institutional holdings for all acquired distressed firms remain practically unchanged 
from quarter -4 to quarter 1.  However, when analyzing changes in each manager type’s 
ownership, we find that banks and managers in “all others” category acquire shares of 
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distressed firms between quarters -1 and 0 and then again between quarters 1 and 4, with the 
largest share acquisition between quarters 1 and 2 (banks and all other managers’ ownerships 
increase by 75 and 27 percent, respectively).  Insurance companies, investment companies, 
and independent advisors slightly increase their ownership from quarter -4 to quarter -3.  
Insurance companies reduce their holdings from quarter -1 to quarter 0 by about 12 percent 
and consistently acquire the shares between quarters 0 and 4, more than doubling their 
holdings.  Investment companies and their managers substantially increase ownership in the 
acquired distressed firms during two quarters following the announcement quarter (by 24 
percent between quarters 0 and 1 and by 39 percent between quarters 1 and 2), then keep it 
unchanged from quarter 2 to quarter 3, and decrease it slightly in the fourth quarter.  
Independent investment advisors purchase shares of merged distressed firms between quarters 
0 and 2 and then sell them during subsequent quarters.   
Prior to the quarter of acquisition announcements and in the quarter of the 
announcements numbers of bankrupt and distressed firms held by institutions are similar (335 
bankrupt firms and 329 distressed firms
135
 in q-2, 325 bankrupt firms and 328 distressed firms 
in q-1, and 309 bankrupt firms and 301 distressed firms in q=0).  We find that number of 
distressed firms with institutional ownership drops from 301 firms in q=0 to 164 firms in 
quarter q+1 and then to 128 firms in q+2.  This decline is greater than the decline for bankrupt 
firms during the same quarters: 309, 269, and 239 bankrupt firms have investments from 
institutions in quarters q=0, +1, and +2, respectively, perhaps suggesting that institutions 
anticipate bigger improvements in the merged bankrupt firms’ operating performance than in 
the distressed firms’ operating performance.  After the quarter of acquisition announcements 
the number of bankrupt firms with institutional investors becomes noticeably greater than the 
number of distressed firms with investments from institutions (in quarters q+1, +2, and +3 
                                                 
135
 In this analysis we also consider those distressed firms that were matched to more than one bankrupt 
firm (the reason why this total exceeds the total of 306 distressed firms reported in Tables 2 and 5) 
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105, 111, and 119 more bankrupt firms have institutional investments than distressed firms, 
respectively).  Differences between bankrupt and distressed firms’ quarterly institutional 
holdings also become more pronounced in the post-announcement quarters.  In quarter q+1 
bankrupt firms’ institutional holdings exceed distressed firms’ institutional holdings on 
average by close to 60,500 shares per firm.  In the following three post-announcement quarters 
institutions hold greater number of distressed firms’ shares than bankrupt firms’ shares (on 
average 117,808, 56,067, and 144,513 more distressed than bankrupt shares per firm are held 
by institutions in quarters q+2, +3, and +4, respectively).   
Differences in the number of institutional shares invested in bankrupt and distressed 
firms are the most striking for investment companies and their managers, manager type 3.  
Investment companies hold greater number of distressed than bankrupt firms’ shares in every 
quarter analyzed, with exception of quarter q-4.  In the quarter of the announcements 
investment companies hold 152,508 (or 35%) more distressed than bankrupt firms’ shares; in 
the following quarter they hold twice as many distressed as bankrupt shares, or 365,673 (or 
101%) more shares; and in the following three quarters these differences are 681,593, 
613,947, and 541,490 shares (or 205%, 153%, and 140%, respectively).  Investment 
companies reduce their ownership of shares of bankrupt firms from q=0 through q+2 and 
almost double their ownership of shares of distressed firms during the same quarters.  
Differences in the number of shares held are quite the opposite for insurance companies.  
Insurance companies hold more bankrupt than distressed firms’ shares from quarter q-2 
through quarter q+1, and then again in quarters q+3, and +4.  For instance, the differences 
between numbers of shares held by insurance companies per target firm are as follows: 33,700 
shares in quarter q-1, 101,648 shares in q=0, and close to 55,000 in quarter q+1.  This again 
confirms that insurance companies possibly anticipate greater improvements in the post-
merger performance of bankrupt rather than distressed firms. 
IV. Hypothesis Testing and Presentation of Regression Results 
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Previously from Table 5 we found that more distressed than bankrupt firms are 
acquired for cash.  From Table 5 we also found that acquired distressed firms secure a higher 
premium for their assets than do bankrupt firms.  In addition, from Tables 6 and 7 we found 
negative abnormal market returns on the day of acquisition announcements for bankrupt firms 
while these returns are positive and economically material for acquired distressed firms and 
reorganized firms acquired in the year following emergence from Chapter 11.  In Table 8, we 
however observed weaker improvements operating performance for the merged distressed 
than bankrupt firms.  Hence, we speculate that distressed firms are better off pursuing 
acquisition as a more beneficial reorganization alternative than Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  That 
said, we now turn to testing our first hypothesis that firms that are larger, less levered, less 
distressed, and with higher returns on assets and operating cash flow returns on sales 
reorganize via merger or acquisition.  We evaluate the likelihood of distressed firms to be 
acquired before they petition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.   
[Insert Table 10 here] 
To test the first hypothesis related to likelihood of acquisition being used as a method 
of reorganization for distressed firms we utilize logistic regression and set our binary 
dependent variable to be equal to one if a firm is an acquired distressed firm (which includes 
all our control firms and excludes all bankrupt firms, regardless of the announcement in 
relation to bankruptcy filings), and zero otherwise.  Prior to running the regressions, we 
eliminate all duplicate firms as a result of matching several bankrupt firms to the same 
distressed firm (in Table 1 we report 428 total number of bankrupt firms and 306 total number 
of distressed firms).  We use the following performance related variables measured as of one 
year prior to bankruptcy filings for bankrupt firms and as of one year prior to acquisition 
announcements for distressed firms, identical to those reported in Table 3, as controls: natural 
logarithm of market capitalization (LNMKTCAP), number of employees (EMP), Altman’s z-
score (ZSCORE), debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT), return on assets (ROA), operating cash flow 
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returns on sales (OCFSL), current ratio measured as current assets divided by current 
liabilities (CURRT), market-to-book ratio (MB), and shareholdings of officers and directors 
(OFFDIR), and institutions (IH) as percentages of total shares outstanding.  We omit using 
several variables reported in Table 3 such as total assets, sales, and debt-to-assets ratio, to 
avoid high correlation between variables in the regression.   
In Model 1 we use the following independent variables: natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, number of employees, and z-score to measure effects of firm’s size and level of 
distress on the likelihood of acquisition outside of bankruptcy.  Larger firms with smaller 
workforces are more likely to reorganize via merger: for one unit increase in natural log of 
market value the likelihood rises by close to 17 percent and for one unit increase in the 
number of employees it falls by 3 percent.   
In Model 2 we add liquidity, debt management, profitability, and market value related 
variables and remove z-score because it highly correlates with several newly added variables.  
We find that the size related variables remain statistically significant.  The magnitude and the 
direction of the variables’ parameters remain similar to those in Model 1.  Variables such as 
debt-to-equity, ROA, and cash returns on sales do not relate to the likelihood of acquisition 
outside of bankruptcy.  We find that current and market-to-book ratios have parameter 
estimates of 0.14 and 0.08, respectively, which are statistically significant at a five percent 
level, indicating that the likelihood to reorganize via acquisition rises for the firms with greater 
current and market-to-book ratios—for one unit increase in each variable the likelihood rises 
by 15 and 8 percent, respectively.   
In Model 3 we add two more variables to the variables in Model 2, percentage 
shareholdings of officers and directors, and of institutional managers, to analyze relevance of 
these variables to the likelihood of being acquired outside of bankruptcy.  We find that the 
relationships between variables such as natural log of market capitalization, number of 
employees, current and MB ratios and the likelihood of acquisition outside of bankruptcy 
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remain statistically significant in the third model.  We find that officers and directors’ 
percentage shareholdings directly relates to the likelihood of considering merger as a 
reorganization method—with one unit increase in the variable the likelihood increases by 
nearly 5 percent.  This relation indicates that firms with greater officers and directors’ 
shareholdings, ownership of individuals who directly influence decisions to merger or to 
petition for reorganization, are more likely to merge outside of bankruptcy.  These individuals 
are likely aware of their firm’s high likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.  To avoid bankruptcy 
and possible loss of all of their holdings, officers and directors with greater stake in their 
companies prefer merger to Chapter 11.  We find no relationship between institutional 
shareholdings variable and the likelihood of merger outside of bankruptcy, suggesting that 
institutional ownership does not influence probability of the firms’ reorganizations via merger.       
We now separate our firms based on the type of acquirer (operating company vs. 
investors) and run regressions 4 and 5 with several variables from Model 3.  Model 4 is for 
distressed and bankrupt firms acquired by investors.  Model 5 is for distressed and bankrupt 
firms acquired by other operating companies.  In models 4 and 5 we use fewer independent 
variables due to the reduced number of observations in each sub-group of firms.  We utilize 
natural log of market capitalization, number of employees, two size related variables, debt-to-
equity ratio, a debt management related variable, ROA, ratio that measures profitability, 
current ratio, ratio that measures liquidity, market-to-book, market value variable, and 
percentage of officers and directors’ shareholdings, an insider related variable.  We use an 
addition dummy variable, SIC, in Model 5 to control for industry.  SIC is equal one if a target 
and its acquirer operate in the same industry, and zero otherwise. 
From Model 4 we observe that investors are more likely to acquire distressed firms 
with smaller number of employees, higher MB ratio and officers and directors’ shareholdings.  
We find that parameter estimates of these three variables are -0.06, 0.159 and 0.142, 
respectively.  For every unit increase in the number of employees the likelihood of the firms 
 183 
 
reorganizing via merger declines by 6 percent, which is not economically material.  For every 
unit increase in either MB or executive shareholdings variable the likelihood of the firms 
choosing merger as a reorganization method rises by on average 16 percent.  We find that 
coefficients of all other variables in the model are not statistically significant.   
Based on the results of Model 5, we observe that operating firm acquirers are inclined 
to purchase outside of bankruptcy struggling targets that are bigger and better performing.  We 
find that for one unit increase in natural log of market capitalization and ROA the likelihood 
of the acquisition increases by 30 and 84 percent, respectively.  The operating firms are also 
more likely to acquire non-bankrupt firms with higher current ratio—for every unit increase in 
current ratio the likelihood goes up by 18 percent.  Similar to the findings by Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1997), we observe that acquisitions of distressed firms by other operating 
companies directly relate to whether or not the bidders and the targets operate in the same 
industry.  We observe that parameter estimate of variable SIC is 0.87, which is economically 
material and statistically significant.   
Based on the results reported in Table 10, Models 1 through 3, we find support for our 
first hypothesis.  Bigger firms (as measured by natural log of market capitalization) with 
higher short-term liquidity (as measured by current ratio) and market valuation (as measured 
by MB ratio) are more likely to reorganize via M&A.  We find that performance related 
measures such as ROA and operating cash flow returns on sales and variables measuring 
levels of distress and leverage (z-score and debt ratio) do not seem to play a role in the 
probability of reorganization via merger.  Finally, we find that percentage of shares held by 
officers and directors directly relates to the likelihood of reorganization via merger.   
Based on the results in Model 4, we observe that firms’ qualities such as size, 
leverage, and short-term liquidity and their performance measured by ROA do not seem to 
matter for timing of acquisitions by investors.  Investors prefer to acquire distressed firms with 
higher share market value and bigger officers and directors’ ownership.  Based on the results 
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of the last regression and in line with our earlier conjectures, operating firm acquirers prefer to 
acquire distressed firms that are bigger, with better short-term liquidity, stronger performance, 
and operating in the same industry. 
To test our second hypothesis, we adopt methodology used by Healy et al (1992), 
Barber and Lyon (1996), and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998).  We use cash flow 
performance variables of bankrupt and distressed firms reported in Table 8 as independent 
variables and run several cross-sectional regressions of post-merger cash flow returns on sales 
for years 1, 2, and 3 on pre-merger cash flow returns in year -1.  We scale operating cash 
flows by sales and not total assets in order to address the historic costs and non-operating 
assets problems.  The disadvantage of using cash flow returns on sales is that it does not 
measure decline in productivity of bankrupt and distressed firms’ assets.  Our intercept 
measures abnormal performance and captures post-merger performance influenced by 
economy-wide and industry factors as well as any omitted variables.  We run the regression of 
the following form: 
 
where is the post-merger (years 1-3) cash flow return on sales for bankrupt (i) and 
distressed (j) firms, and is the pre-merger (year -1) cash flow return on sales for 
bankrupt (i) and distressed (j) firms.  The slope coefficient β measures covariance, scaled by a 
variance term of the explanatory variable, between pre- and post-merger cash flow returns or 
the relationship between the firm performance one year prior to acquisition and post-merger 
cash returns one, two, and three years following the acquisition.  We however are more 
interested in intercept coefficient α that captures magnitude of cash flow improvements from 
one year prior to acquisition to one, two, and three years following the transaction.  To obtain 
results and to address issues of non-normal distribution of data, heteroscedasticity, and 
inclusion of observations with large residuals, we estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix 
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of the estimates under the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity and report heteroscedasticity 
consistent p-values. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In Panel A, in each regression for bankrupt firms the abnormal performance measured 
by α is positive and significant.  The magnitude of cash flow improvements for year-period (-
1, 1) is approximately 17 percent, for period (-1, 2) 15 percent, and for period (-1, 3) 
approximately 14%.
136
  In Panel B, for the distressed firms acquired outside of bankruptcy 
abnormal performance although positive is not different from zero for the first two year-
periods.  The magnitude of cash flow improvement is statistically significant 11 percent for 
the last year-period of (-1, 3), however we don’t observe any correlation between pre- and 
post-merger cash flow returns during this period as the coefficient on variable is not 
different from zero.  In addition, based on the low adjusted R
2
, the third regression equation 
does not have explanatory power while the equations for two prior years do.  This evidence 
reported in Table 11 does not support our second hypothesis.  We instead observe that 
acquisitions of firms in Chapter 11 create greater value in terms of operating cash flow returns 
than do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy.   
In addition to evaluating and comparing operating performance of the merged 
bankrupt and distressed firms, we perform similar analysis of the pre- and post-acquisition 
cumulative market adjusted returns for the two groups of firms.  We analyze the returns for 
three, six, and twelve month post-acquisition periods and regress them on the three month pre-
acquisition cumulative abnormal returns.  We compute three month pre- and post-acquisition 
cumulative adjusted returns as a weighted sum of the returns for target and its acquirer.
137
 
                                                 
136
 Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), for instance, find cash flow improvements ranging from 
approximately 5% to year +1 and 6% to year +2.  In addition, the further away we move from the year 
of merger, the more the cash flow improvements become affected by aspects other than merger. 
137
 To calculate targets’ weights, we divide their pre-acquisition market values by the sum of the targets 
and acquirers’ market values.  Similarly, to calculate acquirers’ weights, we divide acquirers’ pre-
acquisition market values by the sum of targets and acquirers’ market values.  We then multiply targets’ 
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  [Insert Table 12 here] 
In Table 12 we report combined mean cumulative abnormal returns for 3-, 6-, and 12-
month post-merger periods.  We determine combined returns for all bankrupt firms, for 
bankrupt firms that were acquired in Chapter 11, for bankrupt firms that were acquired during 
the first year after emergence, and for distressed firms.  We find that bankrupt firms’ 
combined post-merger cumulative abnormal returns are -1.18, -2.94, and -6.26 percent during 
the 3-, 6-, and 12-month periods, respectively (abnormal returns for 3- and 6-month periods 
are not statistically significant and for 12-month period they are significant at a five percent 
level).  Mean abnormal returns for bankrupt firms acquired while in Chapter 11 are 
approximately -3.54, -5.91, and -9.53 percent during the 3-, 6-, and 12-month periods, 
respectively (abnormal returns for 3- and 12-month periods are statistically significant at a five 
percent level and for 6-month period they are significant at a ten percent level).  Mean 
cumulative abnormal returns for bankrupt firms acquired after emergence and positive, 
however not statistically significant.  Cumulative abnormal returns for distressed firms are 
negative during 3- and 12-month periods and positive during 6-month period; they are also not 
significant in all three time periods.  From these results and the results in Table 6 we observe 
that when bankrupt firms are acquired, the target firms’ shareholders largely suffer great 
market losses at the time of the merger announcements and the acquirers in the year after 
acquisition have negative abnormal returns.  Conversely, when announcements of distressed 
firm acquisitions are made, they and their acquirers get large positive announcement abnormal 
returns and in the year after consummation the acquirer returns are quite modest and not 
                                                                                                                                            
cumulative abnormal returns by their weights and acquirers’ market adjusted return by their weights.  
To determine combined abnormal returns, we sum up the weighted abnormal returns for targets and 
their acquirers.  In the 3- and 6-month post acquisition periods, approximately 41 percent of returns are 
acquirers’ only; in the 12-month post acquisition period, this percentage is 39.  In addition, mean 
(median) percentage bankrupt and distressed target weights are 7.99 (6.96) percent and 13.12 (10.93) 
percent, respectively. 
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nearly of the magnitude of the announcement returns for the targets, thus the targets’ 
shareholders reap the biggest proportion of these returns. 
Finally, in Table 13 we analyze changes in the market performance of merged 
bankrupt and distressed firms.  We run several cross-sectional regressions of post-merger 
cumulative abnormal returns on the three month pre-merger cumulative abnormal returns for 
both sample (in Panels A, B, and C) and control (in Panel D) firms.  As in Table 11, our 
intercept measures abnormal performance and captures post-merger market performance 
influenced by economy-wide and industry factors.  It captures magnitude of market return 
improvements from three month prior to effective date of acquisition to three, six, and twelve 
months following the transaction.  The slope coefficient β measures covariance, scaled by a 
variance term of the explanatory variable, between pre- and post-merger market returns or the 
effect of the firm’s market performance during three months prior to acquisition on post-
merger three, six, and twelve month abnormal returns.  Similar to the regressions in Table 11, 
we estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates under the hypothesis of 
heteroscedasticity and report heteroscedasticity consistent p-values for each regression. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
In Panel A of Table 13 we report regression results for all bankrupt firms.  In each 
regression for bankrupt firms in the panel the abnormal market performance measured by α is 
negative and significant only in the third regression.  The magnitude of market performance 
decline during the month period (-3, +3) is approximately 2 percent, during the period (-3, +6) 
this decline is 5 percent, and during the period (-3, +12) it is 11 percent.  We observe that the 
relationship between the pre- and post-merger cumulative abnormal returns during the second 
and third periods is inverse and do not observe any correlation between the returns during the 
first time period as the coefficients on variable is not different from zero in the first 
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regression.  Based on the adjusted R
2
, explanatory power of the equations improves for the 
longer time periods (equations two and three). 
In the following two panels, Panels B and C, we split bankrupt firms into the firms 
with acquisition announcements either before bankruptcy filings or while in Chapter 11 and 
the firms with acquisition announcement during the first year after emergence, respectively.  
We partition our sample firms this way because, as reported in Table 7, the abnormal returns 
around announcement dates are positive for the firms with acquisition announcements after 
emergence and negative for all other bankrupt firms.  In Panel B, we observe that intercept 
becomes increasingly negative and statistically significant in all three regressions.  We also 
observe that the relationship between pre- and post-merger cumulative abnormal returns 
during all three periods is inverse, suggesting that the market performance of bankrupt firms 
with stronger pre-merger cumulative abnormal returns improves less than the market 
performance of bankrupt firms with weaker pre-merger returns.  In addition, based on the 
adjusted R
2
, explanatory power of the equations improves for the longer time periods 
(equations two and three).   
In Panel C of Table 13 we find that the abnormal market performance measured by α 
is positive however not statistically significant in all three regressions.  We also observe that 
the relationship between pre- and post-merger cumulative abnormal returns during all three 
periods is significant and inverse.  However, based on the low adjusted R
2
, the first regression 
equation does not have explanatory power while the other two equations do. 
In Panel D we report regression results for distressed firms.  Similar to the results in 
Table 11, Panel B, these firms’ post-merger market performance improvements are not 
significant during any of the three periods analyzed.  In addition, in Table 12 we observed 
negative however not statistically significant abnormal returns for acquired distressed firms in 
the six and twelve month periods; these returns are positive and also not significant in the six 
month period.  In Panel D of Table 13, we find that post-merger cumulative abnormal returns 
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positively relate to the firms’ pre-merger three-month cumulative returns in the six and twelve 
month periods.  In addition, based on the low adjusted R
2
,
 
explanatory powers of the three 
regression equations are weak.  
In summary, post-merger market performance improvements does not resemble those 
of post-merger operating performance.  We observe that post-merger market performance of 
bankrupt firms, especially those acquired while in Chapter 11, declines while market 
performance of distressed firms somewhat improves.  We conclude that acquisitions of 
bankrupt firms create greater operating value than do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy and 
acquisitions of distressed firms create greater market value than do acquisitions of bankrupt 
firms.   
V. Conclusion 
Our research paper provides empirical evidence that whether distressed firms are 
acquired in or outside of bankruptcy matters.  The firms acquired outside of Chapter 11 secure 
better price for their assets and have positive and material market reaction to the acquisition 
announcements.  We first analyze characteristics of bankrupt firms that were acquired either 
while in bankruptcy or during one year following emergence from bankruptcy and compare 
them to similar distressed firms that did not file for bankruptcy and were acquired at around 
the same time period.  We also categorize both groups of firms by the type of acquirer because 
we realize that qualities of the firms acquired by another operating company, creditors, or 
investors and of their acquirers may differ.  Acquired bankrupt firms’ total assets and sales are 
greater and market capitalization is lower than those of distressed firms acquired outside of 
bankruptcy.  Although mean operating cash returns on sales is greater for bankrupt firms than 
it is for distressed firms, bankrupt firms’ profitability and operating performance measured by 
median profit margin and ROA are significantly lower than those for distressed firms.  We 
also find greater median values of executives’ shareholdings for bankrupt firms, especially 
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those acquired by creditors and other operating companies, than for distressed firms with the 
same types of acquirers. 
Most importantly, we find that distressed targets are capable of negotiating better deal 
terms than their bankrupt counterparts.  Distressed firms not only avoid selling their assets at a 
discount, they are on average capable of securing a sales price that exceeds their enterprise 
value.  In addition, market abnormal returns on the day of acquisition announcements for 
distressed firms are positive while these returns for bankrupt firms are negative.  These 
differences are perhaps due to the fact that bankrupt and distressed firms are distinctly 
different groups of firms in size, level of debt, operating performance, market valuation, and 
bargaining position.  Based on this evidence, distressed firms are better off pursuing 
acquisition as a more advantageous reorganization alternative to Chapter 11 filing and 
subsequent acquisition in bankruptcy.   
We find that bigger firms with smaller workforce, higher current and market-to-book 
ratios, and greater percentage of shares owned by officers and directors are more likely to 
reorganize via merger.  Investors are more likely to acquire distressed firms with a higher 
market-to-book ratio and percentage of officers and directors’ shareholdings.  Operating 
companies also acquire larger and better performing distressed firms (as measured by ROA) 
and the firms with higher current ratio.  These results explain why operating firm acquirers 
pay the highest premium for distressed firms’ assets than do investors and creditors. 
We find that distressed targets sell assets at a better price (e.g., at a premium or lower 
discount) than bankrupt firms do.  Shareholders of distressed targets also enjoy positive 
abnormal returns at the time of acquisition announcements, while bankrupt targets’ 
shareholders incur losses.  We also find that abnormal cash flow changes from one year 
preceding acquisition to any of the three post-merger annual periods are more pronounced for 
bankrupt than distressed firms, indicating that acquisitions in Chapter 11 add greater economic 
value than do acquisitions outside of bankruptcy.  Insurance companies and, to a lesser extent, 
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independent investment advisors recognize this trend in the acquired bankrupt firms’ post-
merger cash flow improvements and increase their ownership in the firms.  However we find 
that market returns around the day of the announcements do not accurately reflect post-merger 
changes in the operating cash flow returns.  Abnormal market returns are negative for 
bankrupt targets, suggesting that investors do not anticipate positive changes in firms’ future 
cash flows that we find as part of our analysis.  Similarly, positive market reaction to 
acquisition announcements of distressed firms does not correspond to weak positive changes 
in their post-acquisition operating cash flow returns.
138
  We find post-merger market 
performance improvements for bankrupt and not distressed firms.  In summary, distressed 
firms get a merger announcement premium and bankrupt firms give it away to their acquirers 
whose shareholders benefit from acquisition premiums in a year after the mergers.   
                                                 
138
 We analyze mean abnormal market returns around announcement dates (same analysis as in Table 6) 
for the firms included in Table 11.  We find that the returns for those firms are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Table 6: the two-day CMAR for bankrupt targets is negative and statistically 
significant (-21%) and it is positive and also statistically significant for their acquirers (5%); the two-
day CMARs for distressed targets and their acquirers are positive and statistically significant (22% and 
3%, respectively). 
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Figures 1a and 1b 
Annual volume of M&A and Chapter 11 filings for the period between 1993 and 2011 
(a) All M&A announcements and bankruptcy filings                          (b) Bankrupt and distressed firm acquisition announcements 
 
 
 
Figure 1a presents annual volumes of all M&A announcements and Chapter 11 filings for the period between 1993 and 2013.  Figure 1b provides 
annual numbers of acquisition announcements of bankrupt and distressed firms during the same annual periods.  We obtain data from Thompson 
Financial Services SDC Platinum database.  Figure 1a contains two y-axes and one shared x-axis.  The left y-axis plots yearly number of M&A 
transactions, and the right y-axis plots yearly number of bankruptcy filings.  X-axis shows years.  Figure 1b plots number of M&A on y-axis and 
year on x-axis. 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
NAME MA_NO BKPCY_NO BK_ACQ DISS_ACQ 
MA_NO 1 
   BKPCY_NO -0.33028 1 
  BK_ACQ -0.65102 0.706581436 1 
 DISS_ACQ 0.415926 0.465999247 0.253378808 1 
 
The matrix reports correlation between annual volumes plotted in Figures 1a and 1b.  MA_NO 
is number of M&A announcements, BKPCY_NO is number of bankruptcy filings, BK_ACQ 
is number of bankrupt firm acquisition announcements, and DISS_ACQ is number of 
distressed firm acquisition announcements. 
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Table 1 
Sample formation and description of M&A transactions for distressed firms and firms filing for Chapter 11 between 1/1/1992 and 
12/31/2013 
Panel A: Sample of bankrupt firms formation description 
 
Number Percentage 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings from SDC; excludes utilities and financial firms 3,243 
 Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings from Lopucki's Database; excludes utilities and financial firms 843 
 Non-duplicating Chapter 11 filings from both data sets with accurate identifiers (Permno, CUSIP, Ticker) 
and emergence dates between 1992 and 2013; excludes utilities and financial firms 1,429 100% 
Number of firms reorganized between 1992 and 2013 1,381 100% 
Number of bankrupt firms acquired while in reorganization or one year following emergence 428 31% 
Timing of acquisitions: 
       number of acquisition announcements before filing and effective date while in Chapter 11* 14 3% 
     number of acquisition announcements before filing and effective date after emergence 44 9% 
     number of acquisition announcement and effective dates of acquisitions while in Chapter 11* 157 33% 
     number of acquisition announcements while in Chapter 11* and effective dates after emergence 178 37% 
     number of announcement and effective dates of acquisitions during one year following  emergence date 90 19% 
Total number of acquisition announcements: 483** 100% 
Panel B: Acquisition description 
 
Bankrupt firms 
Distressed 
firms 
Percentage of firms acquired by creditor or bondholder 38% 4% 
Percentage of firms acquired by investors (other than creditors and bondholders) 30% 36% 
Percentage of firms acquired by firms in the same industry (only for firms acquired by operating company: 
169 bankrupt firms and 195 distressed firms) 60% 66% 
Mean percentage of target owned after completion of acquisition 85% 67% 
Percentage of acquirers with less than 100% post-acquisition ownership 33% 48% 
Mean value of transaction ($mill) 440.22 201.75 
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* This time period includes dates of bankruptcy announcement and emergence. 
** Several firms were acquired by more than one bidder with different announcement and effective dates. 
 
The table presents number of firms filed for Chapter 11 reorganization and emerged from bankruptcy during the period of January 1992 through 
December 2013.  The data reported here comes from Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum and Lopucki’s Bankruptcy database.  The 
sample consists of all U. S. non-utility and -financial firms that filed for Chapter 11 and completed reorganization during the period.  Panel A 
describes sample formation.  Sample consists of bankrupt firms that were acquired either while in Chapter 11 of during one year following 
emergence.  Panel B provides information on type of acquirer and magnitude of post-merger ownership.  We compile control (distressed) firms 
based on the two-digit Securities Data Corporation (SIC) codes, acquisition announcement date, and size measured by market capitalization. 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of bankrupt firms acquired in Chapter 11 categorized by timing of acquisition announcement relative to bankruptcy filing 
 
Variable 
Group 1 (n=42) Group 2 (n=234) Group 3 (n=69) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total assets ($mill)  3,451.51
b
 620.90
b
 1,111.53 304.91
b
 1,473.40 583.25 
Sales ($mill)  1,228.86 556.66
b
 975.72 339.83
c
 1,435.37 484.85 
Market capitalization ($mill)  97.40 32.39 134.39 28.67 106.94 29.29 
Altman z-score -1.712 -1.307
b
 -1.686 -0.057 -1.670 -0.351 
Total liabilities/total assets 1.222 1.157
b
 1.116 0.930 1.253 1.076 
EBITDA/total assets 0.049
a
 0.067
b
 -0.140
a
 0.022
b
 0.043 0.049 
EBITDA/sales 0.054
c
 0.084
a
 -0.458 0.014
b
 -0.065 0.050 
Profit margin -0.450
c
 -0.368 -0.955 -0.181 -0.734 -0.125 
ROA -0.311
b
 -0.244 -0.537
b
 -0.226
c
 -0.291 -0.133 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
a,b,c
 denote mean (median) significantly different between firms in the two groups at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively, based on t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
 
Table presents accounting related data gathered from COMPUSTAT’s annual financial reporting statements.  In the table we report characteristics 
of sample firms categorized by acquisition announcement timing.  Group 1 contains firms with acquisition announcements before bankruptcy 
filings, Group 2 contains firms with acquisition announcements either on the day of bankruptcy filings or before emergence, and Group 3 contains 
firms with the announcements either on the day of emergence from bankruptcy or during the first year following the emergence.  In parenthesis, n 
is a number of firms in each group with available financial data.  All variables in the table are measured as of one year preceding bankruptcy 
filing.  Altman’s z-score, bankruptcy-risk proxy (Altman (1968)), is defined as 3.3x((pretax income + interest expense)/total assets) + 
0.999x(sales/total assets) + 0.6x(market capitalization/total liabilities) + 1.2x(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets). 
Profit margin is net income divided by sales and ROA is return on assets and calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
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Table 3 
Characteristics of acquired bankrupt and distressed firms, categorized by acquirer type 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=345) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=114) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=104) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=127) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total assets ($mill)  1,468.77 403.222
a
 1,134.20 465.36
a
 2917.62
c
 673.71 622.89 209.25
a
 
Sales ($mill)  1,098.47 386.15
a
 1,088.12 367.15
a
 1,897.29 696.90 499.92 210.82
a
 
Market capitalization ($mill)  124.76
b
 30.14 105.99
b
 36.80 169.06 37.19 106.03
b
 22.69
b
 
Altman z-score -1.686 -0.254 -1.190 0.441 -1.930 -0.336 -1.859 -0.596 
Total liabilities/total assets 1.157
b
 0.989
a
 1.062 0.864 1.355 1.068
b
 1.077
b
 1.003
a
 
EBITDA/total assets -0.080
b
 0.033 0.008
b
 0.059 -0.0002 0.053 -0.208 -0.006 
EBITDA/sales -0.316
b
 0.028 -0.305 0.040 -0.184 0.052 -0.425
c
 -0.004 
Profit margin -0.849
c
 -0.189
b
 -0.747 -0.098 -0.698 -0.146
b
 -1.043 -0.343
a
 
ROA -0.461 -0.211
b
 -0.272
c
 -0.127 -0.382 -0.177
b
 -0.664
c
 -0.354
a
 
Market-to-book 0.263
a
 0.090
a
 0.319 0.324 0.308 -0.015 0.186
a
 0.047
a
 
Days spent in Chapter 11 prior to effective 
day of acquisition 368 240 479 329 358 248 288 186 
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(Table 3, Panel A continues) 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Variable 
All distressed firms 
acquired (n=306) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=111) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=13) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=182) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total assets ($mill)  995.58 100.90 1,488.65 100.90 1,386.76 297.39 635.62 95.04 
Sales ($mill)  850.34 91.20 1,214.42 133.44 1,423.38 277.09 542.68 63.87 
Market capitalization ($mill)  257.19 35.77 292.37 35.62 222.85 57.03 235.67 39.69 
Altman z-score -1.872 0.457 -1.483 0.732 -2.404 -0.486 -2.307 0.314 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.943 0.736 1.015 0.790 1.526 0.857 0.843 0.662 
EBITDA/total assets -0.293 0.033 -0.278 0.054 -0.750 0.085 -0.267 0.014 
EBITDA/sales -0.979 0.041 -0.755 0.053 -1.234 0.062 -0.996 0.023 
Profit margin -1.178 -0.126 -0.738 -0.079 -2.562 -0.456 -1.302 -0.139 
ROA -0.516 -0.122 -0.546 -0.103 -1.225 -0.359 -0.435 -0.136 
Market-to-book 1.204 0.722 0.709 0.500 0.344 0.359 1.642 0.870 
Days spent in Chapter 11 prior to effective 
day of acquisition NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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(Table 3, Panel B continues) 
Panel B: Management turnover & ownership 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=93) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=27) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=40) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=26) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% CEO replaced through bankruptcy 
filing 44.00 0.00 49.00 0.00 47.00 0.00 35.00 0.00 
% CEO replaced through acquisition 35.00
a
 0.00 30.00
a
 0.00 45.00
a
 0.00 27.00
c
 0.00 
% stock held by officers and directors 2.92 0.11 2.19 0.11 3.88
a
 0.11
a
 2.69 0.10 
% stock held by CEO 2.51 0.25
b
 3.70 0.75 1.88 0.15
a
 2.14 0.22
c
 
Panel B: Management turnover & ownership 
Variable 
All distressed firms 
acquired (n=91) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=41) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=12) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=38) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% CEO replaced through bankruptcy 
filing NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
% CEO replaced through acquisition 20.00 0.00 11.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 34.00 0.00 
% stock held by officers and directors 3.44 0.10 2.87 0.09 0.80 0.02 4.20 0.14 
% stock held by CEO 2.64 0.13 3.72 0.55 1.66 0.002 2.51 0.17 
  
2
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EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
a,b,c
 denote mean (median) significantly different between firms in the two groups at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively, based on t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
 
Table presents accounting related data gathered from COMPUSTAT’s annual financial reporting statements as well as information on executives 
and directors obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Insider Data.  We categorize the data by acquirer type: investors, creditors, and operating firms.  In 
Panels A we report characteristics of sample (bankrupt) and control (distressed) firms and in Panel B we report executive management 
entrenchment related data.  In parenthesis, n is a number of firms for which data is available.  We report descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
as of one year preceding bankruptcy filings.  For control firms the same statistics are reported as of one year preceding acquisition announcements.  
The variable “CEO replaced through bankruptcy filing” indicates whether the CEO in office two years prior to filing is still in office at the time of 
filing.  The variable “CEO replace through acquisition” indicates whether the CEO in office two years prior to acquisition date is still in office at 
the time of announcement. 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of operating firm acquirers of Chapter 11 and distressed firms 
 
Variable 
All operating firm 
acquirers of bankrupt 
firms (n=54) 
All operating firm 
acquirers of distressed 
firms (n=143) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Total assets ($mill)  1,976.30
b
 581.48 4,127.10 418.12 
Sales ($mill)  1,900.53
c
 479.34 3,627.70 492.80 
Market capitalization ($mill)  1,703.32
c
 418.08 4,104.98 593.65 
Altman z-score 0.56
b
 1.82
c
 3.38 2.29 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.697 0.611 0.614 0.572 
EBITDA/total assets -0.036 0.088 0.039 0.103 
EBITDA/sales -0.047 0.112 -0.119 0.117 
Profit margin -0.226 0.010 -0.276 0.025 
ROA -0.243 0.010 -0.083 0.029 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
 
The table presents acquirers’ characteristics similar to those reported in the previous tables for 
bankrupt and distressed targets.  We obtain data from COMPUSTAT.  We report descriptive 
statistics for acquirers that are operating companies as of one year preceding acquisition 
announcements.  In parenthesis, n is a number of operating firm acquirers for which data is 
available. 
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Table 5 
Transaction characteristics for bankrupt and distressed firms 
 
Panel A: Transaction characteristics 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=428) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=130) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=164) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=134) 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Acquisition 
270 63% 101 78% 102 62% 67 50% 
Buyback 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Exchange offer 
8 2% 1 1% 5 3% 2 1% 
Merger 148 35% 28 22% 56 34% 64 48% 
Recapitalization 
1 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Multiple bidders 13 3% 4 3% 0 0% 9 7% 
Government owned involvement 4 1% 1 1% 3 2% 0 0% 
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(Table 5, Panel A continues) 
Panel A: Transaction characteristics 
Variable 
All distressed firms 
acquired (n=306) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=111) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=13) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=182) 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Acquisition 
166 54% 81 73% 10 77% 75 41% 
Buyback 13 4% 2 2% 0 0% 11 6% 
Exchange offer 
1 0% 0 0% 1 8% 0 0% 
Merger 126 41% 28 25% 2 15% 96 53% 
Recapitalization 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Multiple bidders 10 3% 2 2% 0 0% 8 4% 
Government owned involvement 8 3% 0 0% 1 8% 7 4% 
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(Table 5, Panel B continues) 
Panel B: Transaction financing 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=428) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=130) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=164) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=134) 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Financing via borrowing 6 1% 0 0% 1 1% 5 4% 
Financing via stock offering 7 2% 2 2% 0 0% 5 4% 
Financing via debt securities 5 1% 0 0% 0 0% 5 4% 
Financing via internal corporate funds 4 1% 1 1% 0 0% 3 2% 
Panel B: Transaction financing 
Variable 
All distressed firms 
acquired (n=306) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=111) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=13) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by another 
operating company 
(n=182) 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Financing via borrowing 27 9% 6 5% 0 0% 21 12% 
Financing via stock offering 2 1% 0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 
Financing via debt securities 3 1% 0 0% 0 0% 3 2% 
Financing via internal corporate funds 42 14% 2 2% 0 0% 40 22% 
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(Table 5, Panel C continues) 
Panel C: Firm and deal valuations 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=278) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by 
investors (n=77) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=72) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by 
another operating 
company (n=129) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Deal value ($mill) 428.98
b
 58.25
a
 185.39
b
 58.42
a
 1136.12
b
 266.80 163.11 41.75 
Enterprise market value ($mill) 1,097.19 327.30
a
 640.50 292.04
b
 1,890.44 927.57 595.81 195.97 
Ent. value based on financials ($mill) 1,164.00 354.46
a
 659.31 292.02
b
 1994.84
c
 927.57 714.59 160.00 
Deal value/sales 0.946
a
 0.297
a
 0.782
b
 0.213
c
 0.789 0.369
b
 1.088
a
 0.308
a
 
Deal value/total assets 0.302
b
 0.218 0.247 0.188 0.319 0.255 0.333
a
 0.219
a
 
Enterprise value/sales 2.351 0.930 2.318 0.930 2.144 0.860
c
 2.727 0.990 
Enterprise value/total assets 0.753
a
 0.640
a
 0.669
a
 0.636
b
 0.792 0.648 0.789
a
 0.533
b
 
Deal value/common equity 2.040
a
 1.086
a
 1.767
a
 1.086
c
 3.033 1.255 1.991
a
 0.979
a
 
Offer price/book value 1.740
a
 1.027
a
 1.655
b
 0.997
c
 2.287 1.255 1.647
a
 0.962
a
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(Table 5, Panel C continues) 
Panel C: Firm and deal valuations 
Variable 
All distressed 
firms acquired 
(n=264) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by investors 
(n=89) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by creditors 
(n=11) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by 
another operating 
company (n=164) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Deal value ($mill) 195.22 24.34 88.80 13.10 347.57 197.70 260.60 33.06 
Enterprise market value ($mill) 868.13 116.32 1,124.64 116.30 1,298.17 1,182.84 678.11 91.76 
Ent. value based on financials ($mill) 925.83 121.15 1,216.74 157.82 1,266.00 1,182.84 764.81 93.63 
Deal value/sales 2.509 0.602 1.677 0.313 3.176 0.841 3.108 0.827 
Deal value/total assets 0.907 0.270 0.805 0.102 0.275 0.226 1.005 0.538 
Enterprise value/sales 3.427 1.010 1.757 0.670 4.179 1.130 4.422 1.220 
Enterprise value/total assets 1.653 0.911 1.348 0.865 1.055 0.659 1.880 0.975 
Deal value/common equity 5.732 2.074 5.683 1.599 7.689 0.882 5.682 2.390 
Offer price/book value 4.893 1.814 3.960 1.286 7.011 0.882 5.291 2.055 
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(Table 5, Panel D continues) 
Panel D: Price paid versus value based on benchmark 
Variable 
All bankrupt firms 
acquired (n=278) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by 
investors (n=77) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by 
creditors (n=72) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired by 
another operating 
company (n=129) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Premiums (+) and discounts (-) calculated based on: 
          industry median ent. value/sales -15%
a
 -29%
a
 -19%
a
 -26% 5% -19% -27%
a
 -38%
a
 
   industry median ent. value/total assets -27%
a
 -37%
a
 -29%
b
 -37%
c
 -16% -28% -33%
a
 -50%
a
 
Panel D: Price paid versus value based on benchmark 
Variable 
All distressed 
firms acquired 
(n=264) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by 
investors (n=89) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by 
creditors (n=11) 
Distressed firms 
acquired by 
another operating 
company (n=164) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Premiums (+) and discounts (-) calculated based on: 
          industry median ent. value/sales 20% -12% 18% -14% 12% -45% 21% -9% 
   industry median ent. value/total assets 6% -20% -1% -27% 19% -39% 9% -17% 
 
This table reports transaction related data.  The data reported here comes from Thompson Financial Services SDC Platinum and COMPUSTAT.  
Panel A describes transaction type, number and percentage of firms with multiples bidders and government involvement.  Panel B reports 
acquisition financing methods (SDC does not report mixed financing).  Panel C presents firm and deal values.  Enterprise values are reported as of 
announcement of acquisition.  Panel D includes transaction premiums (+) and discounts (-) in percentages for two multiples calculated as industry 
median enterprise value divided by sales and industry median enterprise value divided by book value of total assets.  In parenthesis, n is a number 
of bankrupt and distressed targets for which data is available. 
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Table 6 
Stock price effects on targets and acquirers around announcement of acquisition 
Panel A: Acquisitions of Chapter 11 firms 
Day 
Target (n=107) Acquirer (n=48) 
 Mean 
daily 
abnormal 
returns 
P-values 
Mean 
CMAR 
P-
values 
Abnormal 
trading 
volume 
P-values 
 Mean 
daily 
abnormal 
returns 
P-
values 
Mean 
CMAR 
P-
values 
Abnormal 
trading 
volume 
P-values 
-10 -0.28% (0.7202) -0.28% (0.7202) 1.44 (0.0614) 0.44% (0.4450) 0.44% (0.4450) -0.11 (0.4389) 
-9 0.27% (0.8362) -0.01% (0.9166) 1.41 (0.0104) 1.52% (0.1751) 1.96% (0.0998) -0.37 (<.0001) 
-8 -0.42% (0.6325) -0.43% (0.7701) 1.76 (0.0031) -1.05% (0.0203) 0.92% (0.9797) -0.27 (0.0035) 
-7 -1.40% (0.1298) -1.82% (0.1623) 1.03 (0.0048) 1.31% (0.0474) 2.23% (0.2139) 0.04 (0.7521) 
-6 -0.33% (0.7358) -2.15% (0.2097) 0.89 (0.0056) 0.98% (0.2929) 3.20% (0.0845) -0.03 (0.8630) 
-5 1.96% (0.1048) -0.20% (0.8438) 1.15 (0.0017) -0.06% (0.9043) 3.14% (0.0793) -0.13 (0.3668) 
-4 -1.24% (0.1700) -1.44% (0.4622) 2.06 (0.0021) -0.28% (0.5084) 2.86% (0.1858) -0.13 (0.2119) 
-3 -1.18% (0.2200) -2.62% (0.2395) 1.52 (0.0013) 0.05% (0.9224) 2.90% (0.1669) -0.23 (0.0319) 
-2 2.12% (0.1557) -0.50% (0.5868) 1.60 (<.0001) 0.29% (0.5758) 3.20% (0.1411) 0.06 (0.7478) 
-1 -1.36% (0.2459) -1.86% (0.3168) 2.63 (0.0002) -0.65% (0.1355) 2.54% (0.3067) -0.16 (0.1018) 
0 -8.50% (0.0130) -10.36% (0.0221) 8.84 (0.0001) 3.85% (0.0042) 6.39% (0.0165) 0.95 (0.0002) 
1 -1.09% (0.7039) -11.45% (0.0332) 9.32 (0.0006) 1.21% (0.0504) 7.60% (0.0036) 0.56 (0.0057) 
2 -3.54% (0.0382) -14.99% (0.0774) 5.29 (0.0052) 0.19% (0.4927) 7.79% (0.0047) -0.06 (0.6220) 
3 -0.94% (0.7738) -15.93% (0.0965) 3.57 (0.0005) 0.65% (0.1963) 8.44% (0.0037) -0.01 (0.9438) 
4 -0.81% (0.6295) -16.75% (0.0567) 3.08 (<.0001) 1.13% (0.3468) 9.57% (0.0044) 0.31 (0.0617) 
5 0.66% (0.6819) -16.09% (0.0577) 2.98 (<.0001) 0.47% (0.5284) 10.04% (0.0047) 0.06 (0.7097) 
6 0.13% (0.9158) -15.96% (0.0729) 3.00 (0.0331) 0.27% (0.7222) 10.31% (0.0021) 0.03 (0.8200) 
7 -0.77% (0.5439) -16.73% (0.0872) 2.48 (0.0153) -1.07% (0.0326) 9.24% (0.0055) 0.06 (0.6605) 
8 2.16% (0.2639) -14.57% (0.0820) 1.60 (0.0028) 0.61% (0.0862) 9.84% (0.0044) -0.25 (0.0083) 
9 0.70% (0.6038) -13.88% (0.0937) 1.72 (0.0101) 0.51% (0.2742) 10.35% (0.0049) -0.11 (0.4077) 
10 1.28% (0.3699) -12.60% (0.0978) 1.35 (0.0458) -0.42% (0.3596) 9.93% (0.0052) -0.14 (0.0900) 
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(Table 6 continues) 
Panel B: Acquisitions of distressed firms 
Day 
Target (n=202) Acquirer (n=125) 
 Mean 
daily 
abnormal 
returns 
P-values 
Mean 
CMAR 
P-values 
Abnormal 
trading 
volume 
P-values 
 Mean 
daily 
abnormal 
returns 
P-values 
Mean 
CMAR 
P-
values 
Abnormal 
trading 
volume 
P-values 
-10 -0.60% (0.0805) -0.60% (0.0805) 0.13 (0.1047) 0.27% (0.3523) 0.27% (0.3523) -0.07 (0.5657) 
-9 -0.45% (0.1866) -1.04% (0.0190) 0.11 (0.1615) -0.04% (0.8695) 0.23% (0.5037) 0.18 (0.3341) 
-8 0.18% (0.6359) -0.86% (0.1262) 0.01 (0.9271) -0.22% (0.2650) 0.01% (0.9791) 0.07 (0.6076) 
-7 -0.20% (0.5371) -1.06% (0.0959) 0.25 (0.0053) 0.41% (0.2052) 0.42% (0.3294) 0.01 (0.9455) 
-6 0.20% (0.5724) -0.86% (0.2328) 0.39 (0.0004) -0.41% (0.0635) 0.01% (0.8185) 0.16 (0.1532) 
-5 -0.69% (0.1686) -1.55% (0.1000) 0.44 (0.0002) -0.01% (0.9660) 0.00% (0.9630) 0.20 (0.2944) 
-4 0.79% (0.0159) -0.76% (0.4654) 0.47 (0.0001) -0.30% (0.2484) -0.30% (0.6397) 0.29 (0.0544) 
-3 0.86% (0.0324) 0.10% (0.7860) 0.34 (0.0014) -0.42% (0.1148) -0.73% (0.1667) 0.15 (0.4060) 
-2 0.77% (0.0810) 0.87% (0.2731) 0.40 (0.0007) -0.38% (0.3972) -1.10% (0.1426) 0.17 (0.1345) 
-1 0.98% (0.0177) 1.85% (0.0602) 0.63 (<.0001) 0.68% (0.0546) -0.42% (0.7578) 0.06 (0.4962) 
0 12.02% (<.0001) 13.87% (<.0001) 8.37 (<.0001) 2.74% (<.0001) 2.32% (0.0203) 1.73 (<.0001) 
1 6.78% (<.0001) 20.65% (<.0001) 9.06 (<.0001) 0.18% (0.8293) 2.49% (0.0424) 1.00 (<.0001) 
2 -0.40% (0.1374) 20.25% (<.0001) 3.34 (<.0001) 0.28% (0.4469) 2.78% (0.0348) 0.46 (0.0367) 
3 0.69% (0.0218) 20.95% (<.0001) 2.30 (<.0001) -0.73% (0.0335) 2.05% (0.1267) 0.32 (0.0531) 
4 0.38% (0.2408) 21.33% (<.0001) 1.84 (<.0001) -0.10% (0.7111) 1.95% (0.1229) 0.09 (0.2330) 
5 -0.46% (0.1254) 20.87% (<.0001) 1.12 (<.0001) -0.68% (0.0070) 1.27% (0.2974) 0.28 (0.0467) 
6 -0.04% (0.8558) 20.83% (<.0001) 1.08 (<.0001) 0.43% (0.1186) 1.71% (0.1786) 0.08 (0.4095) 
7 -0.25% (0.4212) 20.58% (<.0001) 1.18 (<.0001) -0.49% (0.0937) 1.21% (0.3483) 0.07 (0.4673) 
8 -0.12% (0.6250) 20.46% (<.0001) 0.83 (<.0001) 0.14% (0.6914) 1.35% (0.3209) 0.21 (0.0556) 
9 0.06% (0.7913) 20.53% (<.0001) 0.69 (<.0001) -0.30% (0.1442) 1.05% (0.4554) -0.02 (0.6967) 
10 0.08% (0.7997) 20.61% (<.0001) 0.78 (<.0001) 0.27% (0.3954) 1.31% (0.3332) 0.08 (0.3646) 
CMAR: cumulative market adjusted returns 
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This table describes market reaction to acquisition announcements for both targets and acquirers.  Day 0 is the day of acquisition announcement.  
We present market adjusted and cumulative returns for days -10 through +10 surrounding the announcement day.  We use equally weighted 
market return, including dividends, for expected return.  We find natural logarithm of (1+volume) to address issue of data non-normality.  We also 
consider issue of positive serial correlation and create day-of-the-week indicator variables.  We run OLS regressions controlling for positive 
correlation and day-of-the-week effect.  We utilize CRSP to gather market related data.  P-values presented in parenthesis.  In parenthesis, n is a 
number of targets and acquirers for which market data is available.  Panel A reports abnormal returns and trading volumes for bankrupt firms and 
their acquirers and Panel B reports those for distressed firms that their acquirers. 
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Figures 2a and 2b 
Cumulative market adjusted returns and abnormal trading volumes for bankrupt and distressed targets and their acquirers 
(a) CMARs                                                                                       (b) abnormal trading volumes 
 
 
Figure 2a pictorially presents 21-day window CMARs for bankrupt and distressed firms and their targets reported.  Figure 2b pictorially presents 
21-day window abnormal trading volumes for bankrupt and distressed firms and their targets.  We utilize CRSP to gather market related data.  X-
axis plots number of days with Day 0 being day of acquisition announcement.  Y-axes on Figures 2a and 2b plot CMARs and trading volumes, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Stock price effects on bankrupt targets around announcement of acquisition, categorized based on timing of the announcement 
 
Day 
Ann. date<Filing date (n=26) Ann. date=Filing date (n=25) 
Filing date<Ann. date <Emerg. 
date (n=30) 
Ann. date>=Emerg. date (n=26) 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
-10 0.36% 0.36% -2.93% 0.36% 1.32% 1.32% -0.23% -0.23% 
-9 -1.98% -1.63% 3.52% 0.59% -2.82% -1.50% 3.61%
b
 3.39%
c
 
-8 0.80% -0.83% -3.98% -3.39% 2.28% 0.78% -1.33% 2.06% 
-7 1.92% 1.09% -3.36% -6.75% -2.81% -2.03% -1.37% 0.69% 
-6 0.66% 1.76% -2.50% -9.25% -1.03% -3.06% 1.80% 2.49% 
-5 4.44% 6.20% 3.42% -5.83% -2.16%
c
 -5.22% 2.52% 5.02% 
-4 -0.45% 5.75% -1.78% -7.61% -1.84% -7.06%
c
 -0.83% 4.19% 
-3 -3.27% 2.48% -5.14%
b
 -12.75%
c
 1.90% -5.16% 1.73% 5.92% 
-2 1.62% 4.10% 1.75% -11.01%
c
 2.04% -3.12% 3.19%
b
 9.11%
b
 
-1 -0.23% 3.87% -2.92% -13.93%
b
 -2.80% -5.93% 0.74% 9.85%
b
 
0 -14.53%
b
 -10.66% -29.81%
a
 -43.74%
a
 -3.12% -9.05% 11.81%
c
 21.66%
a
 
1 3.16% -7.50% -10.23% -53.96%
a
 0.49% -8.56% 0.51% 22.17%
a
 
2 -4.35% -11.85% -17.35%
b
 -71.32%
a
 3.01% -5.55% 0.53% 22.70%
a
 
3 -1.82% -13.66% 3.20% -68.12%
a
 -3.05%
c
 -8.60%
c
 -1.15% 21.55%
a
 
4 3.37% -10.30% -5.03% -73.15%
a
 -3.38%
b
 -11.98%
b
 2.06% 23.61%
a
 
5 -0.47% -10.76% 1.27% -71.88%
b
 1.91% -10.06%
c
 -0.30% 23.31%
a
 
 
  
2
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(Table 7 continues) 
Day 
Ann. date<Filing date (n=26) Ann. date=Filing date (n=25) 
Filing date<Ann. date <Emerg. 
date (n=30) 
Ann. date>=Emerg. date (n=26) 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
 Mean daily 
abnormal 
returns 
Mean CMAR 
6 -1.30% -12.06% -4.78% -76.66%
b
 3.97%
b
 -6.10% 0.38% 23.68%
a
 
7 -0.52% -12.58% -8.22% -84.88%
b
 -0.85% -6.95% 0.52% 24.20%
a
 
8 1.60% -10.98% 1.46% -83.42%
b
 -2.73% -9.69% 2.77% 26.97%
a
 
9 1.11% -9.87% 2.60% -80.82%
b
 -1.83% -11.52% 0.27% 27.24%
a
 
10 2.39% -7.48% 0.78% -80.04%
b
 1.10% -10.41% 0.70% 27.93%
a
 
CMAR: cumulative market adjusted returns 
a,b,c
 denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The table presents similar market return data to that reported in the previous table, categorizing the data by acquisition announcement timing as 
follows: announcement date is before bankruptcy filing date, announcement and filing dates are the same, announcement date is between filing 
and emergence dates, and announcement date is after emergence date.  In parenthesis, n is a number of bankrupt targets for which market return 
data is available. 
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Figure 3 
Cumulative market adjusted returns for bankrupt targets based on the timing of 
acquisition announcements in relation to bankruptcy filings 
 
 
 
The Figure pictorially presents 21-day window CMARs for bankrupt firms reported in Table 
7.  We utilize CRSP to gather market related data.  X-axis plots number of days with Day 0 
being day of acquisition announcement.  Y-axis plots CMARs. 
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Table 8 
Post-merger combined operating performance of distressed and bankrupt targets and 
operating firm acquirers 
 
Panel A: Cash flow performance of combined target and acquirer 
Year 
relative 
to 
merger 
Bankrupt firms acquired by another 
operating company 
Distressed firms acquired by another 
operating company  
Number Firm median % Positive Number Firm median % Positive 
-3 39 0.073 54% 126 0.114 81% 
-2 48 0.132 56% 125 0.093 75% 
-1 46 0.081 53% 106 0.098 81% 
1 46 0.141 89% 120 0.123 88% 
2 37 0.179 95% 105 0.144 90% 
3 36 0.135 86% 90 0.131 91% 
Panel B: Change in combined cash flow performance (EBITDA/sales) relative to year prior to 
merger 
Years Number Median 
change 
Median % 
change 
Number Median 
change 
Median % 
change 
-1 to +1 46 0.096
a
 7%
c
 106 0.014 1%
c
 
-1 to +2 37 0.110
a
 6% 105 0.005 2% 
-1 to +3 36 0.107
b
 3% 90 0.010
b
 3% 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
a,b,c
 denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
This table describes post-merger performance.  We utilize COMPUSTAT to obtain necessary 
financial data.  To measure post-acquisition performance we use pretax operating cash flow 
returns.  Operating cash flows are earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA).  To provide measure comparable across sample and control firms we 
deflate EBITDA by sales.  For three years before the acquisition, the operating cash flow 
ratios are calculated as the sums of target and acquirer EBITDA divided by the sums of target 
and acquirer sales revenues.  After the acquisition, we use the acquirers’ operating cash flow 
ratios.  We analyze operating cash flow ratios only for those bankrupt and distressed firms 
acquired by another operating firm for which accounting data is available.  In Panel A, we 
report median levels of bankrupt and distressed firms’ operating cash flows from three years 
before the effective date of acquisition to three years after the effective day of acquisition.  
Panel B of Table 8 shows changes in bankrupt and distressed firm operating cash flows 
relative to the year prior to their acquisitions. 
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Table 9 
Quarterly average number of shares of bankrupt and M&A distressed firms held by institutional investors, categorized by manager type 
 
Quarter 
horizons 
Institutional ownership of bankrupt firms  Institutional ownership of distressed M&A firms  
All 
Manager type 
All 
Manager type 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
-4 417,817 263,450 202,764 468,571 442,228 464,258 395,958 230,100 258,085 460,756 421,531 431,834 
 
333 259 149 134 283 291 321 277 164 146 274 264 
-3 408,255 249,219 276,909 514,875 403,827 459,475 411,847 247,428 312,719 563,799 506,787 418,687 
 
337 241 132 109 273 296 326 275 161 144 279 281 
-2 420,146 243,189 295,554 510,326 436,608 470,130 436,593 255,141 290,944 581,251 505,839 457,923 
 
335 216 106 89 263 281 329 272 169 140 275 281 
-1 454,475 260,481 322,812 568,584 455,317 514,548 403,654 230,293 289,112 588,256 509,005 405,936 
 
325 178 86 68 235 279 328 258 162 143 274 281 
0 464,570 207,703 356,075 434,858 460,681 549,680 433,268 288,501 254,427 587,366 495,318 449,222 
 
309 122 63 51 209 266 301 228 144 119 250 244 
1 512,810 210,003 387,438 363,742 486,035 624,794 452,338 296,324 332,828 729,414 532,161 455,368 
 
269 91 59 51 165 215 164 118 69 61 133 129 
2 470,078 212,484 382,404 332,000 532,988 528,867 587,886 519,231 421,579 1,013,593 633,860 580,135 
 
239 81 62 46 151 196 128 92 60 53 97 96 
3 529,240 174,127 525,169 400,632 609,181 586,011 585,306 540,104 474,445 1,014,579 582,166 585,354 
 
235 88 52 45 146 189 116 81 56 47 85 86 
4 467,620 184,229 556,150 387,052 560,432 482,221 612,133 579,462 531,209 928,542 575,206 622,977 
  209 74 52 49 141 161 113 80 56 47 83 88 
 
This table presents institutional holdings during eight quarters surrounding quarter of acquisition announcements (quarter 0).  Using 13f quarterly 
filings obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional (13f) Holdings–s34 we analyze institutional holdings for acquired bankrupt and distressed 
firms.  Underneath each quarterly holding we report number of firms with institutional holdings.  For quarters -4 through -1, shareholdings and 
number of firms are for targets only; for the following five quarters these numbers also include acquirers, depending on the quarter when 
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acquisition was completed.  Manager types are delineated as:  1 = Banks, 2 = Insurance companies, 3 = Investment companies and their managers, 
4 = Independent investment advisors, and 5 = All others. 
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Figures 4a and 4b 
Quarterly institutional shareholdings for bankrupt and distressed targets 
(a) shareholdings for bankrupt firms                                                   (b) shareholdings for distressed firms 
 
 
Figure 4a pictorially presents institutional shareholdings for bankrupt firms reported in Table 9.  Figure 4b pictorially presents institutional 
shareholdings for distressed firms also reported in Table 9.  X-axis plots number of shares held by institutional managers, all and according to the 
type.  Y-axis plot quarter relative to the quarter of acquisition announcement, quarter 0.  Black line on both plots represents institutional 
ownerships for all respective firms.  Lines in color are each manager type’s quarterly holdings. 
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Table 10 
Propensity of firms to be acquired outside of bankruptcy 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Estimates 
Point 
estimates 
Intercept -1.456
b
 - -1.680
b
 - -2.605
a
 - -3.789 - -4.666
b
 - 
LNMKTCAP 0.154
b
 1.167 0.152
b
 1.164 0.304
a
 1.355 0.235 1.265 0.261
b
 1.298 
EMP -0.032
b
 0.969 -0.034
b
 0.967 -0.040
b
 0.961 -0.064
b
 0.938 -0.014 0.986 
ZSCORE -0.010 0.990 
        DEBT 
  
-0.001 0.999 -0.001 0.999 0.003 1.003 0.008 1.008 
ROA 
  
-0.014 0.986 -0.074 0.929 -0.481 0.618 0.610
b
 1.841 
OCFSL 
  
-0.003 0.997 0.032 1.033 
    CURRT 
  
0.144
b
 1.154 0.202
b
 1.224 -0.251 0.778 0.165
c
 1.179 
MB 
  
0.080
b
 1.083 0.078
b
 1.081 0.159
c
 1.172 0.046 1.047 
OFFDIR 
    
0.044
c
 1.045 0.142
b
 1.152 0.023 1.024 
IH 
    
0.096 1.101 
    SIC 
        
0.873
a
 2.394 
           Number of obs. 469 432 317 118 192 
Likelihood Ratio 16.526
a
 34.450
a
 43.633
a
 22.944
b
 31.908
a
 
a,b,c
 denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The table reports results of logistic regression with binary variable equaling to one if distressed firms that have not filed for bankruptcy are 
acquired, and zero otherwise.  We use the following performance related variables, similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 as controls: natural 
logarithm of market capitalization (LNMKTCAP), number of employees (EMP), Altman’s z-score (ZSCORE), debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT), 
return on assets (ROA), operating cash flow returns on sales (OCFSL), current ratio measured as current assets divided by current liabilities 
(CURRT), market-to-book ratio (MB), shareholdings of officers and directors (OFFDIR) and institutions (IH), and dummy variable (SIC) equaling 
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one if target and acquirer operate in the same industry (based on a two-digit SIC) and zero otherwise.  We partition our firms based on type of 
acquirer (investors in Model 4 and operating companies in Model 5) and run regressions 4 and 5 with several variables from Model 3. 
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Table 11 
Post-merger abnormal operating performance 
 
Panel A: Abnormal post-merger cash flow returns for firms acquired in Chapter 11 
(heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+1,i = 16.8% + 0.22 CR-1,i 0.37 46 
  
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
  CR+2,i = 15.2% + 0.21 CR-1,i 0.42 37 
  
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
  CR+3,i = 13.5% + 0.37 CR-1,i 0.45 36 
  
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
  Panel B: Abnormal post-merger cash flow returns for acquired distressed firms 
(heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+1,j = 3.5% + 0.54 CR-1,j 0.16 106 
  
(0.6309) 
 
(0.2482) 
  CR+2,j = 0.2% + 0.56 CR-1,j 0.28 105 
  
(0.9689) 
 
(0.0827) 
  CR+3,j = 11.0% + 0.07 CR-1,j 0.02 90 
    (0.0005)   (0.4275)     
 
This table reports results of several cross-sectional regressions.  We use cash flow 
performance variables reported in Table 8 as independent variables and run several cross-
sectional regressions of post-merger cash flow returns on sales for years 1, 2, and 3 on pre-
merger returns in year -1 for both sample (in Panel A) and control (in Panel B) firms.  Our 
intercept measures abnormal performance and captures post-merger performance influenced 
by economy-wide and industry factors.  P-values reported in parenthesis.  
is the post-merger (years 1 through 3) cash flow return on sales for 
bankrupt (i) and distressed (j) firms, and is the pre-merger (year -1) cash flow return 
on sales for bankrupt (i) and distressed (j) firms.  The slope coefficient β measures relationship 
between pre- and post-merger cash flow returns or the effect of the firm performance one year 
prior to acquisition on post-merger cash returns one, two, and three years following the 
acquisition. 
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Table 12 
Post-merger combined cumulative abnormal returns for bankrupt and distressed targets 
and their acquirers 
 
Post-merger mean cumulative abnormal returns for bankrupt and distressed firms 
Month 
periods 
All bankrupt firms 
(n=89) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired in 
Chapter 11 (n=63) 
Bankrupt firms 
acquired in the 
first year after 
emergence (n=26) 
All distressed 
firms (n=202) 
3 -1.18% -3.54%
b
 4.07% -0.45% 
6 -2.94% -5.91%
c
 3.80% 0.52% 
12 -6.26%
b
 -9.53%
b
 1.59% -1.64% 
a,b,c
 denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
This table reports combined mean cumulative abnormal returns for 3-, 6-, and 12-month post-
merger periods.  We utilize CRSP to gather market related data.  We determine combined 
post-merger returns for all bankrupt firms, for bankrupt firms that were acquired in Chapter 
11, for bankrupt firms that were acquired during the first year after emergence, and for 
distressed firms.  We compute the post-acquisition cumulative adjusted returns as a weighted 
sum of the returns for target and its acquirer.  In parenthesis, n is a number of firms for which 
market return data is available. 
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Table 13 
Post-merger abnormal stock market performance 
 
Panel A: Abnormal post-merger cumulative market returns for all bankrupt firms 
(heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+3,i = -1.7% + -0.09 CR-3,i 0.01 89 
  
(0.3611) 
 
(0.6532) 
  CR+6,i = -5.1% + -0.48 CR-3,i 0.05 89 
  
(0.1080) 
 
(0.0457) 
  CR+12,i = -10.8% + -0.96 CR-3,i 0.13 89 
  
(0.0071) 
 
(0.0806) 
  Panel B: Abnormal post-merger cumulative market returns for bankrupt firms acquired in 
Chapter 11 (heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+3,i = -5.1% + -0.08 CR-3,i 0.01 63 
  
(0.0224) 
 
(0.6767) 
  CR+6,i = -9.7% + -0.46 CR-3,i 0.06 63 
  
(0.0292) 
 
(0.0683) 
  CR+12,i = -16.9% + -0.97 CR-3,i 0.14 63 
    (0.0038)   (0.0932)     
Panel C: Abnormal post-merger cumulative market returns for bankrupt firms acquired in the 
first year after emergence (heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+3,i = 4.2% + -1.39 CR-3,i 0.08 26 
  
(0.1427) 
 
(0.0082) 
  CR+6,i = 2.6% + -3.17 CR-3,i 0.38 26 
  
(0.3238) 
 
(0.0106) 
  CR+12,i = 0.6% + -2.51 CR-3,i 0.30 26 
    (0.7882)   (0.0984)     
Panel D: Abnormal post-merger cumulative market returns for acquired distressed firms 
(heteroscedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses) 
     
Adj R
2
 N 
CR+3,j = -0.4% + -0.09 CR-3,j 0.01 202 
  
(0.4891) 
 
(0.1395) 
  CR+6,j = 0.5% + 0.28 CR-3,j 0.05 202 
  
(0.6138) 
 
(0.0449) 
  CR+12,j = -1.7% + 0.40 CR-3,j 0.02 202 
    (0.4228)   (0.0433)     
 
This table reports results of several cross-sectional regressions.  We use cumulative market 
adjusted returns as independent variables and run several cross-sectional regressions of post-
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merger cumulative abnormal returns for 3, 6, and 12 month periods on 3 month pre-merger 
returns for both sample (in Panels A, B, and C) and control (in Panel D) firms.  We utilize 
CRSP to gather market related data.  Panel A contains regression results for all bankrupt firms.  
Panel B includes results for bankrupt firms with acquisition announcements either before 
bankruptcy filings or while in Chapter 11.  Panel C includes results for bankrupt firms with 
acquisition announcements in the year following emergence.  Panel D contains regression 
results for all distressed firms.  Our intercept measures abnormal market performance and 
captures post-merger performance influenced by economy-wide and industry factors.  
Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values are reported in parenthesis.  is the 
post-merger (month 3, 6, and 12) market abnormal returns for bankrupt (i) and distressed (j) 
firms, and is the pre-merger (month -3) market abnormal returns for bankrupt (i) and 
distressed (j) firms.  The slope coefficient β measures relationship between pre- and post-
merger cumulative abnormal returns or the effect of the firm market performance three months 
prior to acquisition on post-merger abnormal market returns three, six, and twelve months 
following the acquisition. 
 
